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Hydric Life: A Nietzschean Reading of Postcolonial Communication 
 
Elena F. Ruiz-Aho 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This dissertation addresses the question of marginalization in cross-cultural 
communication from the perspectives of hermeneutic philosophy and postcolonial theory. 
Specifically, it focuses on European colonialism‘s effect on language and communicative 
practices in Latin America. I argue colonialism creates a deeply sedimented but 
unacknowledged background of inherited cultural prejudices against which social and 
political problems of oppression, violence and marginalization, especially towards 
women, emerge—but whose roots in colonial and imperial frameworks have lost 
transparency. This makes it especially difficult for postcolonial subjects to meaningfully 
express their own experiences of psychic dislocation and fragmentation because the 
discursive background used to communicate these experiences is made up of multiple, 
sometimes conflicting traditions. To address this problem, I turn to a strategic use of 
Nietzsche‘s conceptions of subjectivity and language as metaphor to engage the unique 
difficulties that arise in giving voice to the subaltern experience. Thus, I argue that while 
colonialism introduces an added layer of complexity to philosophical discussions of 
language, the concrete particularities and political emergencies of Latin American history 
necessitate an account of language that can speak to these concrete particularities. To this 
vii 
 
end, I develop a conception of, what I call, ―hydric life,‖ a postcolonial feminist 
hermeneutics that better accommodates these cultural specificities.  
1 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the postcolonial world, the inability to speak and be heard across group and 
social differences can come at a ruinous cost, especially for women and indigenous 
peoples who, historically, have been disproportionately affected by social and political 
violence due to intersectional oppressions like race, class, sex, gender, migratory or legal 
status and ethnicity. In situations where, in order to relay social urgencies or negotiate 
material interests (either on their own behalf, that of their family, or marginalized 
communities), postcolonial subjects are compelled to initiate dialogue with members of 
dominantly-positioned cultures (as in Anglo/European) in order to survive, what may be 
lost in the course of intercultural dialogue is far more than a mere failure to reach 
agreement or mutual understanding. For marginalized subjects, whole families may be 
forcibly, irrevocably separated, confiscated indigenous lands razed rather than returned, 
mothers of ‗disappeared‘ children left without a body to bury, public life pervaded by 
impunity, graft, coercion and continued violence against minority groups. It may result, 
for example, in an apology from President Bill Clinton for U.S. support of a former Latin 
American dictatorship 30 years earlier, when indigenous groups attempted to 
communicate Guatemalan president Carlos Arana Osorio‘s threats to their communities, 
which stated, in his words, that ―if it is necessary to turn the country into a cemetery in 
order to pacify it, I will not hesitate to do so‖ (1971). For the quarter of a million Mayan 
Indians that died as a result of this campaign of violence, this was a ‗ruinous cost‘.  
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And yet these social and political issues surrounding intercultural dialogue have 
not been lost on social theorists. In the mid twentieth-century, following the practical and 
moral failures to, as Paul Ricoeur put it, ―listen to the plea from the other side‖ in 
holocaust Europe (2004, 389), particular focus fell on how to go about securing the 
conditions underlying basic processes of communication deemed necessary for equitable 
dialogue, as well as on the need to theorize discursive processes ―immune to repression 
and inequality‖ (Habermas 2001, 88). ―Discourse ethics,‖ (or ―communicative ethics‖) as 
it came to be known, was founded on this ―dialectical double apriori‖ to both posit an 
ideal form of discourse immune from coercion while also pursuing independent legal, 
institutional, and ‗system-related‘ reforms in culture that would create the necessary 
―conditions of application for the basic procedural norms‖ of such an ethic, and which, as 
post-holocaust Europe all-too-well discovered, ―are not, or not yet, given in the world in 
which we live‖ (Apel 2001, 90; 2000).  
For Latin American philosophers like Enrique Dussel, this multi-tiered approach 
to discourse ethics fails to do justice to the concrete historical realities facing seventy-five 
percent of the world‘s population currently living in the third or fourth world, or in what 
is sometimes referred to as the ―global South‖ (1994, 80).1 
 For these populations, the cost of first securing the social and political 
‗conditions of application‘ necessary for the procedural safeguards of communicative 
ethics to take effect in North-South dialogue—and which rely on a mutual extension of 
respect and ―good will‖ on the part of all speakers— simply comes at too high a price. 
The problem today is that, despite a teeming abundance of ‗good will‘ on the part of 
marginalized and subaltern subjects to communicate, their communicative efforts 
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continue to be neglected due to social, structural, and historical oppressions.  But while 
philosophers like Dussel have attempted to remedy this situation by grounding discourse 
ethics on religious-ethical (in his case, Levinasian) imperatives, my approach is different. 
It centers on, what I see as, the pressing need to more robustly theorize the historical 
impact of colonialism on postcolonial and subaltern communicative practices. One clue 
to this need arises when we consider the central principle of discourse ethics to 
―transcend all local convention‖ based on a transcendental-pragmatic model of 
communication that emphasizes ―the intuitive preunderstanding that every subject 
competent in speech and action brings to a process of argumentation‖  (Habermas 2001, 
90, 105). My aim is to show that, in the postcolonial world, what it means to have an 
―intuitive preunderstanding‖ of any social practice is at issue due to the violent impact of 
European colonization.   
For these reasons, in this dissertation I try to understand and give an account, 
from a philosophical perspective, of the historical conditions which have impacted and 
continue to impact the lives of those dispossessed by European colonialism, particularly 
with regard to women in Latin America, the Caribbean, and along the U.S.-Mexico 
border. One way of doing this is by analyzing the effects of colonialism on native 
Mesoamerican conceptual frameworks, effects which, by virtue of the forceful imposition 
of foreign categories of knowledge onto Amerindian landscapes, have had a profound 
impact on the speaking positions of modern Latin Americans, especially through the 
active colonization of native languages. This violent imposition of European norms and 
practices ensured that, in the postcolonial world, light did not ‗dawn gradually over the 
whole‘, to reverse Wittgenstein‘s metaphor. That is to say, for Wittgenstein, ―when we 
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first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole 
system of propositions,‖ (2006, 235) which, in the case of Amerindian culture, was 
shattered and supplanted by a radically different contextual system, enforced, in turn, by 
new linguistic conventions such as subject-predicate grammar and modern alphabetic 
literacy.  
And yet, while this historical impact has been profound, it is rarely acknowledged 
as a powerful force in our day-to-day public dealings and interactions. This is especially 
true at the level of dialogue and discussion-based politics in Latin America, where the 
existence of democratic public processes and institutions (in certain regions) make it 
appear as if structural checks are in place that would allow claimants, regardless of 
ethnic, racial, or sexual differences, to address grievances with confidence that they will 
indeed be heard. Feminist communication theory has been particularly helpful in this 
regard for outlining the ways in which democratic dialogue and deliberative models of 
decision-making can work to exclude certain groups by relying on particular conceptions 
of language as neutral and value-free (Young 1999, 2000; Rakow 2004). Because, by and 
large, these theories also do no account for the differences enacted by colonial imposition 
of one culturally proscribed, discursive framework over another, one way to understand 
my project is as an extension of postcolonial perspectives to feminist communication 
theory. Thus, it might be surprising that I do not directly engage deliberate democratic 
models or feminist critiques thereof in this work.
2
 This is not on account of an oversight, 
but because I have chosen an altogether different strategy for addressing questions of 
marginalization in cross-cultural communication.  
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 Methodologically, I draw on a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives 
including postcolonial theory, Continental and postcolonial feminisms, and hermeneutic 
philosophy. Hermeneutic philosophy serves as a foreground for much of this project 
because it offers the historical and contextual view of language and meaning-formation 
that is crucial for my analysis of the cultural impact of colonization on Amerindian 
languages. To rely on the hermeneutic view of language, then, is to take as a starting 
point the centrality of language in shaping human understanding. To this end, it is 
important to acknowledge the mainstream Anglophone view of language that I am critical 
of in this project. Specifically, it is the conception of language that was inspired by 
Cartesian and empiricist epistemologies and popularized by the legacies of analytic 
philosophers like A. J. Ayer, Bertrand Russell, (even J. L. Austin) and the linguist Noam 
Chomsky, who regard language largely as a rule-governed system that is capable of 
securing an accurate relationship of correspondence between the contents of the speaker‘s 
mind (‗inner‘) and the external referent (‗outer‘) to which he or she refers.  Philosophy of 
language, on this view, becomes the formalized study of the various dimensions of the 
mind as well as the logical analysis of propositions and semantic content.  By way of 
hermeneutic criticisms, I argue that this ahistorical conception of language fails to 
acknowledge the thick background of historical and cultural meanings that are already 
familiar, already shaping and guiding our speech acts, determining in advance why one 
values certain epistemological, socio-political, and ethical paradigms and concepts in the 
first place. This is particularly important for the purposes of my project because these de-
contextualized, subject-object views of language were fundamental in the colonization of 
native Amerindian languages, and can be evinced from conquest-era ethnographic 
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records and administrative manuals, such as Fray Diego de Valadez‘s monumental 
Rhetorica Christiana (1579).  
 
Given this methodological overview of my project, I begin chapter one with an 
analysis of the hermeneutic view of language developed by Martin Heidegger, Hans-
Georg Gadamer and Charles Taylor because these thinkers recognize that prior to the 
reflective, inner/outer distinctions of mainstream representational views of language, 
human beings are already tacitly involved in a socio-historical tradition, a shared 
historical background that gives value and meaning to everyday acts and practices, and 
that we embody these cultural meanings pre-reflectively.  One of the problems 
traditionally associated with this view, however, is that if one is always inextricably 
‗situated‘ in a particular historical understanding, the question arises as to how social 
actors marginalized within that particular tradition can ever adopt an objective, 
independent standpoint from which to genuinely challenge the oppressive, perhaps racist, 
or sexist tendencies that are endemic to that tradition. To address this problem, I offer an 
overview of Jürgen Habermas‘s critique of Gadamer, outlining the various ways in 
which, from Habermas‘s perspective, the limitations of the hermeneutic situation might 
be overcome for social and political theorists. Following my own commitments to a 
plural feminist politics that can attend to the concrete urgencies and specificities of social 
life without abandoning the irreducible imprint of history in shaping those urgencies, I 
then turn to the applied, hermeneutic feminism of Georgia Warnke, who draws on points 
of contact between Habermas and Gadamer. Warnke offers a broader and more pluralistic 
interpretative position that is attentive to the diverse, heterogeneous experiences of 
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marginalized social groups and actors in culture, specifically with regard to women.  I 
conclude this chapter by suggesting that, although Warnke succeeds in broadening the 
hermeneutic horizon to more accurately account for the experiences of women, Warnke 
is, as a hermeneuticist, unable to address the uniquely embodied concerns of the 
postcolonial gendered subject whose meaningful historical background has been forcibly 
shattered by colonialism. 
                 
In chapter two, using a feminist approach, I turn to the question of producing 
theoretical frameworks that do justice to the complexity of lived experience for 
postcolonial and subaltern subjects. In this regard, I show how the rupture of the 
background of meaning for the postcolonial subject adds a layer of intricacy that neither 
traditional hermeneutic philosophy nor Warnke‘s own hermeneutic feminism can account 
for. This is due to the unique effect colonialism has had on native Amerindian languages, 
including the very interpretive possibilities made available in culture. To this end, by 
drawing on postcolonial theory, I show how the introduction of the Western alphabet and 
subject-predicate grammar as well as the assumptions of exclusionary logic (i.e. the laws 
of identity and non-contradiction), interiorization, and narrative linearity have resulted in 
a unique kind of violence to the discursive practices of native Mesoamerican 
communities. The consequences for the modern, marginalized postcolonial subject are, in 
my view, twofold. First, the trauma and confusion caused by inhabiting a horizon of 
disjointed and fragmented meanings has resulted in a complex, multiplicitous experience 
of selfhood that, as Gloria Anzuldúa describes, is always caught ‗in-between‘ worlds and 
produces a state of ―psychic restlessness‖ that makes negotiating between these multiple 
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meanings and cultural norms a complicated affair (1987, 78). Second, the breakdown of a 
prior cultural context means that this postcolonial, multiplicitous subject must bear the 
added burden of negotiating interests through conceptual paradigms and norms one is not 
totally at home with. I go on to argue that because the hermeneutic view of language is 
largely focused on the conditions for worldly meaning that is, for the most part, cohesive, 
stable and unified, it tends to overlook particular experiences of psychic confusion and 
dislocation when an indigenous horizon of meaning has been shattered or destroyed by 
means of colonialism.   
 
Chapter three addresses this phenomenon of ruptured meaning by turning to the 
philosophies of language in Mikhail Bakhtin and Julia Kristeva.  Again, I argue that 
while the hermeneutic view of language emphasizes the stability and continuity of 
meaning—thereby addressing the problem of cultural differences by means of some 
shared agreement or, what Gadamer calls, a ―fusion‖ of interpretative horizons—what is 
often neglected is how this smooth continuity of meaning is frequently shattered in the 
postcolonial subject‘s everyday life. On this account, Kristeva offers a theory of language 
where meaning is continually ruptured by what Kristeva calls ―the semiotic,‖ that is, by 
pre-predicative bodily drives and desires that reveal a self that is never unified and 
cohesive but fundamentally ―in process/on trial [en procès]‖ and multiplicitous.  By 
outlining Kristeva‘s central distinction between the ‗semiotic‘ and the ‗symbolic‘, 
illustrating her often overlooked intellectual indebtedness to Bakhtin, and exploring her 
psychoanalytic connection to Freud and Lacan, I try to show how the hermeneutic notion 
of dialogic understanding between different cultural frameworks can be problematized if 
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the Other‘s self-understanding is already polyphonic and unstable.  I show how, on 
Kristeva‘s account, the semiotic invests language with the full complexity and dynamism 
of the material body, revealing a realm of incarnate meaning that cannot be captured in 
the symbolic realm, in language or in signification.  I conclude this chapter by suggesting 
that, while helpful for postcolonial theory in decalcifying the notion of a unified subject 
and introducing alterity to notions of selfhood (as in ‗the stranger within‘), Kristeva is 
still too indebted to European intellectual culture, specifically the theoretical assumptions 
of psychoanalysis and Western notions of subject-predicate grammar that she inherits 
from her encounters with French structuralism. Thus, she is largely unable to see how the 
phenomena of literacy, Eurocentric interpretations of psychic development, and even the 
alphabet might be experienced as sources of historical oppression.   
 
In chapter four, I attempt to overcome the theoretical prejudices associated with 
Kristeva‘s developmental model while retaining her attentiveness to issues of 
marginality, multiplicitous subjectivity, and embodied alterity by turning to Friedrich 
Nietzsche‘s philosophy of language.  By engaging the influence of Nietzsche on Latin 
American philosophy in general (and how his views on language can resonate with the 
works of important Latina writers such as Mariana Ortega and Gloria Anzaldúa), I 
suggest that, when brought into theoretical interaction with postcolonial theory, certain 
aspects of Nietzsche‘s thought are uniquely suited to address the lived-experience of the 
postcolonial subject.  I begin by distinguishing between three accounts of language that 
Nietzsche gave throughout his career.  The first account is a critique of the 
representational (inner/outer) view of language that the philosophical tradition inherited 
10 
 
from the metaphysics of Plato and Descartes. The second account is a hermeneutic view, 
where language is understood as a background of socio-historical meanings that the 
speaking subject is always inextricably bound to.  The third, and most important view for 
my purposes is the account of language as an embodied and pre-conscious metaphorical 
activity.  I want to suggest that this last account—which integrates the hermeneutic view 
without neglecting the importance of the pre-linguistic, corporeal body—is crucial in 
providing a theoretical framework that recognizes the fractured, contradictory, and 
multiplicitous aspects of postcolonial life while at the same time holding these divergent 
and ambiguous aspects together in a meaningful way so that the notion of selfhood can 
still be applied. By stressing the interdependence between the contradictory and complex 
drives and affects of the physical body on the one hand, and the socio-historical 
background that gives meaning to these drives and affects on the other, Nietzsche opens a 
discursive space for a self that is both multiplicitous and unified, fragmented and held 
together. Language is metaphorical activity in this regard because it always begins with 
the dark and unintelligible drives of one‘s own material body, and these drives are, like 
those of the postcolonial subject, translated and made intelligible by a horizon of meaning 
that is not one‘s own.       
Thus, taking a cue from Nietzsche (but also moving beyond his project), the 
notion of selfhood as continually splintered by experiences of narrative discontinuity (due 
to inhabiting multiple and conflicting contexts of cultural reference) yet held together by 
a hermeneutic background that allows one to strategically participate in meaning-
formation, even in the language of one‘s own oppressors, is what I call ―Hydric life‖.  
Thinking of postcolonial life for historically marginalized subjects as ―hydric‖, on my 
11 
 
view, allows for a positive re-description of an otherwise alienating and confusing 
phenomenon that can further marginalize social groups and actors already at the limen of 
discursive spaces.
3
 It can also concretize and give legitimacy to contradictory experiences 
that, in the absence of a generally cohesive, social backdrop (or what Charles Taylor calls 
a ―home understanding‖) with which to articulate and voice such experiences, are 
deemed invalid or not acknowledged as real.
4 
                   
A word now on terminology. As the reader will find, I often make use of the term 
‗postcolonial subject‘ to denote social groups and actors marginalized on the basis of 
multiple oppressions like race, class, caste, gender and ethnicity in the colonized world.
5 
 Although my use of the term applies to the Latin American context, it is analogous to 
Ranajit Guha‘s term ―subaltern‖ as a ―a name for the general attribute of subordination in 
South Asian society, whether this is expressed in terms of class, caste, age, gender and 
office or in another way‖ (1988, 35). I recognize, of course, that different configurations 
of intersectional oppressions can result in significantly different levels of marginalization 
on the part of individuals (an indigenous K‘iche‘ Mayan woman, for example, is very 
different from a Latina academic living in the United States, yet they are both 
‗postcolonials‘ in the sense I describe), and that social groups are marked by internal 
differences as well. One important difference is that for Guha and other Indian 
historiographers like Spivak, the term subaltern (originally borrowed from Gramsci‘s 
Prison Notebooks from 1929-35) specifically addresses the question of agency in relation 
to contemporary norms and culture. That is to say, subaltern peoples are those who have 
been historically excluded from access to representation in the dominant cultural 
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paradigm, as well as from the very instruments of writing history (such as literacy and 
writing). It is on account of this exclusion that subaltern subjects are ‗muted‘ or cannot 
speak in terms legitimated by the dominant culture. By contrast, a Latina academic, 
whether in Latin America or abroad, cannot be said to be subaltern because she has 
access to what Michel de Certeau calls the ―instruments of history‖ (1988, 70).  For this 
reason, I sometimes qualify the term ―postcolonial subject‖ with ―subaltern‖ to mark the 
difference in subjects I refer to. Although I specifically attend to the experiences of non-
indigenous postcolonial subjects, such as U.S. third-world feminists living in the United 
States, generally speaking, my main focus remains on those most affected, historically, 
by colonial imposition, such as indigenous Amerindian women.  
 
Next, because I sometimes use the term ‗language‘ interchangeably for spoken 
language when addressing issues of communication, there at times remains some 
ambiguity as to the view on language I rely on for my arguments against the Imperial 
project in the Americas. In this sense, a practical differentiation of terms using capitals 
(as in ―Language‖ to denote the hermeneutic view of language, and ―language‖ to refer to 
speech or verbal utterances) might have been helpful but would have introduced its own 
difficulties into the mix. Thus, for the record, I understand speech communication to be 
just one facet, one ‗realization‘—albeit a very important one— of language in the wider, 
hermeneutic sense of an expressive background that gives shape and meaning to all our 
social practices, including, but not limited to speech and verbal utterances. Writing, 
weaving, speaking, painting, dancing, poetry, bodily gestures, and the like are all, on this 
latter view, examples of language.  This is important to stress, both methodologically and 
13 
 
conceptually because, as I point out in chapter two, the view of language fifteenth century 
European missionaries, ethnographers, and conquistadores relied on was the one inspired 
by Cartesian and Empirical epistemologies, and which I critique in chapter one.  Finally, 
with regard to translations of referenced material, unless otherwise noted, all translations 
from Spanish and French into English are my own.  
 
In closing, I‘d like to once again restate my commitments to the concrete 
particularities of social life— making this a thesis, not in hermeneutic, but in social-
political, or social philosophy. It seems to me that, more than a decade after Ofelia 
Schutte aptly drew attention to ―the levels of prejudice affecting the basic processes of 
communication between Anglo-American and Latina speakers, as well as the difficulties 
experienced by many Latin American immigrants to the United States,‖ these concerns 
have not waned but only intensified (1998, 47).  Today, with the recent passing of some 
of the most stringent anti-immigrant legislation in Arizona‘s Senate Bill 1070 and the 
heightening of armed violence along the U.S.-Mexico border, ―the question of how to 
communicate with ‗the other‘ who is culturally different from oneself remains one of the 
greatest challenges facing North-South relations and interaction‖ (ibid). Thus, the project 
of pluralizing intercultural discourse ethics to account for the multiplicitous experiences 
of postcolonial subjects carries great salience today.  This dissertation is just one step 
towards this goal.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
Continental Views of Language: from Cartesian Linguistics to Hermeneutic Feminism 
 
 
Continental views of language can be understood broadly as those that arose in 
the European continent during key shifts in philosophic discourse in the late eighteenth 
century—as manifested in the traditions of German Idealism and Romanticism, and, in 
the early nineteenth century, hermeneutic thought.
6 They are historically responsive to the 
model of language that developed in conjunction with modern science and which came to 
occupy a privileged position in the ‗natural sciences‘ (Naturwissenschaften) from the 
nineteenth century onwards.  
Following the successes of the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century and 
the rise of specialist research culture that accompanied this revolution, the explanatory 
power of philosophy and the other ‗human sciences‘ (Geisteswissenschaften) began to 
lose the dominant status they once held in the classical period and later, in Renaissance 
humanist thought. Responding to this intellectual shift, Continental views of language 
specifically critique the empirical, formalized study of natural languages as a way of 
explaining how language figures into human understanding. This latter view, which came 
to prominence in the nineteenth century through modern linguistics and semantic theory, 
saw language as a rule-governed system capable of securing correct judgment about the 
mind‘s ideas through the logical study of propositions (as in the logical positivism of the 
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Vienna Circle) and semantic content. It stressed the synchronic, rational classification of 
linguistic categories as a way to clarify the nature of the medium through which thought 
was expressed. The demystification of language thus became a subordinate project to the 
demystification of the mind. This tradition, which is entwined with the legacies of 
rationalist and empiricist epistemologies, shaped the trajectory of thinkers like A.J. Ayer, 
Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, J.L. Austin, Rudolf Carnap and Noam Chomsky.   
 
In Cartesian Linguistics (1966), Chomsky traces the development of nineteenth 
century semantics back to the Cartesian-inspired work of Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) 
and other seventeenth-century ―Port-Royal grammarians‖ who, like Descartes, believed 
language was a reflection of thought (31). He writes:  
Pursuing the fundamental distinction between body and mind, Cartesian 
linguistics characteristically assumes that language has two aspects. In particular, 
one may study a linguistic sign from the point of view of the sounds that 
constitute it and the characters that represent these signs or from the point of view 
of their ‗signification,‘ that is, ‗la manière dont les homes s‘en servent pour 
signifier leurs pensées (Arnauld, Grammaire générale et raisonnée, p.5)…In 
short, language has an inner and an outer aspect. A sentence can be studied from 
the point of view of how it expresses a thought or from the point of view of its 
physical shape, that is, from the point of view of either semantic interpretation or 
phonetic interpretation (32-33).
7
  
 
 
The meaning of a sentence on this account has very little to do with what is said in 
conversation—with its expressive content in relation to a human life-world. The principal 
concern is rather with the logical operations that make its technical formulation—with 
―how it expresses a thought‖—possible in the first place. As Hans-Georg Gadamer 
observes, ―the linguist does not want to enter into the discussion of the topic which is 
spoken of in the text; rather, he wants to shed light upon the functioning of language as 
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such, whatever the text may say‖ (1986, 389).8 Under the linguist‘s framework, language 
retains its character as a mere ―instrument of free thought and self-expression‖ for the 
autonomous individual and promotes the common notion that ―language provides finite 
means but infinite possibilities of expression constrained only by rules of concept 
formation and sentence formation‖(Chomsky, 29, my emphasis).9 While the rules of 
sentence formation may be idiosyncratic or arbitrary to a particular time and place, the 
capacity for language learning and of the ―universal conditions that prescribe the form of 
any human language‖ are not—they are, for Chomsky as for many Anglophone 
philosophers of language that follow in this tradition, ―reflected in certain fundamental 
properties of the mind‖ (59).10 
 
This is not what Wilhelm Dilthey, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Paul 
Ricoeur, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and other thinkers associated with the Continental 
tradition think language is. In fact, for Gadamer, ―in opposition to this view of the 
linguist, that which makes understanding possible is precisely the forgetfulness of 
language‖ in our everyday worldly involvements (1986, 391). In saying this, Gadamer 
does not mean that language does not play a role in shaping human understanding—of 
our sense of our world and our place in it— but just the opposite. It means that language 
already envelops and inhabits our lives in a more basic, pre-linguistic sense and that our 
ability to use it pre-reflectively (i.e., without having to stop and think about it)—our 
‗forgetfulness‘ of it, so to speak—is indicative of this primordial role. But when we 
conceive of language itself as the precondition for human understanding—and not in 
terms nonlinguistic mind-dependent states or biological processes— we realize that 
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language cannot then be a private affair, and that its nature must draw instead from a 
publicly shared context to achieve its collective referential power. This context is culture 
itself, understood in terms of a shared historical tradition. However, the suggestion here is 
not that culture is necessarily anterior to the individual (although ‗culture‘ and 
‗individual‘ are already modern categories of analysis), but that the two are, at some very 
fundamental level, dialogically bound up and intertwined. As Charles Guignon explains, 
―words and world are seen as interwoven in such a way that to enter into one is 
simultaneously to master the other. In Wittgenstein‘s metaphor, ‗light dawns gradually 
over the whole.‘ Here there is no way to identify a nonsemantic field of meaning which 
can be grasped independently of the language that serves to constitute it‖ (1983, 118).  
 
Language, on the Continental view, is therefore a much more complex (non-
axiomatizable) human affair that weaves together the various modalities of human 
experience and practice in a way that is constitutive of, rather than being constituted by, 
thought. We find this position, for example, in Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling‘s 1842 
assertion that ―without language we would be unable to conceive not only of a 
philosophical consciousness but of a human consciousness in general,‖ such that ―the 
origin of language cannot be derived from consciousness‖ as the empiricist traditions of 
John Locke (1632-1704) and Étienne Condillac (1715-1780)—which also see thoughts as 
anterior to their expression in language— suppose (qtd. in Emden, 39).  This issue can be 
better understood by looking at Charles Taylor‘s seminal distinction between, what he 
calls, ―designative‖ and ―expressivist‖ views of language. 
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 I. Taylor on Designative and Expressivist Views of Language 
 
 In his essays, ―Language and Human Nature‖ (1985) and ―An Issue about 
Language‖ (2006) Charles Taylor tells the story of the origin of language according to 
Condillac in order to contrast its features with, what I have been calling, the Continental 
view, which he terms the ―constitutive‖ or  ―expressive‖ view of language. According to 
Taylor, Condillac 
offers a fable, a ‗just so‘ story to illustrate how language might have arisen. It is a 
fable of two children in a desert. We assume certain cries and gestures as natural 
expressions of feeling. These are what Condillac calls ‗natural signs‘. By contrast, 
language uses ‗instituted signs‘. Condillac‘s story is meant to explain how the 
second emerged out of the first. He argues that each child, seeing the other, say, 
cry out in distress, would come to see the cry as a sign of something (e.g. what 
causes distress). He would then be able to take the step of using the sign to refer 
to the cause of distress. The first sign would have been instituted. The children 
would have their first word. Language would be born (1985a, 233).  
 
Following Johann Gottfried Herder‘s (1744-1803) critique of Condillac in Über den 
Ursprung der Sprache (1772), Taylor suggests Condillac‘s fable presupposes the very 
thing it‘s meant to explain: language—specifically, ―the passage from a condition in 
which the children emit just animal cries to the stage where they use words with 
meaning‖ (2006, 17). What makes words meaningful—how it is that words or gestures 
say something in the first place—is what Taylor wants to explain. In Condillac‘s story a 
specific, pre-linguistic association between words, saying, and reason seems to already be 
present in the child‘s cry of distress (i.e., between a sign and some mental content). For 
Taylor,  ―this is the classic case of an enframing theory. Language is understood in terms 
of certain elements: ideas, signs, and their association, [and where] the mind is in 
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control‖ (ibid).  
By ‗enframing‘ theory, Taylor is referring to the compartmentalization of 
language when viewed as an inert tool or medium for the expression of ideas. This view, 
echoed in Chomsky‘s description of language as providing ‗infinite‘ possibilities through 
‗finite‘ means (i.e., finite syntax in infinite combinatorial form), portrays language as an 
―assemblage of separable instruments, which lie as it were transparently to hand, and 
which can be used to marshal ideas, this use being something we can fully control and 
oversee‖ (1985a, 231). An ‗enframing‘ theory of language thus posits the autonomous 
individual (a cogito) as the subject-of-language and gives meaning to words by looking to 
the semantic correlations between words and things. Because, on this view, words ‗say‘ 
something by virtue of the things they point to or designate, Taylor also uses the term 
‗designative theory‘ to describe this account of meaning: ―designative theories, those 
which make designations fundamental…account for meaning by correlating signs to bits 
of the world, and these can in principle be identified objectively‖ (220-21).  
For example, under a designative theory of language, the statement ―the book is 
on the table‖ gains meaning though its referential relation to a specified object, in this 
case a ‗book‘, and is governed principally by truth conditions that would allow one to 
verify the relations expressed in it (i.e., that it is indeed on the table). What is left out of 
this account, for Taylor, is the ways in which the statement, ―in a wider sense, might be 
said to express my anxiety, if there is something particularly fateful about the book‘s 
being on the table, or perhaps my relief, if the book were lost‖ (219).  For expression to 
take shape in this wider sense, books have to already have a particular kind of 
significance for us that is not arbitrary or shaped by mere cultural conventions of word 
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use, the kind of which we find articulated in Ferdinand de Saussure‘s (1857-1913) 
Course in General Linguistics (1906-11).  
For Saussure,  ―the language we use is a convention, and it makes no difference 
what exactly the nature of the agreed sign is‖ by a speech community so long as a 
collective agreement to use, for instance, ―arbor‖ (in Latin) or ―Baum‖ (in German) for 
the mental word-picture ‗tree,‘ exists (239). In either case, both words supposedly refer 
back to the same psychological representation of sensory impressions, such that a 
linguistic sign becomes a link between this impression and the concept ‗tree‘. Saussure 
can thus claim that ―the linguistic sign is arbitrary‖ because what holds the possibility of 
intersubjective agreement in place are not words themselves, but the fact that word-signs 
correspond to ―realities localized in the brain‖ that are universally shared under 
physicalist (i.e., materialist) doctrines (297).  
 
 Saussure offers an intriguing example. A child growing up in a particular 
―speech-community‖ or culture, in this case a Chinese child, learns language as one 
would learn a series of rules that ―are quite separate‖ and detached from speech, but 
which, taken together, gradually teach a child to play a game or (with respect to speech 
communication) understand the vocal sounds he hears (ibid). The child then understands 
the social cues or signs for ‗politeness‘ in his culture on these isolated, aggregative terms; 
expressions of politeness, such as ―prostrating oneself nine times on the ground [as] the 
way to greet an emperor in China‖ are seen by Saussure as ―fixed by a rule‖ and  ―it is 
this rule which renders them obligatory‖ to the child rather than the sense in which 
‗politeness‘ is already bound up within an elaborate network of other social and historical 
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understandings in Chinese culture—understandings which cannot be made fully 
transparent insofar as they are what sustain the meaningfulness of the expression itself 
(302).  
It is this latter, wider sense of understanding language as an intricately braided, 
socio-historical ―web‖ (Gewebe) of meaning that Taylor thinks gives weight and import, 
in the fullest sense of these terms, not just to statements like ‗the book is on the table,‘ but 
to all human expression in general—to acts, practices, and other ―symbolic-expressive 
creations of man: poetry, music, art, dance, etc‖ (1985a, 233). Under designative theories, 
the expressive dimension of poems, songs, and works of art are particularly problematic 
and are often bracketed out as non-literal deviations from everyday propositional speech 
acts. For example, Angelus Silesius‘ poetic saying, ―the rose is without why; it blooms 
because it blooms‖ could only, under this view, be interpreted in terms of its semantic 
content, content which does not fully make manifest the robustness and range of poetic 
expressiveness contained in the phrase (1909, 57). A sharp distinction is thus made 
between poetic and everyday, ordinary language, with the former being considered 
derivative or ‗parasitic‘ on the latter.11  
 
Taylor‘s view of language, which he calls the ―expressive‖ (1985a) [or 
―constitutive‖ (2006)], does not face such problems because it begins with the 
assumption that  ―language is not coincident, as it were, with that which is expressed in it, 
with that in which is formulated in words‖  (Gadamer 1976, 88). Instead, for Taylor, 
language constitutes ―a range of activities in which we express/realize a certain way of 
being in the world‖ and ―in virtue of which we are capable of the human emotions‖— 
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that is, ―of standing in specifically human relations to each other‖ (1985a, 235). It cannot, 
therefore, be a mere repository of words (as signs or indexicals) that we subsequently 
attach meaning to and formalize in dictionaries.  For instance, a dictionary, as Heidegger 
cautions, ―has plenty of terms‖ but ―not a single word‖ precisely ―because a dictionary 
can neither grasp nor keep the word by which the terms become words and speak as 
words‖ (1971, 87, my emphasis). This ―apophantic‖ activity by virtue of which we pick 
things out as this or that, requires a background of meanings, a shared historical context 
that give breadth and significance to all human acts and practices—from propositional 
statements and poetic expressions to bodily gestures like ‗swaggers‘ or ‗timidity‘. As 
Chris Lawn explains,  
the expressive power of language is made explicit when we become aware of the 
full range of activities accompanying articulations. The situation, intentions, 
unwitting meanings of speakers within the full range of possibilities (tone of 
voice, modulation, gesture, etc), in short context, expressively contribute to 
meaning. An aspect of the expressive is the ‗constitutive‘. Against the thought 
that language represents the world it is possible to refer to a constitutive role 
(language doesn‘t represent the world, it constitutes it as the site of a human 
world or environment) (2004, 12). 
 
In order to fully understand and situate Taylor‘s constitutive view of language it is 
important to give an account of the hermeneutic thought that informs his view. In 
particular, we need to look at the accounts of language offered by the two central 
hermeneutic thinkers of the twentieth-century, Heidegger and Gadamer. 
 
 II. The Importance of Hermeneutic Philosophy: Heidegger and Gadamer 
 
In ―Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,‖ Heidegger, writes: ―we — mankind — 
are a conversation.  The being of men is founded in language.  But this becomes actual in 
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conversation‖ (2009, 301).   Gadamer, deeply shaped by Heidegger‘s notion of language, 
concurs in saying ―language has its true being only in conversation (Gespräch)‖ (1975, 
404, hereafter TM). What is meant here is that ―conversation is a process of coming to an 
understanding‖ about the ―subject matter‖ (die Sache)—what one says and talks about in 
conversation— that speakers relate to by means of a shared language which is understood 
as a discursive background of meaning (TM, 387). Rather than a willful act, conversation 
is something we undergo, ―fall into,‖ or ―become involved in‖ such that, as Gadamer 
suggests, ―the partners conversing are far less the leaders than the led‖ (385). The first 
thing to notice here is that this view of communication differs substantially from the 
conventional understanding of communication as the mechanistic to and fro of willful 
speech-acts deployed, through the use or ‗tool‘ of a natural language, by autonomous 
subjects or cogitos. In short, it thoroughly rejects the ‗designative‘ view of language.  
 
For Heidegger, the world is held together and made meaningful by the shared 
discursive acts and practices that human beings grow into. It is because human beings 
grow into a particular social situation embodied in public expressions, symbols, practices, 
and rituals that beings make sense to us. On Heidegger‘s account, therefore, meaning 
does not reside within a self-contained mind or consciousness, but rather in the world that 
we‘re ―always already‖ (immer schon) involved in during the course of our everyday 
lives. Being-in-the-world means to be already bound up, pre-reflectively, with everyday 
acts and practices. Language, then, understood as an intelligible background of public 
practices, creates a cultural opening or ―clearing‖ (Lichtung) that allows the meaning or 
significance of things to emerge. In The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger illustrates 
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this point by saying ―we never really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and 
noises in the appearance of things‖ but rather, what we hear is ―the storm whistling in the 
chimney,‖ ―the three-motored plane‖ or ―the difference between the engine roar of a 
Mercedes from a Volkswagen‖; in short, when ―we hear the door shut in the house‖ we 
hear just this—a door shutting, and ―never hear the acoustical sensations or even mere 
sounds‖ (152). Likewise, for Gadamer, to ‗hear‘ what the other says in spoken 
conversation is already to be familiar with what is said insofar as one does not hear a 
‗bare‘ vocal sound. Even to hear acoustical sensations as being produced by a larynx is to 
already perceive the sound in a meaningful way, i.e., as recognizably ‗human‘; thus, we 
see here how for both Heidegger and Gadamer, ―man‘s being-in-the-world is 
primordially linguistic‖ (TM, 440).  
Thus, on the hermeneutic view of language, to understand something is to already 
have interpreted it in a certain way so that things speak or have claims over us by virtue 
of the social contexts in which we are enmeshed: ―language,‖ says Gadamer, ―is the 
universal medium in which understanding occurs. Understanding occurs in interpreting‖ 
(390) and is in many ways synonymous with it. However, as Heidegger points out ―the 
understanding that arises in interpretation cannot at all be compared to what is elsewhere 
called understanding,‖ like objective knowledge in the social sciences or a ―knowing 
comportment‖ in the sense of ―intentionality‖ (1999, 12). This distinction is important 
because the kind of ―understanding‖ (Verstehen) that takes place in conversation rests on 
hermeneutical understanding, which, on this view, is more primordial than scientific 
―explanation‖ (Erklärung). Hermeneutic understanding is more primordial because 
scientific explanation is always grounded in a prior background of meaning that makes 
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scientific discourse possible to begin with. The scientist makes sense of her world 
through a ready-made framework of falsifiable causal links, regularities, and patterns in 
natural laws that she understands through her training as a scientist and by becoming a 
practitioner in the broader scientific tradition. It is only by virtue of this tradition that she 
can speak as a scientist. More importantly for our purposes, it is also by virtue of this that 
she can speak to other scientists. It is clear she already knows how to speak to the other 
scientist and how to answer them, for ―only the person who knows how to ask questions 
is able to persist in his questioning‖ in a fluid, seamless way, carrying a conversation 
along without awareness that one is having ‗a conversation‘ at all, much less with another 
scientist (TM, 360).    
The implications of this view are significant because the Cartesian assumption of 
an objective, Archimedean starting point which grounds the physical sciences can now be 
seen as just that—an assumption.12 We are alerted to the fact that scientific practices 
themselves require a tacit background or interpretive framework. Language or 
―discourse‖ (Rede), on this account, ―must have essentially a kind of being that is 
specifically worldly‖ (1962, 161). ―Being-in-the-world‖ therefore becomes articulated as 
the totality-of-significations that always ―carry meaning‖ in advance of any 
interpretation.  
Language, understood this way, is thus not something we stumble upon or 
‗discover‘. Rather, we come into it by ―living it‖ (TM, 386), by growing into it in the 
course of our everyday lives. On this account, ―to come into language does not mean that 
a second being is acquired‖ (470) separate from one‘s concrete being-in-the-world; in 
fact, when we undergo experiences of things we see that it is just the opposite — that, in 
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fact, ―the language that things have—whatever kind of things they may be—is not the 
logos ousias, and it is not fulfilled in the self-contemplation of an infinite intellect; it is 
the language that our finite, historical nature apprehends when we learn to speak‖ (471, 
emphasis added). We see that in conversation a common language is presupposed, where 
language is the ―in-between‖ (die Mitte), the ‗medium‘ which sustains the presence of a 
dwelling place where beings can emerge in a meaningful way. On this view, ―language is 
not just one of man‘s possession in the world; rather, on it depends the fact that man has a 
world at all‖ (440).13 
 
Having explicated the hermeneutic view of language, we are now in a position to 
return to Gadamer‘s initial claim that  ―conversation is a process of coming to an 
understanding‖ about the ―subject matter‖ (die Sache)—a dative process wherein 
speakers are far less ‗the leaders‘ than ‗the led‘ (387).  First, Gadamer‘s emphasis on 
‗subject matter,‘ or what the conversation is about, now emerges—not as an independent 
lexical referent in the conversation, as the designative view would hold—but rather as 
expressing or making manifest something already held in common.
14
  
Second, understanding what someone else is talking about depends on a prior 
sharing or fusion of horizons of meaning. ―This is what takes place in conversation,‖ 
Gadamer argues; it is a process we undergo ―in which something is expressed that is not 
only mine or my author‘s, but common‖ (390).  This ‗common‘ aspect is what is 
disclosable—what can show up or appear— within an already opened space or horizon of 
meaning.  
Third, through the spoken conversation, what unfolds in the ebb and flow of 
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dialogue is not a truth-claim ―under the rubric of rational ideas‖ (vernünftige Gedanken) 
of some sort (180). Rather, “what emerges in its truth is the logos, which is neither mine 
nor yours and hence so far transcends the interlocutors‘ subjective opinions that even the 
person leading the conversation knows that he does not know‖ (361). This means when 
we intelligibly and coherently relate to the subject matter, a shared language has already 
been established, recedes into the background, and tacitly supports the meaningful 
dimension of the conversation. We need only think of how one uses up words in spoken 
conversation: words are discarded or recede as soon as they are used since ―the word is a 
word only because of what comes into language in it,‖ which is to say that ―its own 
physical being exists only in order to disappear into what is said‖ (470). With this, all 
traces of the ‗instrumental,‘ ‗speech-act,‘ ‗objectifying,‘ or ‗designative‘ view of 
language should disappear from the notion of a hermeneutic conversation. We see that ―a 
hermeneutic conversation, like real conversation…coincides with the very act of 
understanding and reaching agreement‖ (389, emphasis added).15 
 
Because hermeneutical understanding ensures that the meaning of what is said or 
interpreted can never be closed off in advance (since there is no one ‗true‘ or objective 
standpoint from which to interpret meaning ‗correctly‘), to insist on our interpretations as 
the ‗only‘ possible ones is misguided. However, not every interpretation can resonate 
with the other speaker; Gadamer is quick to append his call to openness by adding, ―but 
this openness always includes our situating the other meaning in relation to the whole of 
our own meanings or ourselves in relation to it‖ (Ibid, emphasis added). For Gadamer, if 
the other person can always, in principle, be right, one should no longer be as concerned 
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with the rhetorical success of the moves made in conversation. This is, in fact, what leads 
to inauthentic or corruptive forms of conversation for Gadamer. When we are concerned 
with muscling our own opinions over and against the other speaker so that we may, from 
the beginning, win the argument, the conversation has been lost. In fact, in Gadamer‘s 
eyes, it never even began because the speakers were not open to really hearing what the 
other person was saying. Thus, dialogue ―requires that one does not try to argue the other 
person down but that one really considers the weight of the other‘s opinion‖ (361).  
While we can acknowledge the crucial significance of hermeneutic openness to 
the other for any genuine dialogue to occur, Gadamer‘s account neglects the important 
question of why the Western tradition has been motivated to impose universal standards 
and procedures for dialogue that, in turn, have made it difficult to ‗hear‘ those who reside 
at the margins of one‘s own familiar horizon of meaning. To this question, Richard 
Bernstein has an important reply.   
Bernstein characterizes this tendency as one motivated by ―Cartesian anxiety,‖ 
one that attempts to bring order, stability, and control over an otherwise chaotic and 
contingent world, and being exposed to a strange, foreign culture with a radically 
different horizon of meaning can remind us of this fundamental contingency. But if we 
follow fixed, rational procedures, this can ―culminate in the calm reassurance that 
although we are eminently fallible and subject to all sorts of contingencies, we can rest 
secure in the deepened self-knowledge that we are creatures of a beneficent God who has 
created us in his image‖ (1983, 17). We can think of Bernstein‘s concept as following 
Nietzsche‘s suspicion that  
mankind set up in language a separate world beside the other [lived]world, a place 
it took to be so firmly set that, standing upon it, it could lift the rest of the world 
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off its hinges and make himself master if it…he really thought that in language he 
possessed knowledge of the world…language is, in fact, the first stage of the 
occupation with science (HH I, 11).  
 
However, Cartesian Anxiety does not refer to a psychological state. As Bernstein 
explains:  
It would be a mistake to think that the Cartesian Anxiety is primarily religious, 
metaphysical, epistemological, or moral anxiety. These are only several of the 
many forms it may assume. In Heideggerian language, it is ‗ontological‘ rather 
than ‗ontic,‘ for it seems to lie at the very center of our being in the world. Our 
‗god terms‘ may vary and be very different from those of Descartes. We may 
even purge ourselves of the quest for certainty and indubitability. But at the heart 
of the objectivism‘s vision, and what makes sense of his or her passion, is the 
belief that there are or must be some fixed, permanent constraints to which we can 
appeal and which are secure and stable. At its most profound level the relativist‘s 
message is that there are no such basic constraints except those that we invent or 
temporally accept (23). 
 
With Bernstein‘s conception of Cartesian anxiety, the complicity between 
scientific objectivism (including the view of language that supports it) and the imperial 
project in the Americas begins to come into focus. Rooted in an ontological need for 
control and stability, Cartesian anxiety can be understood as informing the reification of 
subject-object relations, which invariably turn ‗the native‘ into an object to be 
manipulated and analyzed by the European ethnographer. However, as we will see in 
later chapters, the ability to encounter the native not as an object or thing to be exploited 
but as a way of being already nested in a rich and meaningful context of socio-historical 
and cultural relations seems to be much more viable on the hermeneutic view. 
With this overview of hermeneutic accounts of language in place, we get a clearer 
sense of the fundamental role that Heidegger and Gadamer play in Continental views of 
language and how these thinkers undermine a number of core assumptions in traditional 
Anglophone or designative views of language. It is important to note, however, that the 
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hermeneutic view is not without its critics within the Continental tradition, especially by 
those, like myself, who are concerned with social, political, and psychically violent 
implications of language for the postcolonial subject. We can now broaden our discussion 
by examining the central points of this socio-political critique by its principal architect, 
Jürgen Habermas.  
 
 III. Contemporary Debates: Gadamer and Habermas  
 
 Although Habermas does not take up a hermeneutic view of language— opting 
instead for ―the [truth-conditional] semantics founded by Frege and developed through 
the early Wittgenstein to Davidson and Dummett,‖ a view which ―gives center stage to 
the relation between sentence and state of affairs, between language and the world‖16 
 (1984, 276)—nonetheless, as David Hoy suggests,  
Habermas can be placed within the framework of hermeneutics because he 
acknowledges as a direct influence on his own theory the primacy given to 
understanding by the hermeneutical tradition from Dilthey to Heidegger and 
Gadamer. His own thesis is that ―reaching understanding is the inherent telos of 
human speech‖ (1995, 127). 
 
Indeed, it is easy to see why, with statements such as, ―every process of reaching 
understanding takes place against the background of a culturally ingrained 
preunderstanding‖ (1984, 100), Habermas‘ debt to the hermeneutic tradition is clear.  
Beyond this, Habermas can also be placed within the hermeneutic framework insofar as, 
in offering an account of how understanding between individuals in culture is reached, he 
rejects the foundational Cartesian subject in favor of a more dialogically inspired ―model 
of the attitude of participants in communication,‖ a model based on ―collective like-
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mindedness [Gleichgestimmtheit]‖ rather than the monadic product of individual 
cognition (1984, 287).  
It is important to note that although Habermas privileges an intersubjective model 
of ‗communicative rationality‘ based on the normative standards and expectations of 
lived, social contexts, as a composite feature of this rationality, he still retains the 
traditional model of the intentional Cartesian subject. According to Habermas‘ own 
definition, ―the term ‗reaching understanding‘ [Verständigung] means, at the minimum, 
that at least two speaking and acting subjects understand a linguistic expression in the 
same way‖ (307, my emphasis). Drawing on Max Weber‘s action theory, which 
distinguishes between different kinds of action and corresponding rationality in society 
(Weber, 1978, 4), Habermas wants to illustrate a model of rationality and human agency 
that emphasizes (what he believes to be) the reciprocal, communicative relation between 
individuals interacting in everyday life, and which serve as the basis for coordinating 
action plans between them. The key will be to then offer a rational reconstruction of the 
process by which such coordination is achieved in a non-coercive, non-manipulative 
fashion—something Habermas believes to be possible by virtue of the ―inescapable 
presuppositions‖ found in the very process of coming to an understanding through 
rational, argumentative discourse (1976, 30). What makes argumentative discourse the 
foci of reciprocal, unconstrained agreement between people is that, for Habermas, ―the 
idea of impartiality is rooted in the structures of argumentation themselves and does not 
need to be brought in from the outside as supplementary normative content‖(2001, 75-
76). Following a procedural model of rational argumentation—where argumentation is 
seen ―as a special form of rule-governed interaction‖— can thus offer certain guarantees 
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against ―repression and inequality‖ in speech situations by presenting us with ―a form of 
communication that adequately approximates ideal conditions‖ (88). It is the process that 
is key for Habermas, and this process, in turn, is intersubjectively valid because it rests on 
formal rules that  ―spring spontaneously from our intuitive grasp of what argumentation 
is‖ (92).17  
On the whole, Habermas‘ overall shift in emphasis from individuals to 
community derives from his cautionary wariness of the negative aspects of the 
Enlightenment tradition, especially of the instrumental (or ‗purposive,‘ means-ends) 
rationality criticized in Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno‘s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (1944). His goal, however, is not to criticize this tradition but to redeem it 
by producing a more robust account of rationality that can accommodate the shared 
aspects of consensual, deliberative democratic procedures in public life and downplay the 
instrumental, goal-directed acts of autonomous, individual agents. Habermas worries that 
an independently acting ego committed towards ―reaching success‖ will orient their 
actions teleologically towards private interests and can potentially lead to totalitarian or 
authoritative social realities. Societies focused on the continual employment of other-
directed ‗communicative rationality‘— which Habermas thinks is the ―original mode of 
language use‖ upon which all modes are ‗parasitic‘ (1984, 288)—will help thwart such 
tendencies in public and political life. 
 
Thus, for Habermas, the hermeneutic process of ‗coming to an understanding‘ is 
based on a radically different set of premises from hermeneutic understanding, sufficient 
to posit a theory of social or ―communicative action‖ that goes far beyond the goals of 
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hermeneutics, and aims instead at reaching concrete forms of intersubjective agreement 
between speakers. He writes:  
The goal of coming to an understanding [Verständigung] is to bring out an 
agreement [Einverständnis] that terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of 
reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one 
another. Agreement is based on recognition of the corresponding validity claims 
of comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness and rightness (1979, 3, my emphasis). 
 
 Because Habermas adopts a designative view of language from the Analytic 
philosophical tradition—a view whose heritage he readily acknowledges and sketches out 
himself— Habermas believes ―we can explain the concept of reaching understanding 
only if we specify what it means to use sentences with communicative intent‖ (1984, 
287)—and this, in turn, will involve a reductive account of language as a series of truth-
conditional speech acts which accurately convey our intentions to other speakers and 
provide the background material necessary for coordinating joint plans of action in the 
social sphere. Thus, Habermas thinks that ―if we take as our unit of analysis a simple 
speech act carried out by S, to which at least one participant in interaction can take up a 
―yes‖ or ―no‖ position, we can clarify the conditions for the communicative coordination 
of action by stating what it means for a hearer to understand what is said‖ (101). Two 
things are involved here: the nature of the conditions under which speech communication 
effectively coordinates actions between individuals, and what it means for individuals to 
actually understand one another through their speech acts. For Habermas, ―we understand 
a speech act when we know what makes it acceptable‖ in the particular normative life-
world from which it derives its validity, which presupposes a particular conception of 
rationality (297):  
In contexts of communicative action, we call someone rational not only if he is 
able to put forward an assertion and, when criticized, to provide grounds for it by 
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pointing to appropriate evidence, but also if he is following an established norm 
and is able, when criticized, to justify his action by explicating the given situation 
in the light of legitimate expectations. We even call someone rational if he makes 
known a desire or an intention, expresses a feeling or a mood, shares a secret, 
confesses a deed, etc., and is then able to reassure his critics in regard to the 
revealed experience by drawing particular consequences from it and behaving 
consistently thereafter (15).   
 
While for Gadamer, being able to ‗accept a speech act‘ is something we do pre-
reflectively by virtue of a shared history, for Habermas it remains an intentional act 
between ‗at least two speaking and acting subjects‘ using reflective consciousness, each 
of whom retains the capacity to judiciously accept or reject the other‘s claims. This is key 
for Habermas, as it points us towards a non-authoritative view of rationality as fallible 
knowledge that only achieves its ―binding force‖ in the procedural to-and-fro of two or 
more communicatively acting agents. He writes:  
These reflections point in the direction of basing the rationality of an expression 
on its being susceptible of criticism and grounding: an expression satisfies the 
precondition for rationality if and insofar as it embodies fallible knowledge and 
therewith has a relation to the objective world (that is, a relation to the facts) and 
is open to objective judgment (1984, 9).  
 
This, then, leads us to Habermas‘ principal criticism of Gadamer. The famous ‗debate‘ 
between Habermas and Gadamer began in the 1960‘s when Habermas, some 30 years his 
junior, read Gadamer‘s Truth and Method and published a book review containing a 
seminal critcism of Gadamer‘s rehabilitation of the concept of ―tradition‖. The critiques 
from this review, first published in German in Philosophische Rundschau (1967, English 
translation 1977) were then expanded in a section titled ―the hermeneutic approach‖ in 
Habermas‘ On the Logic of the Social Sciences (1970). In particular, Habermas raised 
concerns that Gadamer‘s emphasis on ‗the authority of tradition‘ as the precondition for 
human understanding was too conservative and restricted the possibility of social 
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change—of taking a possible standpoint outside tradition in order for social agents to 
challenge or critique it. According to Habermas, historical traditions—even if they 
provide the normative background against which understanding takes place— must, in 
principle, be open to criticism in the same way that reason, for Habermas, first embodies 
fallible knowledge, and on those grounds does not pose a threat of ―instrumental 
mastery‖ over us (1984, 11). For this reason, Habermas charges that ―hermeneutics 
comes up against the walls of the traditional framework from the inside, as it were‖ and 
potentially renders—to use one example, the protestational acts and practices of political 
claimants mute against authoritative regimes (1977, 360). 
 
Before considering Gadamer‘s reply, to fully appreciate Habermas‘ position it is 
essential to first understand it in terms of the lived commitments and historical influences 
that shaped his philosophical project. As Richard Bernstein explains:  
The world in which Habermas grew up and came to intellectual maturity, which 
coincides with the rise and fall of Nazi Germany, was virtually a totally different 
world than the one in which Gadamer grew up. Whereas Gadamer‘s primary 
experience has been one of historical continuity, the primary formative experience 
for Habermas was that of discontinuity—the trauma of almost a total break with 
tradition. Many commentators of Habermas tend to ignore or downplay the 
specific historical circumstances that had a decisive influence on him during the 
decades of the 1940s through the 1960s: the collapse of Nazi Germany, the 
discovery by Germans only after the war of the immensities of the horrors of this 
era, and the hope of making a new beginning. Yet we fail to adequately 
understand even Habermas‘ most theoretical work if this context is ignored. What 
impressed Habermas, as a young student, was the failure of twentieth-century 
German culture to provide a serious counterthrust to the rise of Nazi ideology 
(1983, 177).  
 
Thus, although Habermas was Adorno‘s assistant at the Institute of Social Research in 
Frankfurt, he largely rejected the radically pessimistic view of the Enlightenment project 
shared by Adorno, and what would later be known as the ‗Frankfurt School‘ of Critical 
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Theory. As a neo-Marxist shaped by the lived concerns of a post-holocaust social and 
political milieu, Habermas was compelled to retain a belief in the emancipatory powers 
of reflective processes against the distortions produced by ideology. However, insofar as 
he understood the deep complicity between instrumental, means-ends rationality and the 
Nazi project of racial cleansing, a project that hauntingly reached the level of official, 
bureaucratic, and legal sanctioning in Nazi Germany, Habermas remained committed to 
a more critical model of rationality—but one which still had to retain the critical capacity 
to unveil ideology‘s distortive lens on society. In this respect, Habermas is still tied to the 
project of modernity but in a much more critical, rehabilitative sense.  
From this perspective, the notion of drawing our understandings from an 
apparently unmovable historical background of interpretive possibilities—which form 
our ‗prejudgments‘ and which Gadamer calls ‗tradition‘—cannot help but be deeply 
problematic for Habermas.  This is because, on this view, social actors cannot ―work 
themselves free of the form of life in which they de facto find themselves‖ (1996, 163). If 
our historical traditions are dominated by racist, sexist, even totalitarian values and social 
practices, how are we to shake ourselves free of the ‗de facto situation in which we find 
ourselves‘ without an objectively independent standpoint to appeal to that is (and for 
Habermas must be) outside this tradition? An independent standpoint that can guide us as 
to the possible harms of such outlooks, even by making appeals that reference our own 
normative cultural standards? For Habermas, the objective power of reflection is this 
‗independent‘ standpoint, such that, on his account,    
Gadamer fails to appreciate the power of reflection that is developed in 
understanding. This type of reflection is no longer blinded by the illusion of an 
absolute, self-grounded autonomy and does not detach itself from the soil of 
contingency on which it finds itself. But in grasping the genesis of the tradition 
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from which it proceeds and on which it turns its back, reflection shakes the 
dogmatism of life-practices (1977, 357). 
 
 The same year Habermas‘ review of Truth and Method appeared, Gadamer 
published his reply in an essay titled ―On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical 
Reflection‖ (1967 original, reprinted in Philosophical Hermeneutics, hereafter PH). 
Gadamer‘s reply is two-tiered. First, he thinks Habermas has fundamentally misread or 
overlooked key passages in Truth and Method where Gadamer points to the flexive, 
open-ended aspect of tradition without losing any of its ‗authoritative‘ aspect on how we 
first come to make sense of things in understanding. Second, he points to Habermas‘ own 
presuppositions that would make him overlook or misinterpret such passages. According 
to Gadamer:   
The presupposition is that reflection, as employed in the hermeneutical sciences, 
should ‗shake the dogmatism of life-praxis.‘ Here indeed is operating a prejudice 
that we can see is pure dogmatism, for reflection is not always and unavoidably a 
step towards dissolving prior convictions. Authority is not always wrong. Yet 
Habermas regards it as an untenable assertion and treason to the heritage of the 
Enlightenment, and the act of rendering transparent the structure of prejudgments 
in understanding should possibly lead to an acknowledgment of authority. 
Authority is by his definition a dogmatic power. I cannot accept the assertion that 
reason and authority are abstract antitheses, as the emancipatory Enlightenment 
did. Rather, I assert that they stand in a basically ambivalent relation, a relation I 
think should be explored rather than causally accepting the antithesis as a 
‗fundamental conviction‘ (PH 32-33).  
 
For Gadamer, it would be a mistake to see tradition as purely ‗conservative‘ in the sense 
of immovable structures. In Truth and Method he clarifies that ―tradition is not simply a 
permanent precondition; rather, we produce it ourselves inasmuch as we understand, 
participate in the evolution of tradition, and hence further determine it ourselves‖ (293, 
emphasis added). One way to get a better grasp on this concept is through the idea that 
language (on the hermeneutic model) is realized in speech. As Taylor notes, ―men are 
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constantly shaping language [as speech], straining the limits of expression, minting new 
terms, displacing old ones, giving language a changed gamut of meanings,‖ and yet, 
following Heidegger and Gadamer, these ―new coinages are never quite autonomous, 
quite uncontrolled by the rest of language. They can only be introduced and make sense 
because they already have a place within the web, which must at any moment be taken as 
given over by far the greater part of its extent‖ (1985a, 232). Picasso‘s Guernica or 
Rothko‘s abstractionism are in this sense new perspectives in Western aesthetic practice, 
ones which only make sense as new perspectives when considered against the old ones; 
in fact, the old perspectives of realism act as kind of unconscious backdrop and are 
necessary to give abstractionist paintings the very meaning they possess as 
‗abstractionist,‘ as departure from realism. Here, Taylor explicates Gadamer‘s concept of 
tradition through Otto Neurath‘s (1882-1945) image of remaking a boat while at sea:  
We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never 
able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must 
at once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this 
way, by using the old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, 
but only by gradual reconstruction (1973, 199).  
 
In reply to Habermas‘ criticism, Gadamer argues that tradition is not binding in 
the sense that no new interpretations are possible, but only in the sense that what we say 
to each other is going to already be shaped and guided in advance by a specific historical 
horizon that is never, in principle, fixed and static. For Gadamer, the meaning of what 
one says to another in conversation ―represents a fluid multiplicity of possibilities‖ and 
yet, ―within this multiplicity of what can be thought‖ or talked about, ―not everything is 
possible‖‘ because one must always ―be able to fit‖ what one has heard—even as a 
misunderstanding—into the pre-figured ―range‖ of one‘s own ―various expectations of 
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meaning‖ (TM, 271). One must have a horizon if one is to hear at all. Or, in Heidegger‘s 
words: ―only he who already understands is able to listen‖ (1962, 161). We take up 
stances against totalitarian regimes or undertake social transformations against certain 
values because we already, in a deep sense, value principles of fairness, justice, and the 
good of all. But this latter perspective is relative only to a particular historical tradition 
where such values are interpretive possibilities in the first place. As Paul Feyerabend, in 
Science and a Free Society, explains 
Being a tradition is neither good nor bad, it simply is. The same applies, to all 
traditions—they are neither good nor bad, they simply are. They become good or 
bad (rational/irrational; pious/impious; advanced/primitive; humanitarian/vicious; 
etc.) only when looked at from the point of view of some other tradition. 
‗Objectively‘ there is not much to choose between anti-Semitism and 
humanitarianism, but racism will appear vicious to a humanitarian while 
humanitarianism will appear vapid to a racist (1978, 8-9).  
 
For Gadamer, we are not slaves to tradition. The fact that we are shaped by both 
humanistic values and have histories steeped in instrumental rationality means we are in 
a unique position to mitigate between these traditions through the kinds of practices we 
take up and in light of how these traditions have been received. Thus, Gadamer replies to 
Habermas in saying that  
from the hermeneutical standpoint, rightly understood, it is absolutely absurd to 
regard the concrete factors of work and politics as outside the scope of 
hermeneutics. What about the vital issue of prejudices…Where do they come 
from? Merely out of ‗cultural tradition‘? Surely they do, in part, but what is the 
tradition formed from? It would be true when Habermas asserts that 
‗hermeneutics bangs helplessly, so to speak, from within against the walls of 
tradition,‘ if we understand this ‗within‘ as opposite to an ‗outside‘ that does not 
enter our world—our to-be-understood, understandable, or non-understandable 
world—but remains the mere observation of external alternations (instead of 
human actions) (PH 31).  
 
The wide gulf that then divides Habermas and Gadamer centers on the extent to which, in 
being able to reshape tradition without dominating it, human beings (or for Habermas 
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‗social actors‘) retain control of this process. Gadamer‘s position, as Taylor explains it, is 
that in reshaping tradition ―without dominating it, or being able to oversee it…we never 
fully know what we are doing to it‖; to use the speech analogy suggested earlier, ―we 
develop language without knowing fully what we are making it into‖ (1985a, 232). 
Because of their significantly different starting points and lived commitments, this is a 
gulf that cannot be bridged between the two thinkers.
18 In a letter to Richard Bernstein, 
Gadamer concedes as much:  
I too am in favor of a government and politics that would allow for mutual 
understanding and the freedom of all. But this is not due to the influence of 
Habermas. It has been self-evident to any European since the French Revolution, 
since Hegel and Kant. But I am not talking about what is to be done in order to 
realize this state of affairs. Rather, I am concerned with the fact that the 
displacement of human reality never goes so far that no forms of solidarity exist 
any longer (as qtd. in Bernstein, 1983, 264).
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And so the impasse stands.  
Yet, there have been important attempts at reconciliation between these two 
philosophical positions. In her essays, ―Communicative Rationality and Cultural Values‖ 
(1995) and ―Hermeneutics, Tradition, and the Standpoint of Women‖ (1994) Georgia 
Warnke attempts to do this by way of feminist concerns.
20 Warnke‘s aims are particularly 
important for the purposes of my project because she constructively engages both the 
limitations and possibilities of Habermas‘s social democratic thought while at the same 
time acknowledging the potentially oppressive and inescapable nature of Gadamer‘s 
hermeneutic situation. 
  
Warnke criticizes Habermas‘ use of ―the normative principles that are justified in 
discourse‖ on the grounds that the mechanism by which actual negotiation of interpretive 
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differences can take place is limited to 1) a restrictive model of argumentative speech and 
2) procedural observation of ‗the rules of discourse‘ (1994, 135). For Warnke, the 
underlying assumption here is that reasoned argument is indeed impartial and capable of 
altogether transcending particular socio-historical contexts, contexts which include 
important gendered and sexual differences that affect, for example, how communication 
shows up for women. 
 On this view, one way to look at the problem of communicative action is that it 
―attempts to abstract from [cultural] history and complexity to find neutral foundations 
for universal principles‖ based on a model of reasoned interaction in ideal speech 
communication (1994, 209).  While Habermas‘ approach is not attentive to difference in 
the way Warnke envisions, neither does she think we can transcend these differences 
objectively: ―we cannot rise above the tradition to understand ourselves and our social 
situation without the blinders the tradition forces upon us‖ (1995, 220). Here Warnke is 
clearly following Gadamer and his criticism that Habermas does not acknowledge the 
extent to which there is no neutral, value-free, isolated standpoint from which we may 
make privileged judgments or deliberations. Although Warnke is sympathetic to the 
social democratic motivations for Habermas‘ project, a larger question for deliberative 
democratic models of speech communication remains, namely: what if  
the very language of a tradition can be the source of power and domination? What 
are we to do about the distortions within our thick vocabulary that render women 
mute or serve to deflate or deconstruct the expressions of their concerns? In this 
case, it will not be enough to insist that women be allowed the opportunity to talk, 
for the language in which they might speak may be one that cannot be responsive 
to their needs or interests (215, my emphasis).  
 
And yet, Warnke also thinks Gadamer‘s appeal to historical traditions, including his 
critique of ―subjectivism‖ has more than a mere ―conservative tint‖; according to 
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Warnke,  
 
in appealing to our history and interpretive traditions as the ground for our 
reflections, critical or otherwise, Gadamer tends to play down the extent to which 
this ground is one of struggle and debate. Hence, he also plays down the degree to 
which traditions require the solicitation and support of their adherents who 
cannot, therefore, be seen as simple flickers in the closed circuits of historical life 
but are active participants in the meaning a tradition comes to possess (1994, 
223). 
 
What this shows is that Warnke is a hermeneutic thinker. We see this commitment 
in her explanation that Gadamer does not neglect, but only ‗plays down‘ the regenerative 
role of social agents in interpreting (and thus shaping) their own historical traditions.  But 
she is also a social-political theorist concerned with practical issues of lived experience, 
which include the experience of women and the role of gender in social institutions and 
the law.  However, Warnke‘s views are important to my project not merely because she 
finds important points of contact in these two conflicting critiques, but because she is 
pursuing a project of applied hermeneutics that is attentive to the heterogeneous, practical 
concerns of marginalized social actors while recognizing the immense influence of the 
movement of history on these concerns. This is to say that, unlike Gadamer, Warnke is 
not concerned with outlining transcendental conditions for the possibility of meaning, but 
rather with how we can apply this meaning in everyday social situations with respect to 
the complex concerns of those marginalized. She calls this approach ―Hermeneutic 
Feminism‖.21 
For Warnke, ―hermeneutic feminism will be pluralistic‖ and will attend to the 
diverse interpretive stances taken by women positioned in radically dissimilar speaking 
situations, marked, as she notes, by various racial, ethnic and sexual identifications   
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(intra-culturally as well as cross-culturally) (225).  Moreover, hermeneutic feminism‘s 
emphasis on difference and plurality sheds a more inclusive light on the hermeneutic 
concept of historical traditions. I will later argue that this attentiveness to the plurality 
and complex specificity of lived-experiences for the marginalized is essential in 
articulating an interpretive space that is capable of addressing the fractured and 
multiplicitous experience of selfhood that characterizes the postcolonial subject. 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to offer an overview of Continental views of 
language, broadly conceived. In doing so, I situated these views within the hermeneutic 
tradition, identified core ideas of hermeneutic discourse as they emerge in the work of 
Heidegger, Gadamer and Taylor, show how these ideas undermine fundamental 
assumptions in mainstream Anglophone views of language, and articulate how these 
hermeneutic ideas have been critically engaged by Habermas and Warnke.  In the 
proceeding chapters, my aim is to show how Warnke‘s approach succeeds in broadening 
the hermeneutic horizon to more accurately account for the experiences of women but is 
largely unable to address the embodied concerns of postcolonial women whose 
meaningful histories have been forcefully erased by colonialism. I hope to show that this 
loss of a background of meaning adds a layer of complexity that neither hermeneutics nor 
hermeneutic feminism can account for, but which is essential to articulate in order to shed 
light on the conditions of marginalization affecting intercultural dialogue.  However, to 
get a grip on this problem we first need to examine the effect of colonialism on language, 
including its effect on the interpretive possibilities made available in culture.  We turn to 
this issue in the next chapter. 
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 CHAPTER TWO:  
Intercultural Dialogue and the Problem of Colonized Languages: A Feminist Approach  
 
 
La lengua ha sido testimonio de la opresión y del imperialismo: lo que a 
finales del siglo XV era una realidad histórica, por más que la humanidad 
se lastime, en el siglo XX sigue siendo instrumento de intervención y de 
extorsión de las conciencias.  
 
         --Manuel Alvar, 1986  
 
This is the oppressor‘s language, yet I need it to talk to you.  
 
         --Adrienne Rich, 1966  
 
 
Within feminist theory, there has often been special attention paid to the 
discursive space required for women to effectively participate in the interpretive 
processes of culture without having to perform great feats of linguistic and psychic 
dexterity. Historically, the call to alter, enlarge, and transform this space has centered on 
the awareness that performing such tasks, while allowing women to engage in public 
dialogue and moral deliberation through a determinate location of their voice within 
preexisting social norms and standards, typically comes at the expense of radical 
differences and complex intersections of multiple categories of self-identification, 
including those of race, sex, gender, class and ethnicity (Frye 1983, Jaggar 1998, 
Lugones 2006, Young 2002, Schutte 1998, Spivak 1988). In this chapter, I would like to 
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extend this project to the complicated epistemic labors performed by postcolonial 
subjects in the course of intercultural dialogue.  
 
My approach will be to address the lived concerns of historically marginalized  
communities—specifically, the pressing need of native Amerindian speakers to negotiate 
everyday legal, social, and economic matters within European-style institutions—through 
a hermeneutic analysis of the conditions of conversation that underlie such negotiations. 
As we saw in chapter one, it is by giving a primarily historical account of the barriers 
involved in coming to an understanding in intercultural conversation that the hermeneutic 
approach differs from Habermas‘ influential analysis of speech situations, an analysis 
based on the ―formal presuppositions of intersubjectivity that are necessary if we are to be 
able to refer to something in the one objective world, identical for all observers, or to 
something in our intersubjectively shared social world‖ (1984, 50). My project does not 
attempt to bridge the gap between different or ‗competing‘ cultural accounts of the ―one 
objective world‖ through a norm-seeking enterprise of rational justifications and validity 
claims. Unlike Habermas, I do not ask about ―what norms, indeed what universal norms, 
are appropriate for critically evaluating competing traditions, and competing cultural 
claims‖ (Bernstein 1996, 40). My question, rather, is historical; it follows Gloria 
Anzaldúa‘s methodological insight that, since postcolonial life gives rise to a unique set 
of contradictory cultural experiences (from inhabiting multiple yet conflicting frames of 
reference), the first step towards producing an account capable of ―documenting our 
struggles‖ and communicating our sense of rupture is ―to take inventory‖ (1987, 104).  
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Taking inventory, in the historical sense, is especially difficult in colonial 
situations because of the intricate heterogeneity of background assumptions (e.g., the 
Indian, European, Anglo) that often clash with one another, and which, over time, make it 
difficult to distinguish between the inherited, acquired, and forcibly imposed (―lo  
heredado, lo adquirido, lo impuesto‖) in culture (ibid). The shared cultural heritage of 
postcolonials is not, on this account, an unproblematic plurality of mixed historical 
traditions fusing over time into a stable, collective framework of interpretive reference: 
Indian and European/Anglo traditions are, and have been from the very beginning, 
asymmetrically positioned, with European interpretive practices dominating the former— 
but without successfully sublating it altogether.
22 Giving a more robust account of the 
problems and difficulties involved in speaking from colonial situations is thus an 
important step in not only pluralizing intercultural discourse ethics, but also in 
legitimating the creative efforts and linguistic tactics of beings caught in the midst of 
articulative difficulties and internalized feelings of, what might be called, ‗inarticulacy‘.  
 
To this end, I am concerned with the following question: If meaningful 
communication is possible only on the basis of a shared socio-historical background of 
discursive acts and practices, what happens to a marginal culture‘s ability to effectively 
communicate and make sense of the world when—as is the case with European 
colonialism—these acts and practices have been covered-over, shattered, or destroyed 
(whether in part or in whole)? What happens to one‘s ability to render their experience of 
the socio-historical world through language (as understanding) if, as Serge Gruzinski 
argues in La Colonisation de L‟imaginaire (1988), the resources of expression have 
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themselves been colonized through Western epistemic orthodoxies such as 
subject/predicate language and the conventions of Western literary practices?  
Take, for example, the Dominican Domingo de Santo Tomás‘s (1499-1570)  
account of Qechua, an Amerindian language, as ―a language so in agreement with Latin 
and Castilian in its structure that it looks almost like a premonition that the Spaniards will 
possess it,‖ not, of course, by living it, but by transcoding it into alphabetic form, setting 
down rules of orthography, and Latinizing it (qtd. in Mignolo 1995, 48). The idea that 
Mayans dwelled in an understanding of language as a rationalized logical structure is an 
Occidental prejudice that formed the basis for its subsequent trans-codification through 
the Latin alphabet. This forceful re-territorialization of language seems to problematize 
one of the most pivotal notions in modern discourse ethics: securing the conditions for 
uncoerced, equitable argumentation.  
Generally, this is taken to mean that one cannot be said to have a conviction if, as 
Habermas argues, that conviction was formed ―under conditions that simply do not 
permit for the formation of convictions‖—conditions like duress, deceit, but also 
different forms of social injustice and oppression (Habermas 2001, 90). The problem of 
colonized languages is that oppression is also rooted in the mechanism by which ‗one 
forms convictions‘ in the first place, and, to complicate matters, to remove this constraint 
as a source of possible oppression would potentially render large social sectors mute. In 
this respect, the hermeneutic view of language outlined in chapter one offers a much 
broader conception of human communication (rather than reducing it to the propositional 
content of human locution) more hospitable to talking about non-Western and Native 
Amerindian notions of communication. Such notions may rely on substantially different 
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relations between self and world, where to speak (in Nahuatl), for example, is to ―flower-
sing on and on, to rejoice with flowers‖ (xochicuicuicatinemio) and henceforth ‗give the 
voice‘ (nontlatoa) that is collectively required for a world to be sung into existence 
(Leon-Portilla 1962). In The Singing of the New World (2007), Gary Tomlinson carefully 
points out that  
The duality of literal and figurative language is all told a Western importation to 
the Mexica mentality; the indigenous construction of the world connected things 
to other things in a network of extraordinary, more than Western complexity and 
intimacy… the expression of one thing in another was, therefore, a real 
connection—a metonymic one, again, involving the interplay of adjoining parts of 
a whole (41).  
 
The hermeneutic view can also address how non-lexical vocables (a linguistic term for 
recognizable terms or utterances) in an oral tradition, such as singing, nasal stress or 
intonated rhythms, can be meaningful in reference to a wider whole. However, there are 
limitations. While hermeneutic philosophy can help contextualize some of the difficulties 
involved in cross-cultural communication in general, I want to suggest that feminism‘s 
aim of questioning structures of oppression and the homogenous nature of human identity 
can focus better attention on the complex ways European Colonialism impacted 
Amerindian peoples, especially at the level of language.  
 
I. Between ‗novel metaphors‘ and ‗new idioms‘: Feminism, Language, and 
Postcoloniality  
 
While there has been general consensus amongst feminist theorists about the 
existence of cultural double binds and discursive constraints noted earlier, there has also 
been great debate about how to go about transforming them. One general disagreement 
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has to do with the extent to which radical transformations in the social sphere are possible 
given the deep historical embeddedness of masculine narratives, texts and practices in 
Western culture, along with the question of which tactics to employ in response. As 
feminists, for example, we may want to do more than merely integrate women into 
existing social hierarchies or structures of power, which, as Graciella Hierro put it, 
―construct power to oppose the other power‖ but do little in the way of promoting a 
deeper, ―ontological vision‖ of eventually displacing the very centrality of gender 
subordination coursing throughout the many interlaced levels of culture, and which keep 
oppression a primarily ‗structural‘, rather than ‗personal‘, affair (1994, 10).  
Attempting changes at this deeper level, however, runs up against the oft-cited 
difficulty of how to even go about ―analyzing our own exploitation…while being 
inscribed within an order prescribed by the masculine‖ (Irigaray, 1977, 81). The most 
striking example of this kind of exploitation is through embodying the acts and practices 
of our own language. As Judith Butler explains:  
…we have a description of a self that takes place in a language that is already 
going on, that is already saturated with norms, that predisposes us as we seek to 
speak of ourselves…so that when one speaks, one speaks a language that is 
already speaking, even if one speaks it in a way that is not precisely how it has 
been spoken before (2004, 69).  
 
The idea that radical new possibilities for social change can come about as a result of 
women‘s ongoing public battles for legal or political reform, on this view, have to be met  
with tempered expectations of what the norms of moral and political discourse will 
allow to count as change, as well as what the grammatical conventions of the syntax used 
in these struggles will allow (in terms of possibilities) for describing our grievances and 
experiences of oppression. Thus, from a feminist perspective, a tension exists between 
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the view of the subject as linguistically constituted and the degree to which we are free to 
determine meaning and have semantic authority over our own self-descriptions.  
 
For Luce Irigaray, the sedimentation of masculine norms in language happen to 
place ―so strong a bearing of things‖ that the only way to produce new meanings in a 
largely patriarchal life-world (understood as a signifying economy) is to step outside it 
and construct a new one to run as a parallel script (1993, 67). While Irigaray retains a 
view of language on the model of the linguist (where at maximum, we are co-constituted 
by language but remain separate from it as tool-users), Butler, on the other hand, cannot 
conceive of a way to ever step outside language because, for her, we are through and 
through linguistic beings whose identities are no more and no less than the discursive 
effects of a historically unique pattern of enacting certain social scripts—or of 
‗performing‘ them. Just as ―there is no reference to a pure body which is not at the same 
time a further formation of that body,‖ for Butler there is no subject anterior to its 
emergence in a cultural and historical field in which subjects make sense or learn to 
signify as ‗social agents‘ (1993, 10; 1990, 145). Without this ‗discursive‘ background 
there are no ‗bodies that matter‘, as the title of her book suggests, but also no public 
sphere to try to change, and no identities to reject, take up, reconfigure or defend—
including those based on gender.
23
  
As a Foucauldian shaped by both the phenomenological tradition and 
psychoanalysis, Butler is able to balance the rejection of the Cartesian subject with the 
need to address the concrete experiences of physical and psychic wounds that befall the 
subject, regardless of the social construction of both the wounded and the wound. The 
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subject may be a fiction, but it is a fiction we must live to live at all; the point then, is to 
pursue a radical feminist politics precisely by recognizing that these limitations exist, and 
that in order to transform them we must first wrestle with the deep imprint they place on 
what we consider as our bodies, voices, lives and ‗selves‘. Thus, on her view, one way to 
maneuver through the restrictions placed by language and the sociohistorical construction 
of our identities is by recognizing ―the possibility of a complex reconfiguration and 
redeployment‖ of the categories of meaning we grow into, and which invariably keep us 
within the bounds of a given cultural horizon (1990, 145, my emphasis). This means that 
while ―there is no subject prior to its constructions‖ it is not the case that the subject is 
totally determined by those constructions:  
It is always the nexus, the non-space of cultural collision, in which the demand to  
resignify or repeat the very terms which constitute the ‗we‘ cannot be summarily 
refused, but neither can they be followed in strict obedience. It is the space of this 
ambivalence which opens up the possibility of a reworking of the very terms by 
which subjectivation proceeds—and fails to proceed (1993, 124, my emphasis).  
 
In what is admittedly difficult prose,
24 Butler straddles the line between 
hermeneutics and post-structuralism, arguing for an expansion of what can possibly be 
articulated within the bounds of what already can, but with the general aim of expanding 
the plenum of the possible over time. Specifically, for Butler, we must start social 
transformations by soberly acknowledging that there are no tools outside of the master‘s 
tools, that ―there is only a taking up of the tools where they lie, where the very ‗taking 
up‘ is enabled by the tool lying there,‖ and proceed by trying to find creative ways of 
―public misappropriation,‖ misuse and mimicry of shared terms, acts, and practices so as 
to destabilize their meaning (1990, 145). By disrupting the flow of expectation and 
fulfillment of meanings, we call attention to the way things normally look or work in 
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their default mode, and which allows the normative feeling of our world to hold.
25 For 
Butler, performing parodies, inappropriate gestures and cross-dressing would all be ways 
of subverting norms while still relying on them, and taken as a whole with other 
practices, ―constitutes the basis of an ironic hopefulness that the conventional relation 
between word and wound might become tenuous and even broken over time‖ (1997a, 
100, my emphasis).  
In this respect, Butler‘s approach bears resemblance to Richard Rorty‘s notion of  
‗novel metaphors‘ as a guide to social change. For Rorty, ―creative misuses of 
language—familiar words used in ways that initially sound crazy‖ are ways of 
recontextualizing existing beliefs and attitudes that, over time, can make ―alternative 
descriptions of what is happening‖ acceptable in culture, such that, eventually, 
―something traditionally regarded as a moral abomination can become an object of 
general satisfaction‖ (1998, 204). The problem with this framework, as Christopher 
Voparil rightly points out, is that the ―we‖ for whom these novel redescriptions of 
experience become acceptable or ―gain in popularity‖ remains uncontested:  
The picture [Rorty] sketches of the ‗new language‘ of marginalized groups 
gradually being ‗woven into the language taught in the schools‘ does not pay 
sufficient attention to the beliefs and desires within the larger society that worked 
to exclude these groups in the first place. That is, while Rorty‘s diagnosis of the 
condition of ‗meaninglessness‘ in which marginalized groups can find themselves 
and proposal for achieving semantic authority offer valuable resources, we must 
also perceive the ways that this linguistic silencing is part of the functioning of the 
dominant discourse. Focusing only on ‗the larger society coming to terms with 
something new‘ obscures the power of both structural and discursive formations 
to oppress and exclude (2010).   
 
The difference between Rorty and Butler, on this particular account, lies in Butler‘s 
attentiveness to forces of power and oppression in culture.  In ―The Question of Social 
Transformation,‖ Butler highlights the need to heed such forces, even if that means 
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foregoing her theoretical framework of subverting norms from within (that is, by 
appealing to them in the process): She writes, ―what moves me politically, and that for 
which I want to make room, is the moment in which a subject—a person, a collective— 
asserts a right or entitlement to a livable life when no such prior authorization exists, 
when no clearly enabling convention is in place‖ at the level of shared norms or cultural 
practices (2004, 224, my emphasis).  
This move gestures towards another equally important tactic for social change in 
feminist theory, one that has grown out of women‘s concrete experiences of lived 
suffering (including the urgency of addressing oppression) and calls for a politics of self-
determination. That is to say, in the course of our practical dealings and worldly 
engagements, there may or may not be a recognition of the deep, historical imbrication of 
masculine narratives in culture—a recognition which, in either case, is subordinated to 
one‘s awareness that ―this is the oppressor‘s language, yet I need it to talk to you‖ (Rich 
1966).  
Under this approach, the realm emphasized is the practical realm, the one in 
which women must speak, act, advocate for specific interests, make use of cultural 
norms, and mobilize politically in the midst of asymmetrical power relations, both within 
culture and across them. Thus, the primary focus of this approach to feminist inquiry 
becomes the need to articulate and vocalize what are often very complex, liminal 
experiences—or simply those that cannot be voiced within a dominant cultural 
discourse— in order to address felt harms and seek public redress of wrongs. Under this 
rubric, effecting social change at deeper interpretive levels may still guide feminist 
inquiry, but to do this, as Gloria Anzaldúa argues,  
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we must have very concrete, precisely worded intentions of what we want the 
world to be like, what we want to be like. We have to first put the changes that we 
want made into words or images. We have to visualize them, write them, 
communicate them to other people and stick with committing to those intentions, 
those goals, those visions. Before any changes can take place you have to say and 
intend them (2000, 290).  
 
However, intending and saying those goals, on the hermeneutic view, requires a 
background language in which those intentions make sense or matter in a particular 
ways—a pre-predicative web of meanings which prefigures one‘s ‗intentions‘ and which 
continually relates individual parts to a larger whole. Under philosophical hermeneutics, 
there is no way out of this ‗circle‘ or ‗situation‘. It is, as Gadamer says, fundamentally 
―universal and basic for all interhuman experience‖ (1976, 30). In The Politics of Reality 
(1983) Marilyn Frye has indirectly challenged the universality of hermeneutical 
understanding from the perspective of subjects who, due to historical marginalization in 
culture, fail to experience a smooth continuity of meaning. On Frye‘s view, as beings 
already marginalized on the basis of sex and gender,  
we fear that if we are not in that web of meaning there will be no meaning: our 
work will be meaningless, our lives of no value, our accomplishments empty, our 
identities illusory…This is a terrible disability. If we have no intuition of 
ourselves as independent, unmediated beings in the world, then we cannot 
conceive of ourselves surviving our liberation …we have to dare to rely on 
ourselves to make meaning and we have to imagine ourselves capable of 
…weaving the web of meaning which will hold us in some kind of intelligibility 
(80, my emphasis).
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Weaving our own web of meaning is not without precedent in the Continental 
philosophical tradition. Like Frye‘s insistence on a creative politics of self-determination, 
Jean-François Lyotard‘s call ―to institute new addressees, new addressors, new 
significations, and new referents in order for the wrong to find an expression and for the 
plaintiff to cease being a victim‖ relies on a picture of the self as an active social agent 
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capable of producing meaning and having semantic authority over their own self-
descriptions (1988, 13). According to David Carroll, for Lyotard, ―totalitarianism is 
precisely any principle or system that prevents victims…from testifying to the injustice 
they have experienced, and from testifying to it in their own idiom, which may not be, or 
most likely is not admissible according to the regulations used to determine historical 
reality or truth‖ (1984, 78).  
 
In recent years, postcolonial feminisms have contributed to this discussion by 
highlighting the need for both approaches to social change—for novel metaphors that 
acknowledge the irreducible imprint of colonial history on our lives and speaking 
situations, and for new idioms that can speak directly to the social and political 
emergencies instituted by that history—be it through poetry, avant-garde art or 
transgressive social protest, to name a few examples (Richard 2004). This view holds 
that, on the one hand, for women in postcolonial communities the day-to-day exigencies 
of social violence often calls for practical strategies of resistance aimed at addressing 
issues of survival, yet on the other hand, as Chandra Mohanty argues, ―colonialism 
almost invariably implies a relation of structural domination, and a suppression—often 
violent—of the heterogeneity of the subject(s) in question‖ that must be addressed at a 
different level (2003, 51). As feminists, for instance, we have to think about the ways in 
which ―if, in the contest of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and cannot 
speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in his shadow,‖ sufficient to constitute 
a layered or doubled—sometimes tripled—oppression (Spivak 1999, 274, my emphasis). 
In light of this, one response is to hold that  
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what the subaltern woman needs is a conceptual framework, a language capable 
of articulating her injuries, needs, and aspirations. The existing discourses or texts 
of exploitation do not provide such a language: even when they promise explicitly 
to liberate the subaltern, they obscure the distinctive nature of her oppression; 
indeed, by purporting to speak for her, they position her as mute. In order to 
articulate her specific exploitation, the subaltern woman must create her own 
language (Jaggar, 1998, 6).  
 
Of help here is the distinction drawn by Ofelia Schutte between two kinds of 
theoretical models in feminist inquiry: participatory and evaluative (1993, 231). For 
Schutte, participatory models are ―those that emphasize the direct and active participation 
of women in public projects‖ with the general aim of increasing their ability ―to exercise 
decision-making power about matters that affect their own lives,‖ and which take 
exclusion to be ―a major feature of domination‖ (ibid). By contrast, evaluative models 
sketch out a primarily conceptual analysis of gender subordination and ―can be traced 
back to a desire for certain theoretical correctness‖ that ranges from ―flexible‖ to ―purist‖ 
approaches to women‘s liberation (231-32). Pluralist evaluative models that also 
incorporate elements of participatory models have been instrumental in addressing 
complex issues of communicative marginalization in Latin America.  
Take the case of Rigoberta Menchú, for example. In 1983 the K‘iche‘ Mayan 
woman attempted to bring attention to the massacre of over 200,000 Maya Indians at the 
hands of the Guatemalan Armed Forces by giving a testimonial account of her 
experiences (testimonio) to an ethnologist. David Stoll, an American anthropologist, 
responded to the subsequent publication of Menchú‘s oral narrative by questioning the 
veracity of her claims. Using a model of speech acts based on a correspondence theory of 
truth, he cast doubt on the legitimacy of her narrative by pointing to apparent 
contradictions in the names and ages of her deceased family members, including the 
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manner of death. While Stoll claimed his intent was not to challenge the primacy of 
larger claims to genocide by the K‘iche‘ community, the debate stirred up enough 
controversy as to usurp the urgency of Menchú‘s plea for intervention and instead 
disseminated her narrative within the broader academic discourses of the ‗culture wars‘ 
that were emerging in the 1980s.  
 
The evaluative model is important because, if we look to some of the Western 
conceptual biases inflected into Amerindian cultural traditions through colonialism—as 
in the assumption that history is a linear narrative based on logographic recording 
methods (which privilege literacy)— we find that the speaking positions of modern 
K‘iche‘ are always interwoven, pre-predicatively, with a cultural history marked by 
relations of power and domination, and which become visible each time the Western 
observer‘s claim to finding ‗textual distortions‘ in K‘iche‘ narrative texts arises. 
However, participatory models are equally important because Menchú is not speaking in 
a vacuum, but from the concrete historical situation of ethnic genocide and violence 
against indigenous communities.  
 
There are many factors that can lead to the communicative marginalization of 
subaltern subjects, or to an erasure of their cultural differences. For instance, one 
argument commonly emerges which points to pre-Hispanic Mayan codices (hieroglyph 
scripts) as sharing many of the same conventions typically associated with ‗Western‘ 
historiography. While recent scholarship suggests Mayan scripts are meant to be sung 
rather than ‗read‘, by all accounts they seem to enumerate a coherent, meaningful 
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continuity of politically-significant events, including the successive names of rulers, 
priestly casts and local rights of administration, etc. In turn, scholars like Stoll have 
deduced from this Mesoamerican history a more general, cross-cultural standard of 
rationality assumed to exist below the level of culture, and which can be steadfastly 
applied to the formal study of objects in empirical research, including ethnography. Yet 
paradoxically, this argument may reinforce the existence of cultural difference, historical 
injustice and cross-cultural misrecognition in the Latin American context.  
We know, for example, that in Mesoamerican K‘iche‘ society there existed an 
influential priestly scholarly community known as the aj tz‟ibab. Because the aj-tz‟ibab 
sustained Mayan religious practice through the composition and interpretation of 
calendars, Spanish conquerors quickly moved to eradicate both the religious calendars 
and their perceived ‗authors‘ (Carmack 1973, 17). The violent extermination of the aj 
tz‟ibab are significant to the de-legitimization of Menchú‘s narrative almost 500 years 
later, since, as George Lovell and Christopher Lutz point out,  
 
once the practice of training ‗historians‘ was curtailed—it was a Kaqchikel 
[Menchú‘s tribe] custom also, we should note—the loss must have had a serious 
impact on the accuracy and care with which Maya authors later wrote títulos, 
memorias, and relaciones. The disappearance of professionals such as the aj 
tz‟ibab would surely have affected how Maya oral tradition was passed down 
through the generations (2001, 171).  
 
Careful not to treat ‗history‘ as a universal category of analysis, Lovell and Lutz 
are not concerned with the preservation of standards of ‗care‘ and ‗accuracy‘ in historical 
science, but with the Eurocentric devaluation of proverbial, metaphoric and oral-poetic 
elements in K‘iche‘ narratives—something they accuse Stoll of doing. On their view, any 
chance of judging K‘iche‘ narrative practices according to standards similar to those of 
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Western historical science were eradicated when the aj tz‟ibab were massacred. Thus, the 
development of certain oral-poetic, mnemonic features in K‘iche‘ narrative practice after 
the conquest owes much to the fact that, while Spanish conquerors violently forced a 
functional change in sign-systems onto Amerindian linguistic communities, they 
simultaneously excluded those communities from practices (such as literacy) that would 
allow them to engage collectively in the interpretive processes of culture.  
This does not mean, however, that the K‘iche‘ do not have a sense of ―historical 
memory,‖ only that the communal narrative which sustains it had to be based—following 
the conquest—on the mnemonic devices of orality: ―factual discrepancies and 
contradictions, questions of authority and representation, the purposeful act of 
simplifying, embellishing, improvising,‖ and rhetorical repetition not only underlie 
Menchú‘s narrative, but the sixteenth-century memorias (‗memoirs‘) sent by K‘iche‘ 
Indians to King Philip II of Spain as well (186). In light of this example, we see how, 
when a modern K‘iche‘ goes to speak or make claims on behalf of their community, 
relations of power and domination already shape their enunciative attempts: their very 
language and narrative practices are a product of this history of domination.
27
  
 
This problem of the subaltern, postcolonial subject‘s incapacity to speak in terms 
unencumbered by a problematic cultural heritage (or histories of domination) allows us to 
critique contemporary hermeneutics on a number of fronts.  
First, the historical tradition that constitutes the hermeneutic web of meanings is 
largely monolithic, invariably rooted in a framework of Greek, Judeo-Christian and 
Enlightenment assumptions, and fails to account for the existence of a ―plurality of 
60 
 
cultural traditions‖ in colonial situations (Mignolo 1995, 19). That is to say, for Walter 
Mignolo, ―colonial situations imply a plurality of traditions (instead of an ‗ongoing 
natural one‘) that call for a redefinition of Gadamer‘s philosophical hermeneutics, and 
invite a pluritopic, instead of a monotopic hermeneutics‖ (ibid). As we‘ll see shortly, this 
latter brand of one-dimensional hermeneutics results in a failure to grasp the extent to 
which intercultural communication already entails forms of discursive violence because 
the complex and heterogeneous situations of colonial subjects are never addressed.  
Second, philosophical hermeneutics as it manifests in the work of Heidegger and 
Gadamer is largely concerned with the broad question of how meaning is constituted and 
sustained within the horizon of Western history. The particular social and political 
oppressions that emerge when the Western horizon covers over an indigenous, 
Amerindian horizon are overlooked. Thus, philosophical hermeneutics, as Richard 
Bernstein notes, fails to offer  
an adequate conceptual understanding of what stands in the way, blocks, and 
distorts authentic cultural understanding in the contemporary world. Gadamer is 
not primarily a social and political thinker. We will not find in his hermeneutics a 
developed notion of how power, force, and violence actually work in 
contemporary societies (1996, 39).
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In the remainder of this chapter, I want to explore specific instances of what 
‗stands in the way, blocks, and distorts‘ attempts at intercultural dialogue and 
understanding by turning to colonial history and the colonization of Amerindian 
languages. In so doing, I hope to contribute to this conversation by giving a more robust 
account of the complexities involved in speaking through cultural situations colored by 
colonial experience, and which bear a strong (yet largely unacknowledged) imprint in the 
difficult epistemic labors performed by marginalized postcolonial subjects, and women in 
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particular, in the course of intercultural dialogue.  
 
 II.  Modern Alphabetic Literacy and the Conquest of the Americas  
 
In his acclaimed The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and 
Colonization (1995), Walter Mignolo gives a detailed account of how European powers 
conquered vast Amerindian territories through the imposition of foreign categories of 
knowledge, of which the most important were Western literacy and the alphabetic 
technologies that supported it. For Mignolo, by colonizing Amerindian languages through 
a threefold process of alphabetization, orthographic systematization, and translation into 
European dictionaries, sixteenth-century missionary ethnographers displaced the primacy 
of speech and orality in Mesoamerican culture. They overlooked the fact that ―speech and 
writing, in Amerindian societies, were not related and were not conceived in the same 
way that they were in Greece and in the construction of the Western tradition‖ (2004b, 
298). In light of this, the imposition of Greco-Roman alphabetic scripts as the basis for 
speech communication made it difficult for surviving Amerindians to express, to use one 
example, embodied relations of mutuality and interwoven reciprocity with their life-
world, as these relations often had to be performed or sung, and could not be reduced to 
the conventions of Western scribal technology.  
In fact, the Nahua scholar James Lockhart has remarked that the very notion of a 
‗word‘ was alien to contact-era Nahuatl speakers, who, when forced to abandon native 
writing systems for alphabetic writing, ―transcribed sound, syllables, and sentences but 
not words‖ (Mignolo 2004b, 296). The anthropologist Mark King has reinforced this 
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point in other Amerindian languages, adding that the calendar day names in Quiché 
[K‘iche‘] are untranslatable into Spanish as proper names—that ―in actual practice names 
are ‗read‘ not as words in themselves but as a kind of oral rebus for quite other words,‖ 
which are in turn linked back to ―the social actions that characterize them‖ instead of ―a 
fixed inventory of symbols‖ that map one-to-one onto an ‗objective‘ world (2004, 113). 
This kind of cyclical, woven reciprocity between language and the human life world was 
not only shattered by ―the solidification brought about by alphabetic writing‘‖—insofar 
as it was ―at odds with an autochthonous connectedness to things,‖ (Tomlinson 30) but 
also showed that ―one of the problems for the Western mind is conceiving of tangible and 
graphic systems of communication that are qualitatively different from alphabetic 
writing‖ [―uno de los problemas para la mente occidental es concebir sistemas tangibles y 
gráficos de communicación cualitativamente diferentes de la escritura alfabética‖] 
(Quispe-Agnoli, 292).  
Deeply influenced by Serge Gruzinski‘s La Colonizasion de L‟imaginaire: 
Sociétés Indigenes et Occidentalisation dans le Méxique Espagnole, xvème-xviiième 
Siècles (1988), Mignolo‘s analysis represented a significant turn in theoretical approaches 
to the study of colonized languages in the Americas (Castro-Klaren 1998).
29 Prior to this, 
the imposition of peninsular Spanish and the suppression of native Amerindian languages 
were primarily understood through a political paradigm, one rooted in contemporary 
analyses of medieval political philosophy and the role of language in imperial state-
building projects. Consider, for instance, the Bishop of Avila‘s advice to Queen Isabella, 
the Spanish Catholic monarch in 1492: 
Soon Your Majesty will have placed her yoke upon many barbarians who speak 
outlandish tongues. By this, your victory, these people shall stand in a new need: 
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the need for the laws the victor owes to the vanquished, and the need for the 
language we shall bring with us (qtd. in Humphreys, 313).  
 
Language, on this view, was the natural ―companion of empire‖—to use Antonio 
Nebrija‘s famous phrase30— because it could unify and impose a certain regulative 
authority over large groups of people on par with centralized forms of governance or 
religion. It was a tool to be used like any other, and Spain‘s political reality in the 
decades leading up to 1492, the year Spain became a unified state, testified to the success 
of language polices over large territories. In 1492, Spain‘s re-conquest (Reconquista) of 
the Iberian peninsula drew to a close with the expulsion of the last of the Arab 
settlements (dating from 711 AD), and one way to unite the remaining loose federation of 
states, comprising of Aragonese, Catalan, Leonese, and Basque speakers, was through a 
common tongue: Castilian (Mar-Molinero 2000, 1-38). The process of ‗Castilianization‘ 
of peninsular languages was thus bound up with the construction of a national identity for 
political gain. Given this history, beginning in the nineteenth century, scholarly interest in 
Amerindian languages revolved around the issue of cultural sovereignty and the recovery 
of a Pre-Columbian heritage in decolonization efforts.  
Mignolo‘s approach differs from this interpretation of the role of language in 
colonization insofar as he highlights the epistemic consequences of imperial language 
policies as well as the role of ―the theoretical languages of modernity‖ in shaping the 
colonial project at large (1995, ix).
31
 He draws from a wide variety of sources, most 
notably cultural anthropology, Latin American social theory, postcolonial historiography, 
and ancient literary studies, all in an attempt to articulate a framework that can account 
for interpretive differences covered-over by colonialism. He terms this approach 
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―pluritopic hermeneutics‖. As Ofelia Schutte explains, Mignolo uses this notion  
to analyze the effects of Spanish conquest and colonization in a non-Eurocentric 
way while also pointing to a blind spot or lapse in colonial thinking…‗pluritopic 
hermeneutics‘ reverses the established Eurocentric linear thinking with an 
interpretive counterstance in which concepts of time and space held by various 
indigenous societies could be cognitively mapped in a type of side-by-side 
relation to those of the Iberians, rather than subordinating the former to the latter. 
In this view, the adoption of a pluritopic hermeneutics performs a valuable role in 
allowing for a decolonization of the interpretive methods by which one may come 
to understand indigenous thinking and cultural practices (as they would no longer 
be subsumed by an alien imaginary and symbolic order) (2010, 318).  
 
Although there is some ambiguity in Mignolo‘s broader theoretical claims, The 
Darker Side of the Renaissance makes clear that ―the Spaniards erased the differences 
between the two cultures by using their description of themselves as a universal frame for 
understanding different cultural traditions,‖ and that a theoretical remedy must be sought 
(1995, 96). What is not often clear from the beginning, however, is the unique status of 
European colonialism amongst other forms of cultural imperialism or territorial 
expansion. That is to say, the question arises as to whether or not this unilateral cultural 
projection is in fact a general attribute of religious and political expansion projects 
throughout world history —whether it happens to come at the helm of a Charlemagne, 
Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, or in our case, Hernán Cortéz. How is European 
colonialism different than, say, the Norman conquest of England? The Norman invasion, 
after all, resulted in the linguistic imposition of Old Norse and Anglo-French phonetic 
variants, sufficient to transform Old English into what the medieval scholar Kate Wiles 
has called ―post-conquest English‖(2009). Finally, what of well-known cases of cultural 
imposition within Mesoamerica, most notably through the Aztec domination of the region 
and the imposition of tribute regulations on the Tarascans and Tlaxcalans?  
 For Gayatri Spivak as for other historiographers of the colonized world, the 
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difference lies in the starting assumptions European ‗conquerors‘ held about the peoples 
and territories they ‗discovered‘ (Said 1994, Bhabha 1994, Ghuha 1988). She calls this 
the assumption of ―terra nullis,‖ the idea that native inhabitants were like a blank slate 
not yet ‗inscribed‘ with a prior background of meaningful cultural norms and practices— 
a type of no man‘s land free for the taking (1999, 212-13). Because the ―assumption of an 
uninscribed earth that is the condition of possibility of the worlding of a world generates 
the force to make the ‗native‘ see himself as ‗other‘,‖ European colonialism had the 
added consequence of alienating Amerindian peoples from their own self-identifications 
(or contextual ‗worlds‘) and replacing them with, among other things, a negative 
interpretation of themselves under the subordinated side of imperial binaries (as in 
master/slave, civilized/uncivilized, Spaniard/Indian, etc.) (ibid).  
 
Under the imperial rubric, Amerindians were seen, at best, as noble savages in the 
primitive stages of cultural development (but capable of either quasi or full rationality, 
and hence of ‗human rights‘) and at worst, brute savages existing in a state of nature 
without meaningful cultural indicators, but with the minimal rationality for 
evangelization. The French naturalist Georges-Louis Leclerc (1707 -1788) expressed the 
latter view, which continued well past the eighteenth century, as the notion that ―all 
natural Americans were, or still are, savages; Mexicans and Peruvians have been so 
recently brought under orderly government that they should not be considered an 
exception. Whatever the origin of these savage nations is, it must be common to all‖ (qtd. 
in Zavala, 333). This position is not unique to Leclerc, and became particularly 
entrenched in Western thought through the Hegelian idea that ―universal history goes 
from East to West,‖ with Europe as the telos or absolute end of history. Not surprisingly, 
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in Hegel‘s Philosophy of History (1837), the destruction of Native Amerindian culture is 
explained in terms of ‗natural inferiority‘—the idea that ―culturally inferior nations such 
as these are gradually eroded through contact with more advanced nations which have 
gone through a more intensive cultural development‖(164). Like Leclerc, Hegel 
contends:  
We do have information concerning America and its culture, especially as it had 
developed in Mexico and Peru, but only to the effect that it was a purely natural 
culture which had to perish as soon as the spirit approached it. America has 
always shown itself physically and spiritually impotent, and still shows itself so. 
For after the Europeans had landed there, the natives were gradually destroyed by 
the breath of European activity. Even the animals show the same inferiority as the 
human beings…they are obviously unintelligent individuals with little capacity 
for education. Their inferiority, in all respects, even in stature, can be seen in 
every particular (ibid).
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The Latin American philosopher Enrique Dussel has commented at length on the 
deep complicity between European modernity and colonization efforts in America and 
Africa, drawing attention to Hegel‘s assertion that ―Africa…does not properly have a 
history. For this reason we abandon Africa, we will mention it no more‖ (1995, 22). The 
notion that native inhabitants are without a properly recognizable history or meaningful 
framework of reference can also be seen in the voluminous records of ethnographic 
correspondences between state emissaries and European monarchs.
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 Consider the first letter to be sent from Brazil. On May 1, 1500, Pedro Vaz de 
Caminha, then stationed at Porto Seguro de Vera Cruz in the Andes, sent a letter to King 
Manuel I of Portugal detailing his impression of native Amerindians. He writes:  
They seem to me people of such innocence that if one could understand them and 
they us, they would soon be Christians, because they do not have or understand 
any belief…I do not doubt that they will become Christians, in accordance with 
the pious intent of Your Highness… for it is certain these people are good and of 
pure simplicity, and there can easily be stamped upon them whatever belief we 
wish to give them (my emphasis).  
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European colonization is unique because, by contrast, the violent encounters between 
Carthage and Rome, Aztec ritual warfare with Tlaxcalans, the Ottoman incursion into 
Byzantium, Mongol control of Eurasia and the Norman conquest of England can all be 
situated within a larger framework of pre-conquest cultural contact, whether through 
territorial wars, religious excursion, commercial trade, piracy, or migratory settlement. 
They were aware of one another‘s existence, either through first hand encounters or 
allusions in epic narratives. Amerindians had no such cultural record of white Europeans. 
Although Aztecs and Tlaxcalans (to use one example) may have wished to ‗stamp 
whatever belief‘ upon the other, most likely judging one another‘s interpretive framework 
and cultural beliefs as inferior, the assumption never went so far as to hold that the other 
had ‗no beliefs‘ or background framework.  
But part of this ‗blank slate‘ assumption, as Angel Rama has argued, also has to 
do with providing a requisite justification for imperial settlement in the first place. In The 
Lettered City (1996) he explores this notion by analyzing the relationship between  
Western literacy (as a stratifying, privileged practice) and urban planning/architectural 
policies in Colonial America. Rama points out that in an effort to bring to life ―the ideal 
of the city as the embodiment of social order,‖ native landscapes ―were blindly erased by 
the Iberian conquerors to create a supposedly ‗blank slate‘ ‖ that could accommodate 
their visions of the orderly city; the tool which helped them achieve this was an 
administrative bureaucracy ruled by restricted access to the official instruments of 
writing. What‘s more, ―this ordering impulse could do relatively little to transform the 
old cities of Europe, where the stubbornly material sediments of the past encumbered the 
flight of a designer‘s fancy, but it found a unique opportunity in the virgin territory of an 
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enormous continent‖ (1-2).  
In either case, this is a uniquely recurrent theme in the colonization of the 
Americas, and Mignolo‘s early work on colonial historiography of language brings this 
problem to the forefront. He finds powerful evidence for this in a 1529 letter addressed to 
Phillip II, where Fray Pedro de Gante remarked of the difficulty in teaching the gospel to 
―people without writing, without letters, without written characters and without any kind 
of enlightenment (era gente sin escriptura, sin letras, sin caracteres y sin lumbre de cosa 
alguna)‖ (1989, 66) but also in the common and repeated expression ―this language lacks 
such and such letters (esta lengua carece de tales letras)‖ found throughout Amerindian 
grammars and missionary ethnographies, to which we now turn (1995,46).  
 
For European colonizers, ―knowledge was the sum of observations classified and 
categorized through language, a system of referential signs connected by logical 
operations suited to represent external reality‖‘ that differed significantly from the 
existing relationship between knowledge, language, and reality in pre-Hispanic America 
(Zavala 1989, 323). Principles of interwoven reciprocity and embodiment governed the 
latter, such that, to use Lockhart‘s example, at the level of spoken language every 
Nahuatl noun ―is at least potentially a complete equative (relational) statement in itself‖ 
with an internal subject and verb (2001,11). Assigning a formal grammar to Nahuatl 
based on the logical operations of Western syntax obscures the fact that ―the most basic 
words are, in Richard Andrew‘s term, ‗sentence-words,‘‖ with predicates already 
included in every substantive (Tomlinson, 29). For example, the noun 
tenepantlamoquetzani roughly translates as "one who puts himself between those who are 
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quarreling in order to calm them" (Maffie 2007, 4).
34 
Speakers of Indo-European languages have great difficulty grasping this braided 
complexity between spoken language and the proximate world. This is largely due to 
underlying Western assumptions about the nature of the world and the self that are, in 
turn, encoded in subject-predicate grammar. The most prominent of these assumptions is 
the subject/object distinction. In Nahuatl, no such distinction holds, and can be seen in 
the total absence of third-person (singular and plural) subject prefixes and the 
agglutinating restrictions placed on the first person subject prefix. This means that any 
reference to an ―I‖ must be compounded with broader concepts with no way of stressing 
the independence of the singular subject (likewise, there is no differentiation between the 
nominative case personal pronouns in the second person, as ‗you‘ and ‗we‘ both share the 
prefix form ―ti‖). On this account, designating an instrumental relationship between 
acting subjects and independent objects is very difficult without an independent ―it‖.   
Interestingly, whereas third person subject prefixes do not exist in Nahuatl, third 
person possessive prefixes of nouns appear, but as unstressed parts of nouns. This owes 
to the conceptual reciprocity between spoken language and the Nahua life-world. That is 
to say, because ‗houses‘ (as human dwelling places) are inextricably related to the people 
that inhabit them, there is no way to simply say the noun ―house‖ independently of this 
social context. Thus, ―calli‖ has a third person subject built into it (-i) that means ―it is a 
house,‖ or, more precisely, ―that it is a house‖ (for him, her, or those who dwell in it), as 
the translation ‗it is a house‘ places undue emphasis on the noun as an impersonal object. 
Lastly, because no human stands alone, ―Nahuatl has absolutely no way to say ‗he‘ or 
she‘,‖ and remains ambiguous in the third person singular possessive (in both gender and 
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number) (Lockhart 2007, 1-51). This is reflective of a communitarian ethos where every 
being is a relational being already woven into a reciprocal stance with one another, and 
where speech communication is more reflective of, what Martin Buber would call, an ―I-
thou‖ rather than an ―I-it‖ relationship (Buber 1923).  
Much of the grammatical ambiguity in classical Nahuatl and other contact-era 
Amerindian languages can be traced to the fact that reality itself was understood as 
―irreducibly ambiguous‖ (Maffie 2010, 13). European-trained ethnographers and 
grammarians, of course, had a radically different background understanding of language 
and reality. This difference is evident in Cornelius de Pauw‘s (1739-1799) oft-cited 
Recherches Philosophiques sur les Américains (1771), where he observes that ―les 
langues de l‘Amérique sont si bornées, si destitutés de mots, qu‘il est imposible de render 
par leur moyen un sens métaphysique: il n‘y a acune de ces langues dans laquelle on 
puisse compter au-delà de trios‖ (II, 162). Although typical of the time, the rising 
primacy of reason and Enlightenment egalitarian ideals began to stir intellectual debates 
in Europe surrounding the adequacy of this view. In his Historia Antigua de Mexico 
(1780), for example, the Jesuit historian Francisco Xavier Clavigero (1731-1787) 
responds:  
The languages of America, says M. de Pauw, are so limited, and so scarce in 
words, that it is impossible to express any metaphysical idea in them. In no one of 
those languages can they count above three…M. de Pauw is no less wrong in 
affirming, that the languages of America are so poor, that they cannot express a 
metaphysical idea (an opinion M. de Pauw has learned from M. Condamine). 
Time, says this philosopher treating of the languages of America, duration, space, 
being, substance, matter, body, all these words, and many others, have no 
equivalents to them in their languages; and not only the names of metaphysical 
beings, but also those of moral beings cannot be expressed, unless imperfectly and 
by long circumlocution… it is very true that the Mexicans had no words to 
express such concepts as matter, substance, accident, and the like; but it is equally 
so that no language of Asia, or Europe had such words before the Greeks began to 
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refine them and abstract their ideas, and to create new terms to express 
them…(396, translation modified).  
 
By repositioning Europe on a historical continuum tracing back to ancient Greece, 
and the Greek metaphysical tradition, it would seem Clavigero might move towards a 
recognition of basic cultural differences between Europe and the Americas, one that is 
based on regional histories and the contingent philosophical traditions that emerge from 
them. Instead, the long-standing assumption of an Indigenous terra nullis is applied to 
Amerindian conceptual frameworks in order to superimpose European values and ideas 
on them. Clavigero does this by pardoning the ―ancient Mexicans‖ for having ―no 
concern with the study of metaphysics,‖ and consequently, for ―not having invented 
words to express those ideas,‖ yet insisting on the natural transferability of metaphysical 
concepts onto Amerindian languages:  
We, on the contrary, affirm, that it is not easy to find a language more fit to treat 
metaphysical subjects than the Mexican: as it would be difficult to find another 
which abounds so much as it in abstract terms; for there are few verbs in it from 
which are not formed verbals corresponding with those in ‗-io‟ of the Romans; 
and but few substantive or adjective nouns from which are not formed abstracts 
expressing the being, or as they say in the schools, the quiddity of things…(397, 
my emphasis).  
 
Born in Veracruz, Mexico, to a Spanish state emissary and educated in the 
Mexican provinces of Puebla and Morelos, Clavigero‘s Historia is important on account 
of the thirty six plus years he spent living in the ‗new world‘ prior to Charles III‘s 
expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767. Part of his argument against the French naturalists (e.g., 
Georges-Louis Leclerc, Cornelius de Pauw, Charles-Marie de la Condamine) in fact 
concerns what he considered to be their mere status as ―travelers,‖ foreign visitors 
without the proper background cultural knowledge for their ethnographic claims (199, 
357). In particular, he accuses de Pauw, as representative of these views, of 
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misunderstanding the nature of Amerindian Amoxtli and Tacu (painted codices), which de 
Paw saw as character-less drawings far inferior to Egyptian hieroglyphic writing (373-
74). Differentiating himself from the naturalists, Clavigero notes that ―the understanding 
of those paintings is not difficult to any person who has knowledge of the manner in 
which the Mexicans usually represented things, the characters which they made use of, 
and their language; but to M. De Pauw they would be as unintelligible as those of the 
Chinese expressed in the proper characters of that nation‖ (401). Clavigero clearly saw 
himself as well-versed in Amerindian culture, less by formal study than by first-hand, 
practical experience and immersion in Nahua language. This, then, does not explain why, 
despite decades of cultural immersion, Clavigero still ascribes European linguistic habits 
to Nahuatl speakers. He offers the following chart ―to the curious among our readers‖ as 
absolute nouns ―signifying metaphysical and moral ideas, which are understood by the 
rudest of Indians‖ (397):  
 
Clavigero‘s semantic equivalencies, along with the parallelism he finds between 
Nahuatl and Roman verb structures—particularly in light of his first-hand experience 
with Nahuatl speakers— should make evident the idea that ―the conceptualization (i.e., 
the ‗meaning network‘) associated with word[s] and activit[ies] is culture specific,‖ in the 
sense that it requires a series of cultural pre-understandings that illuminate all human 
practices (be it words, actions, etc.) in specific, meaning-laden ways (Mignolo, 1995, 
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119). Clavigero‘s selection of ‗essence, goodness, truth, reflection,‘ but also ‗king‘ as 
lexical bearers of moral meaning is a strong indicator of this, as it ties him to a Western 
philosophical tradition where self-conscious reflexivity is a prerequisite for correct 
judgment (but also for achieving moral goodness), all the while situating him within the 
broader norms of eighteenth century European political discourses (as in the relation 
between sovereign/subject and the construction of statehood).  
Given the importance of background contexts, the philosopher James Maffie has 
noted the extent to which contact-era indigenous thought reflected metaphysical and 
epistemic principles alien to post-Socratic Western thought. He attempts to remedy this 
situation by giving a detailed account of Pre-Columbian Aztec and Andean thought using 
a mix of pre-conquest primary sources, archeological remains, and post-conquest 
ethnohistories. To avoid the trappings of a rational reconstruction of history, Maffie 
employs a critical methodology for triangulating between these sources, noting the 
difficulty and limitations involved in such a project (2010, 9). He stops short, however, of 
an equally ethnocentric bias that claims non-Western peoples cannot have categories of 
knowledge that bear resemblance to Western philosophy, or that only westerners have 
asked the question of the meaning of Being (Heidegger 1962). Without claiming 
philosophical vocabulary as trans-historic, universally valid categories of analysis, Maffie 
nonetheless asserts ―Pre-Columbian societies contained individuals who reflected 
critically and systematically upon the nature of reality, human existence, knowledge, 
right conduct, and goodness,‖ and who puzzled over questions such as ―how should 
humans act?‖ ―What can humans know?‖ and ―What can humans hope for?‖ (2010, ibid).  
According to Maffie, Aztec (Nahua) and Inca (Andean) philosophies were guided 
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by principles of reciprocity, equilibrium, balance and mutual exchange that presided over 
a flux-filled universe where humans always hung precariously in the balance. 
Amerindians saw themselves—to take an image form Bernardino de Sahagún‘s 
Florentine Codex— as balancing life ―on a razor‘s edge…toiling along a windswept 
ridge, an abyss on either hand‖ (Clendinnen 1995, 25). Yet, as Maffie notes, it is this very 
tension and the oscillating relations of balanced reciprocity surrounding it that make 
human existence possible in the first place (2010, 11).  
Under this account, ―processes rather than perduring objects or substances are 
ontologically fundamental. Activity, motion, flux, time, change, and transformation are 
the principal notions for understanding things‖ (13, my emphasis). These equilibrating 
processes, in turn, are guided by a single ―dynamic, vivifying, eternally self-generating,‖ 
animated (yet non-intentional) force which the Aztecs called ―Teotl‖ and the Inca, 
―Camaquen‖ (ibid). Camaquen (also called camac, upani, or amaya), like a Spinozistic 
substance, permeated all aspects of the cosmos and ―appears to be coextensive with 
existence as such‖ (10). Most significantly, camaquen took the form of non-hierarchical, 
non-exclusionary, reciprocal dualities. For Maffie, these ―interdependent, mutually 
arising, complementary dual forces‖ can be thought as the binaries of ―day/night, 
sun/moon, above/below, cultivated/uncultivated, insider/outsider, life/death‖ with the 
important caveat that one side of the binary is never normatively privileged or overvalued 
over the other (ibid). These binaries (which significantly, do not include ―good/evil‖) in 
fact ―oppose one another but never exclude or contradict one another‖— a reciprocal 
concept that saturated all aspects of Pre-Columbian culture, from double-faced textiles, 
artifacts, public spaces, ritual, and, as we‘ll see in a moment, Mesoamerican writing 
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technologies.  
Like the Andean camaquen, for the Nahua, teotl is the vivifying element in the 
cosmos that, ―properly understood,‖ is ―neither being nor non-being‖ but ―becoming‖: 
―Teotl neither is nor is not: Teotl becomes‖ and ―is at bottom, ontologically ambiguous‖ 
as unordered (i.e., it is neither ―determined or governed top-down by laws or principles‖ 
nor disordered or ―chaotic‖) (13-14). Moreover, just as camaquen takes the form of 
reciprocal dualisms, teotl is understood in terms of ―the autochthonous Nahua notion of 
nepantla‖ (ibid). This is a crucially different concept over Western metaphysics.  
Nepantla can be broadly conceived as a processive totality that brings balance to 
all aspects of the cosmos through an act of ―middling,‖ a ‗thirding‘ of sorts that places all 
things ―within a ‗borderland,‘ i.e., a dynamic zone of mutual interaction, reciprocal 
influence, unstable and diffuse identity, and transformation‖ (14). It cuts across 
conventional categories and leads to one always being ―betwixt and between‖ categories, 
as in a ceaseless state of nepantlatli (the middled balance between two endpoints, where 
anything ―is neither this nor that, yet both‖) (16).35 Lastly, because ―human life takes 
place in [and is of] nepantla,‖ one is always not-yet one, living in a constant rhythmic 
flow of ―change, transition, becoming, and transformation‖ that requires people ―to learn 
how to change, move, and become in balance‖ (18). For this reason, Maffie writes, 
―Nahua wisdom aimed at teaching humans how, like skilled mountain climbers, to 
maintain their balance upon the narrow, jagged summit of the earth‖ or how, ―like 
accomplished weavers, to weave together the various forces and tensions in the cosmos 
and in their lives into a well-balanced fabric‖ (18-19).  
This metaphysical ambiguity helps explain why language, for the Nahua, could 
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never be a purely referential affair (in the sense of subject-object representational 
language). To return to Clavigero‘s ―specimen of words,‖ it should be apparent how 
translating ―truth‖ simply as ―Neltiliztli‖ misses (or in fact, covers-over) the contextual 
embeddedness of Nahua thought. To clarify,  
Nahua epistemology does not embrace semantic goals such as truth for truth‘s 
sake, correct description, or accurate representation. The aim of cognition is 
walking in balance upon the slippery earth, and epistemologically good (cualli) 
cognition is that which promotes this aim... Nahua philosophy conceives of truth 
in terms of authenticity, genuineness, and well-rootedness in and non-referential 
disclosing of teotl—not in terms of correspondence, aboutness, or representation 
(contra most Western philosophy)…expressing one‘s understanding of teotl 
requires a non-binary mode of expression, viz. ‗flower and song‘ (Leon-Portilla 
1963, 75). Artistic activity generally, but especially singing and poetry—rather 
than advancing of discursive arguments—is the truest most authentic way of 
expressing one‘s understanding of teotl. Philosophers are perforce poet-singers 
and artists who unconceal teotl through metaphorical speech and artistic image. 
Finally, because teotl is unordered, betwixt-and-between, etc., human beings are 
unable to fully comprehend teotl (Maffie 2010, 19-20, my emphasis).  
 
Thus, we are now in a position to see how Mesoamerican writing systems, as one 
aspect of Amerindian languages, reflected key themes in pre-Columbian thought. In stark 
contrast to chirographic, Western literary practices, Amerindians wrote without words. 
Instead, they employed nonalphabetic scripts such as the Andean knotted strings called 
khipus (also quipu, or quippus), Mayan hieroglyphs, Aztec codices (narrative 
pictographs) and book-like amoxtli (also tacu, or vuh for Mayans), and many other forms 
of textiles, including the woven tocapu and wooden keros. With the exception of Mayan 
hieroglyphs, by and large, modern Western linguists do not recognize khipus, codices, 
tacu and textiles like tocapu as real scripts or ―true writing,‖ reducing them to simple 
―aides-mémoire‖ in cultures characterized by ―primary orality‖ (Diringer 1953; Gelb 
1963; Ong 1988, 83; Lounsbury 1989, 203). Mayan hieroglyphs, which currently date 
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from as far back as the third century B.C., have fared better on account of their 
logographic qualities; because they are made up of pictorialized logograms (with 
accompanying sets of phonetic clues in later glyphs), they resembled ‗embryonic‘ 
attempts at transcribing spoken language into fixed form, and could thus, like Egyptian 
hieroglyphs, fit into the traditional classificatory schema for the development of Western 
writing (Houston 2004b, 352).  
The idea that Amerindian writing systems were at embryonic or early stages of 
chirographic development—which, given enough time and favorable conditions— might 
have blossomed into a robust semiotic system of standardized markings (with a fixed 
phonetic value and accompanying rule-system for correct combinatorial use) is an 
occidental prejudice, and a deep one at that.  
 
In Writing Without Words: Alternative Literacies in Mesoamerica and the Andes 
(2004), Elizabeth Hill Boone and Walter Mignolo trace this evolutionary model to the 
privileging of alphabet-based chirographic literacy in post-Homeric Greece and its 
resurgence in the European Renaissance (228). Boone, in particular, cites Isaac Taylor‘s 
1899‘s ―five-stage sequence for the development of writing, which he explained as  
progressing from pictures to pictorial symbols, verbal signs, syllabic signs, and  
ultimately alphabetic signs‖ (6). Out of this modern historical matrix, a conception of 
‗true writing‘ arose that, by definition, excluded systems other than syllabic and 
alphabetic writing. Offering a critique of such a model is especially germane to 
discussions on colonialism given that, in the sixteenth century, even humanist ‗defenders‘ 
of Amerindian‘s rights held that ―barbarians are those who lack a literary language (qui 
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literali sermone carent) which corresponds to their mutual idiomatic language, as is Latin 
to us, and thus do not know how to express what they think‖ (Mignolo, 78, citing Fray 
Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484-1566)). Mignolo hence takes issue with David Diringer‘s 
(1962) influential definition of writing as more than any semiotic mark with culturally-
situated meaning (in the hermeneutic sense); ―pure‖ writing, on Diringer‘s view, arose 
when, along with the semiotic mark or practice, ―a coded system of visible marks was 
invented whereby a writer could determine the exact words that the reader would 
generate from the text‖ in an objective fashion (229). We see this still today, for example, 
in the notion that ―textile specialists continue their quest for a Rosetta stone leading to the 
decoding of Inca information in woven tocapu according to the rules of Inca logic,‖ 
including the use of complex mathematical algorithms (even game theory) for breaking 
the ‗code‘ behind the recurring, dualistic patterns in Andean textiles (Heckman 2004, 52). 
The point Mignolo tries to make throughout the course of his writings on Amerindian 
languages, and which at times can be difficult to discern, is that the ‗code‘ is culture 
itself—i.e., it is not learned but inhabited— and that at the time of the conquest, 
Spaniards rooted in their own codes failed to see that a fully fleshed-out, intricate code 
―co-existed‖ in the Americas prior to European ‗discovery‘ of the New World:  
The missionaries believed that Amerindians did not have a language sufficient to 
explain the mysteries of the Holy Catholic Faith, but the missionaries did not 
consider the possibility that their own language was equally insufficient to 
account for Amerindian matters, among them the Amerindian uses and 
conceptualization of painting, carving, and weaving (e.g. writing) and the role that 
these played in society (2004a, 225). 
 
They were, in other words, ‗mono‘-topical as opposed to ‗pluri‘-topical in their 
thinking. In addition, Mignolo also wants to say that there are some codes that, because 
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of their history, notions of language, reality, the self, etc., lend themselves to this kind of 
perspectival attitude, but that this is something that must itself be pointed out (as the 
monolithic process of colonization can obscure the complexities of our hermeneutic 
situation). Trying to decipher a tocapu, or other Andean textiles according to a set of 
‗rules‘ in ‗Inca logic‘, on this view, is something that interpreters shaped by Western, 
modern-European frameworks are apt to do. In the last page of Martin de Murúa‘s 
Historia General del Perú (c.1590), we find such an attempt to provide a background 
‗code‘ or Rosetta stone for the decipherment of Amerindian textiles and weaving 
patterns, with alphabetic technologies as a model. 
 
However, there is very little reason to think Amerindian writing systems would 
have ever developed into an alphabetic script, as all the other parts of the ‗web‘ that held 
those systems in a particular kind of intelligibility supported metaphysical and epistemic 
principles of deep, embodied reciprocity and ambiguity alien to post-Socratic thought, 
and the disambiguating, alphabetic technologies that accompanied it. For instance, take 
the practice of narrative pictography, as seen in Nahua tacu (also amoxtli). These were 
accordion-like sheets of folded bark or deer skin on which paintings conveying a story 
were recorded using (mostly) red and black ink drawn from plants and flowers. Tacu can 
be rendered (roughly, of course) as ‗the act of painting‘ or ‗design-making‘, yet it also 
had a second, equally important sense of attentive listening, (or that one listens) (King, 
2004, 105,127). This draws us to the reciprocal binary of giving/receiving that the 
practice of tacu, as a nepantla process, brought into balance. To write is to ‗rob flowers of 
their color,‘ and so to maintain balance one must reciprocate by listening to ‗the skin of 
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the earth,‘ which, because it is always transient, changing and in flux, can only be (at 
most, dimly) conveyed by humans through the polysemous nature of song. This is why 
written Amerindian scripts, ―as part of the earth,‖ had to be sung and performed out loud 
(107).  
 
 We know, by contrast, that the practice of silent reading, as a process of 
individual interiorization, was a late byproduct of Western modern alphabetic literacy 
(Havelock 1963, Ong 1982). However, as Stephen Houston argues, the Pre-Columbian 
practice of oral performances of written scripts (often called ―recitation literacy‖) has, to 
date, been narrowly understood by Western scholars as a simple consequence of orality, 
and the burdens of memorization oral mnemonics (like repetition, rhythm, meter, 
cadence, improvisation and bodily emphasis) helped relieve (2004a, 30-31): It is a 
―cognitive consequence‖ of the script technologies surrounding different stages of 
writing. For Houston, this is misleading; the constant comparisons with Classical Greece 
have made it difficult to see how Amerindian literacies were primarily ―a product of 
historical and social processes‖ that were ―not intrinsic to the script itself‖ (33). The idea 
that, contra Western epistemology, truth had to be sung, does not then come as a result of 
the oral technologies involved in certain types of Mesoamerican scripts, but from the 
intricate backdrop of a socio-historical life-world that gave rise to them. This helps 
explain why tacu, as a nepantla process, can encompass a range of meanings associated 
with writing, paining, listening, knowing, singing, but also life in general—that one is 
―alive‖ (King, 127). The purpose of Mesoamerican writing was hence not to ‗fix‘ the 
meaning of words through semiotic marks, but to express the various elements of Aztec 
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or Inca culture in a way harmonious with their background assumptions.  
Maffie‘s background context for Pre-Columbian thought helps us recognize how 
painting, as a Mesoamerican script, was no different from weaving or knot-tying in 
quippus, or other texile-based scripts that told narratives without an established 
independent code—and that, in fact, to read these writings aloud, one had to already 
know the story in the first place. Western literacy, on the other hand, presupposes that a 
reader, at the start of a sentence, has no knowledge of its contents, with the book, rather 
than the person, being the site of knowledge and authority (Mignolo 1995).  
But there is still more. In ―The Text in the Body, the Body in the Text: the 
Embodied Signs of Mixtec Writing,‖ John Monaghan confronts the question of 
embodiment that Western literacy often neglects, and which is particularly important for 
understanding the more pernicious aspects of the colonization of Amerindian languages. 
Typically, the embodied relation between literacy and the body is taken to mean that 
―texts, when performed, were given voice through the entire body: through choreography, 
through hand gestures, through spacing, and through the clothing worn, as well as 
through verbal utterances‖ (2004, 91). Monaghan also suggests a deeper sense of 
embodiment in Mesoamerican scripts. Native Amerindians such as Mixtecs, he writes,  
 
use corporeal processes, the functions of organs, and bodily products as models 
for other processes, functions, and products [like weaving or painting]. Thus, 
when producing a history, or a description of a ritual, or an account of how 
settlements may be related to one another, the Mixtec scribe was likely to focus 
on how the event, or practice, or relationship could be expressed in terms of the 
body…the linguistic basis of the sign and the corporeal basis for the sign 
interpenetrate to such an extent that they cannot be separated from one another 
(95-96).  
 
By using indigenous metonymies and homologies ―between the body and the 
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world,‖ Mesoamerican scripts had an incarnate, bodily element that, once gained, 
maintained a balanced network of reciprocity. All of this changed with the introduction of 
the Latin alphabet. According to Mignolo, ―one of the features of alphabetic writing—
which we can guess was one taken for granted by Castilian men of letters—is that it 
permits us to communicate at a distance and to detach the ‗letter‘ (as image of the sound) 
from the body‖ as an equal contributor to the interpretation of meaning (Mignolo 1989, 
56). An alphabet (from the Greek letters alpha, beta, derived from Semitic aleph, beth) 
can be understood as an organized, fixed system of signs ―expressing the basic sounds of 
the language, through which it is possible to record in writing whatever the user wishes to 
express‖ (Ouaknin 1999, 19). To quote the Spanish renaissance humanist Antonio 
Nebrija (1441-1522), ―the letter is nothing more than a trace or figure by means of which 
the voice is represented‖ in a precise, objective fashion devoid of background contexts or 
latticed associations between body, language, culture and the voice (as qtd. in Mignolo 
1995, 42).  
 
The most important record we have today concerning the alphabetization of 
Amerindian languages is Fray Diego de Landa‘s (1524-1579) Relación de las Cosas de 
Yucatán (1566), wherein Landa transcodes isolated Mayan glyphs into letters in the Latin 
alphabet, with the appending remark:  
These people made use of certain characters or letters, with which they wrote in 
their books their ancient matters and their sciences, and by these and by drawings 
and by certain signs in these drawings, they understood their affairs and made 
others understand them and taught them. We found a large number of books in 
these characters and, as they contained nothing in which there were not to be seen 
superstition and lies of the devil, we burned them all, which they regretted to an 
amazing degree, and which caused them much affliction. Of their letters I will 
give here an A,B,C, since their ponderousness does not allow anything more… 
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(169).  
 
Landa‘s assumption that Mayan hieroglyphs had equivalences in the Roman 
alphabet (at least for A, B,C) was taken up by the Franciscan Diego Valdéz (1533-1589) 
in his monumental Rhetorica Christiana (1579), which served as a teaching tool for 
Friars teaching Nahua speakers their own language in Romanized form. But it was not 
enough to teach natives individual letters, for they might employ indigenous principles 
and habits to combine them in particular ways the Friars could not control. There needed 
to be an orthography to set out formal rules of usage, and to ensure Amerindians ‗spoke 
as they wrote, and wrote as they spoke‘ (Nebrija 1517). These grammar books—which 
included the Jesuit Horacio Carochi‘s Arte de la Lengua Mexicana (1645), Fray Alonso 
de Molina‘s Vocabulario en Lengua Castellana y Mexicana (1571), and Fray Domingo 
de Santo Tomás Grammatica o Arte de la Lengua General de los Indios de los Reynos 
del Peru (1560)— were among the first books to be printed in the New World. Their 
orthographic rules introduced subject-predicate grammar, the use of punctuation, word 
spacing, all in the linear conventions of Western literary practices, with economies of 
writing suited to fit the European page rather than deerskin, yarn, bark, or wood.  
 
In later stages, the sedimentation of modern alphabetic literacy also became a 
fulcrum around which the history of ideas could be implanted in the New World, from 
Renaissance humanist thought to the premises of the European enlightenment. For 
instance, the philologist and statesman Andrés Bello (1781-1865) (who, incidentally, 
guided Alexander Von Humboldt during his expedition to Latin America), produced a 
sweeping orthography of the Spanish language in order to ―make writing a faithful and 
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dependable expression of laws, arts, and sciences, and of everything discussed by wise 
and learned men in all professions‖ (1823, 61). His goal, in keeping with the ethos of 
nineteenth-century European political thought, was ―to spread enlightenment in 
America,‖ as this was ―the only way to establish rational freedom, and with the 
advantages of civic culture and public prosperity‖ (71). 
 
 III. The Impact of Colonized Languages: Cultural Alterity and Liminality 
 
One of the greatest impacts of the colonization of Amerindian languages has been 
the closing off of discursive alternatives in culture, as well as the inability to give voice to 
contradictory experiences resulting from the loss of prior cultural contexts. In the 
twentieth century, postcolonial and U.S. third-world women (i.e., postcolonial women 
situated in North America, particularly in North-South borderland regions) began 
attempting to describe this difficult experience of being multicultural in a social context 
where, due to European colonization, certain aspects of one‘s identity were seen as 
inferior in relation to Anglo-European cultural norms (Anzaldúa 1987, Sandoval 2000). 
This hybrid, postcolonial self had the added burden of reconciling these different strands 
of one‘s identity at the same time she negotiated the various norms and standards from 
her different cultural backgrounds:  
Alienated from her mother culture, ‗alien‘ in the dominant culture, the woman of 
color does not feel safe within the inner life of her Self. Petrified, she can‘t 
respond, her face caught between los intersticios, the spaces between the different 
worlds she inhabits (Anzaldúa 1987, 42). 
 
 This experience of being caught ―between worlds‖ while having to address the 
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multiple oppressions that affect one‘s life has been brought to the forefront by Latina 
philosophers like Mariana Ortega, who see a need to better articulate the complex 
experiences of the multicultural self. ―For other multiplicitous selves like me,‖ writes 
Ortega, ―it is liminality, oppression, colonization, erasure, a mix of all these‖ that bear a 
powerful (yet usually unacknowledged) imprint on the lives we live as postcolonial 
women of color (2008, 236). Following the ―phenomenological insight‖ that our 
theoretical frameworks and epistemologies ought to ―do justice to our lived experience,‖ 
Ortega calls attention to blind spots in traditional hermeneutical conceptions of selfhood 
that posit a predominantly stable narrative self-identity (ibid). For Ortega, such accounts 
fail to do justice to the narrative life of multicultural and subaltern subjects because, as 
she explains, 
one of the main sources of anguish for this multicultural self is precisely that, 
unlike Heidegger‘s Dasein, it does not have a sense of all the norms and practices 
of the new context which it now inhabits. Thus it does not relate to the world 
primarily in terms of know-how, [as] Heidegger claims that we do (2001, 9). 
 
 The point Ortega wants to make is that postcolonial subjects dwell in an 
understanding of things marked, not by continuity, but by discontinuity, rupture, and 
alterity. This is because postcolonial subjects ―continually live these experiences of 
uneasiness, even while performing practices that for the dominant group are for the most 
part customary and readily available, or what Heidegger calls ‗ready-to-hand‘ ‖ (10, my 
emphasis). Ortega uses the example of ordinary practices like eating to show how easily 
the hermeneutic notion of pre-reflective understanding breaks down for postcolonial 
subjects, adding that what is at stake in her analysis is something far more important than 
deciding which utensils to use for meals (or whether to use them at all). In this regard, 
Ortega is concerned with ―experiences that deal with more important, agonizing, cultural 
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norms‖ such as norms ―related to our bodies, our sexuality, our educational possibilities, 
our relationships with others, etc.‖ (ibid). Along this same point, understanding how the 
colonization of Amerindian languages forcibly covered-over a range of interpretive 
possibilities in culture can have a therapeutic element for postcolonial subjects feeling 
voiceless or dislocated from the burden of inhabiting multiple cultural contexts.   
 
Take the experience of gender, for example. In Ancient Maya Gender Identity and 
Relations, Karen Bassie-Sweet describes how, ―in the male/female principle, a human 
being was considered to be both male and female, with the right side of the body male 
and the left side female‖—a concept that can be found throughout Mesoamerica and in 
Uto-Aztecan cultures like the Hopi Indians (2002, 169). This is continuous with Maffie‘s 
earlier description of balanced oppositions and reciprocal dualisms in Pre-Columbian 
thought. Now, consider Anzaldúa‘s assertion that ―what we are suffering from is an 
absolute despot duality that says we are able to be only one or the other,‖ either male or 
female but not both (1987, 41). As a chicana (Mexican-American) lesbian woman 
growing up at the Texas-Mexico border, Anzaldúa suffered deep prejudices and 
alienation form her own community on account of her sexuality. ―The people of Hargill, 
in south Texas,‖ she writes, ―believed that if you were a lesbian, you were a woman for 
six months of the year and had periods, and for the other six months, you were a man and 
had a penis‖ (2009, 90). It would seem to be the case that, given the apparent 
continuation and resilience of (at least some aspects of) the male/female principle, so-
called ―half and halfs‖ would not be normatively devalued to the extent that Anzaldúa 
recounts. But when we recall that European colonialism imported a system of 
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exclusionary logic (which would include the laws of identity and non-contradiction) that 
was reinforced through, among other things, gendered articles (in Spanish) and subject-
predicate grammar, we see that for beings caught ―between and betwixt‖ these categories, 
the resources of expression necessary to describe and do justice to such experience are no 
longer at one‘s disposal. Instead, due to the logical rules built into the language we use to 
describe experience, what falls outside these categories or cannot be assimilated through 
them becomes devalued as Other, as outside the norm. Thus, we see here a vivid example 
of the internal clashes, the ―choque‖ Anzaldúa talks about when referring to the multiple, 
but asymentrical contexts of reference postcolonials must inhabit, and which often lead to 
experiences of being ―an outsider‖ at multiple levels—of being ―always the outside of the 
outside of the outside‖ (2009, 90).   
 
From a feminist perspective, there are at least three important consequences of the 
colonization of Amerindian languages. First, it closed off avenues for thinking openly 
and easily about the self as a ―relational being‖ (Held 1990, 724) that is already 
embedded in a network of woven reciprocities and concrete relations with others, and 
where one of these relations includes the reciprocity with one‘s own body as a source of 
moral insight. Second, the colonization of native resources of expression obfuscated the 
ways in which Pre-Columbian thought made room for ambiguity and ambivalence, both 
with respect to reality and identity. (Again, with respect to gender, one did not have to 
fall neatly into either the category of male or female.) Third, feminism‘s concern with 
power inequities alerts us to the fact that modern alphabetic literacy in the Americas 
disenfranchised women by socially legitimating certain knowledges over others—as ―the 
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alphabetic system was the one employed by the colonial administration in all of its 
transactions‖ (Mignolo 2004b, 299)—and by restricting women‘s early access to literacy.  
From this last point, we see there is an important social and political dimension 
that coincides with the linguistic silencing brought on by alphabetization. Amerindians 
had to be taught back their own language after it had been transcoded to the Latin 
alphabet, creating a rift between new categories of ‗literate‘ and ‗illiterate‘ Indians. 
Modern alphabetic literacy, after all, was also a prerequisite for citizenship in the 
constitutions of early Latin American states (Mar-Molinero 2000, 33).
36 
Finally, all three of these concerns unite in discussing post-conquest intercultural 
dialogue. Taken together, these histories have led to a situation where modern 
Amerindians always inhabit a pre-predicative space of, what I call, ―discursive 
liminality‖ with respect to dominant cultures, and where the shared discursive acts and 
practices underlying meaningful communication are themselves rooted in contexts of 
oppression. The quickness with which alphabetic, Romanized Nahuatl took root among 
some Amerindians is an important clue in this direction. Leon-Portilla estimates that by 
1528, less than a decade after Cortez‘s arrival, ―we can feel confident that there certainly 
could have been Nahuas capable of writing their language in Latin script,‖ and that 
within thirty-five years from the conquest, many became particularly adept in order ―to 
protect their privileges and advocate for their interests‖ (1962, xvi-xx).37 And yet, it is 
important to stress that the few Amerindians that became adept at using alphabetic 
Nahuatl were almost all male, as colonialism imposed a new system of gender binaries 
and restrictions that differ significantly form Pre-Columbian conceptions of gender 
(Lugones 2007). Moreover, becoming ‗adept‘ did not mean simply growing into an 
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understanding of those practices, of dwelling meaningfully in a way that allows one to 
make sense of things in one‘s world. For many contact-era and modern Amerindians, to 
use one example, becoming adept at Spanish was akin to becoming adept at Latin 
prayers: ―It‘s something we do, not because we understand it, but because that‘s the way 
it has to be‖ Menchú explains, ―so although it‘s something we say and express…we don‘t 
always understand what it means‖ (1984, 81). This should remind us of the eighteenth-
century collective native testimonies declaring that ―in order for the [Spaniards] not to 
kill us…we have to accept to have water poured on our heads, that we worship the new 
god, [and that we] declare he is the same as the one we had‖ (Leon-Portilla, 161).  
 
In light of this analysis, we ought to gather a deeper sense of the complicated 
factors involved in North-South dialogue, including an awareness of the difficult 
epistemic and interpretive labors marginalized postcolonial subjects must often perform 
without any reciprocal acknowledgment of those efforts. We can now begin to engage 
these epistemic and interpretive difficulties more rigorously. We will do this in the next 
chapter by looking at the account of language offered by poststructuralist philosopher 
Julia Kristeva. I want to suggest that Kristeva‘s thought is important not only because it 
resonates to the postcolonial conception of selfhood that is always fragmented and 
multiplicitous (as in the ―stranger within‖ [1999]), but because it is also attentive to the 
experience of discursive ruptures and breakdowns of meaning that play such a crucial 
role in postcolonial life and are, as I have argued, often neglected in the hermeneutic 
account of language.        
 
90 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: 
Theories of Polyphonic Signification: Kristeva, Bakhtin and Beyond 
 
If the overly constraining and reductive meaning of a language made up of 
universals causes us to suffer, the call of the unnamable, on the contrary, 
issuing from those borders where signification vanishes, hurls us into the 
void of a psychosis that appears henceforth as the solidary reverse of our 
universe saturated with interpretation, faith, or truth. I attempt [to] shed 
light on a number of borderline-practices of meaning and signification 
…[that] scrutinize the most subtle, the most deeply buried logic of those 
unities and ultimate relations that weave an identity for the subject, or 
sign, or sentence.    
      —Kristeva, Desire in Language, preface, x 
 
 
In this chapter, I offer an account of Julia Kristeva‘s early work on language as an 
important alternative to the hermeneutic model, drawing on both its strengths and 
limitations for application in postcolonial, North-South contexts. This suggestion is based 
on intuitions about the problematic dialectical role of ―otherness‖ [Andersseins] in 
hermeneutical self-understanding, whether as a culturally differentiated individual ‗other‘ 
or epistemically as ―the strange (atopon)‖ (Gadamer 1976, 32). While philosophical 
hermeneutics, as we saw in chapter one, places the emphasis on how everyday 
understanding is made possible through a continuity of meaning—often by bridging 
differences or coming to some shared agreement through a ‗fusion‘ of interpretive 
horizons—Kristeva‘s work places the emphasis instead on how the smooth continuity of 
meaning frequently lapses, ruptures, or is breached by pre-predicative bodily drives and 
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desires. Thus, while the hermeneutic model is enormously important for problematizing 
restrictive notions of linguistic practice prevalent in the colonization of Amerindian 
languages—notions which the hermeneutic or ‗expressivist‘ view of language seems to 
better accommodate than ‗designative‘ views—Kristeva‘s model is more pertinent for 
talking about issues of complex communication and the fragmentary, disunifying 
experiences that frequently befall postcolonial subjects, and which Mariana Ortega has 
artfully described as resulting in a type of hybrid, ―multiplicitous subjectivity‖ (2008b, 
65).  
To this end, after drawing important (but often neglected) parallels between 
Kristeva‘s work and that of the Russian post-formalist thinker, Mikhail Bakhtin, I expand 
on Kristeva‘s polyphonic view of human signification as it appears in her seminal 
Revolution in Poetic Language.  Lastly, in carefully situating her work historically 
through the paradigms of Eastern-European and French intellectual history—including 
her own formative experiences in Bulgaria— I suggest that, while Kristeva‘s linguistic 
theories are helpful in rehabilitating static notions of language and subjectivity in 
structural linguistics and psychoanalytic discourse theory, they are still too indebted to 
Western developmental and linguistic frameworks and thus not well suited for addressing 
questions of communicative rupture and marginalization that arise out of the particularity 
of the Latin American experience with European colonization. 
 
I. The Particularity of Language in Postcolonial Latin America  
 
To begin, as we saw in chapter two, in Latin America the philosophical problem 
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of language and its capacity to describe experience emerges in ways different from the 
global North due to the impact of colonialism on Amerindian conceptual frameworks and 
linguistic systems. This is due to the fact that both experience and the means with which 
to describe it have been reconfigured on the basis of, what I call, a ―re-
grammaticalization‖ of experience that is already steeped in the discursive patterns of 
modern European and imperial history. On this view, it was not language itself 
(understood hermeneutically) but rather the underlying rationale and Occidental 
prejudices towards language— the view that language, as we saw in preceding chapters, 
is an impartial, representational system bound by rules of subject-predicate grammar— 
that supported the imperial project‘s objectifying ideology towards the other as a ‗thing‘ 
or ‗native‘ to be studied, manipulated, or possessed; in Aimé Césaire‘s terms, 
―colonization = thingification‖ (1972, 42).  
 
This particular pre-understanding of language, however, was itself not arbitrary or 
unique to the momentous political developments taking shape in fourteenth and fifteenth 
century Spain. Rather, it unfolded over the course of almost two millennia of Greco-
Roman, European social acts and practices originating in Athens in the fifth century B.C., 
and which over time, formed the basis of particular ways of seeing the world, of making 
sense of experience through a collaborative network of metaphysical assumptions and 
conceptual biases. These biases— which include subject-predicate language, Western 
models of human agency (as atomistic individualism), a linear conception of time 
(chronos), an understanding of narrative life based on self-reflexive introspection, 
Gregorian calendrics (which eliminate the night sky as a reference point), non-reciprocal 
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hierarchical binaries, and instrumental forms of rationality, to name just a few—did more 
than simply cover over the interpretive traditions of Mesoamerican communities. Indeed, 
if, following the hermeneutic tradition, we understand language as the background set of 
shared cultural assumptions that make meaning possible to begin with, we see that by 
violently forcing beings into a shared linguistic situation that is not theirs, colonialism 
created a powerful rift between Amerindian lived experience and the adequacy of a 
newly imported Western language to describe such experience.  
 
The word ‗rift‘ has some important consequences here, as it suggests the 
perseverance of some aspect of pre-conquest, Amerindian culture, against which the 
values and norms of Occidental culture cause what Gloria Anzaldúa aptly calls ―un 
choque,‖ a cultural collision or clash. This rift owes much to the fact that modern Latin 
American inhabitants did not simply ‗grow into‘ what Hans-Georg Gadamer calls 
―effective history‖ [Wirkungsgeschichte], the meaningful texts and social narratives that 
constitute their historical lives.  In Latin America, these narratives were inscribed by 
force.  This was done, to use one example, through the active colonization of the 
workday. By imposing such things as the regulatory mechanisms of Western time, 
market-driven standards of productivity, pastoral herding practices, gendered labor 
norms, and the instrumental relation between nature and man, colonial discourse 
forcefully ‗worlded-over‘ the indigenous context…and yet, paradoxically, it was this very 
use of force that made it possible for residual traces of Amerindian culture to persist. As 
Gayatri Spivak has argued in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason (1999), since this 
grafting of foreign practices took place on soil historically cultivated for other practices, 
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other harvests, it resisted the new crop; planting on ―resistant ground‖ thus became the 
ontological basis for the preservation of cultural practices rather than their total 
extinction.  Although Spivak does not expand on this, the underlying assumption is that 
the role of violence in the development of historical traditions is a game changer, because 
it fundamentally affects the very ability of those traditions to sediment themselves and 
settle into the kind of familiarity necessary to operate as ‗effective history‘. 
 
In a broader context, historical examples like these help to explain why Spivak 
proposes a continued ―commitment not only to narrative and counternarrative‖ against 
imperial history, ―but also to the rendering (im)possible of (another) narrative‖ in the 
form of forcibly foreclosed cultural possibilities (1999, 6, my emphasis). The tendency to 
see speech acts as graphematic, for example, foreclosed the articulative range and 
potential of the Andean quippus, the Navajo blanket, as well the narrative mode of 
performance-based history, as in the Sinaloan Danza del Venado.
38
 In our case, the fact 
that colonial orthography did not mark tone, breath, or even nasalization of spoken 
Nahuatl— forcibly recoding the highly polymorphous phonology through the single, 
fixed phonetic meanings assigned to each letter of the Roman alphabet—shows how 
western conceptual biases supported the imperial project in the Americas through 
restrictive notions of linguistic practice.  
 
Due to their rootedness in Greco-Roman semiotic and graphic traditions, the 
modern Western pre-understandings of language could not accommodate the polysemous 
nature of Mixtec lexical structure nor the related cultural understanding of speech 
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communication as a nepantla process—one that, as Maffie explains, ―places all things 
within a borderland, a dynamic zone of mutual interaction‖ and which conceives of the 
speaking subject as a complex, heterogeneous process that is always flexive and 
precariously positioned (Maffie 2010, 9). On this view, by displacing the primacy of 
speech, orality, and non-binary modes of expression in Mesoamerican culture, the 
cultural concealment of speech communication as a nepantla process had a profound and 
lasting impact for modern Amerindians. In particular, one place this impact emerges is in 
a sense of ‗inarticulacy‘ or diminished verbal competency postcolonial people may 
experience in communicative exchanges with members of dominant cutlures.  
 
For these reasons, in the preceding chapters, I have tried to make evident the 
claim that speech is always more than speech acts, particularly in the context of 
Amerindian languages. The hermeneutic/expressivist view of language outlined in 
chapter one helps us see that there are many ways of speaking, of making manifest or 
fitting together the range of meanings made possible by the socio-historical communities 
we grow into. As individuals, we rely on the continuity of those communities to sustain 
the meaning of what we say, not only through words (as the speech-communicative 
paradigm is only one facet of language) but also through our moods, bodily gestures, 
rituals, caring practices and art, to give only a few examples. During times of great loss 
and distress, where words falter and the insufficiency of one resource of expression may 
give way to the creative employment of another, the heterogeneous, fluid, and dynamic 
nature of culture often provides apertures for alternative avenues of ‗expression‘—of 
‗giving voice‘ in particular ways.  And yet, as we saw in chapter two, that creative range 
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of possibilities— how one gathers together the pieces of the social fabric we come to 
know through practical life in unique ways, but which provides the requisite framework 
for sharing with others the complex dimensions of individual experience—was curtailed 
by European colonialism, but in a way that has lost transparency today.  
 Because the expressivist view of language allowed us to speak of human practices 
like weaving, braiding, painting, even silence as language, it provided us with a way to 
expose the limitations of representational/designative language. This is important 
because, as Walter Mignolo suggests, ―even today we hold some of the beliefs about the 
nature of language and its function in society which were held by the men of letters in 
charge of either educating the natives or justifying the education of the natives‖ (1989, 
54). The hermeneutic view of language outlined by Taylor and Gadamer was helpful in 
this regard.  
However, as Gadamer himself argues, ―hermeneutics is primarily of use where 
making clear to others and making clear to oneself has become blocked‖ (1976, 92). The 
emphasis is overcoming differences rather than theorizing the complexity of the factors 
that lead to such differences. He continues by saying:  
One of the fundamental structures of all speaking is that we are guided by 
preconceptions and anticipations in our talking in such a way that these 
continually remain hidden and that it takes a disruption in oneself of the intended 
meaning of what one is saying to become conscious of these prejudices as such. 
In general the disruption comes about through some new experience, in which a 
previous opinion reveals itself to be untenable‖ (ibid).  
 
 On my account, one of the reasons ‗the other‘ is so important in the themes 
discussed in Gadamer and Taylor‘s work is that it performs a crucial function in 
hermeneutical self-understanding. In Taylor‘s terms, ―other-understanding changes self-
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understanding‖ (1994, 67). It displaces the anticipation of meaning generated by the 
background understanding of what Taylor calls ―our home culture‖ (1994, 39), and so 
prevents the sedimentation of meaning in particular historical traditions. Georgia Warnke 
cites this concept positively, quoting MacIntyre‘s assertion that ―the resources provided 
by some quite alien tradition‖ are the perhaps ―the only resources‖ that ―will enable us to 
understand the limitations of our own tradition‖ (1987, 173).  The atopon (ἄ τοπον), the 
strange, has a paradoxically instrumental role in hermeneutical self-understanding. No 
where is this more evident than in Gadamer‘s claim that ―the mere presence of the other 
before whom we stand helps us to break up our own bias and narrowness even before he 
opens his mouth to make a reply‖ (1986, 383, my emphasis).  
 
For hermeneutics, the dialogic relationship between the self and other is one that 
takes the model of a conversation with independent conversational partners, one where 
each may be positioned in very different cultural frameworks and where the goal is 
coming to an understanding, despite the Other‘s possible radical alterity, through some 
type of shared agreement. By contrast, for Kristeva, alterity is already within the subject. 
A plural or multiplicitous self-understanding can be achieved by acknowledging the 
stranger within all of us.   
 
According to Kristeva, ―the methods of classical thought [i.e., philosophy] 
privilege in signifying practice the moment of stability, and not of crisis‖ (1977, 519). 
[―Les méthodes de pensée classique privilégient dans les pratiques signifiantes le moment 
de stabilité, et non de crise‖].  She finds this emphasis objectionable, and instead 
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characterizes her intellectual project in the following way:   
I shall therefore and in conclusion argue in favor of an analytical theory of 
signifying systems and practices that would search within the signifying 
phenomenon for the crisis of the unsettling process of meaning and subject rather 
than for the coherence or identity of either one or a multiplicity of structures 
(1980, 125). 
 
 Before engaging the particularities of her work, however, it is helpful to situate it in 
the context of historical influences and traditions.  
 
 II.  Kristeva‘s Background and Intellectual Influences 
 
Julia Kristeva was born in the southeastern province of Silven, Bulgaria on June 
24, 1941 to Eastern Orthodox parents, Stoyan and Christine Kristev.  Her upbringing 
coincided with tremendous historical shifts and geopolitical realignments in Eastern 
Europe. At the time of her birth, for example, the region was already mired in conflict: 
only three months earlier, in March 1941, still reeling from significant losses in the 
Balkan wars, Bulgaria aligned with Axis powers in an attempt to forgo invasion, 
realigning with Allied nations only at the very end of WWII. Although the move saved 
almost the entirety of Bulgaria‘s Jewish population from encampment, it also created 
internal rifts in the ruling elite and paved the way for the September 1946 coup d‘état that 
ousted the Tsarist monarchy and replaced it with communist rule (Crampton 1987, 2005). 
The educational milieu into which Kristeva entered was thus very different from that of 
her father, who, as a devout Christian (and church accountant by trade), wished to see his 
daughters brought up in an educational context favorable to old-world Latin, 
francophone, and byzantine intellectual traditions more at home with the culture of the 
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former Kingdom of Bulgaria than with the new People‘s Republic of Bulgaria. In a 
speech given in commemoration of her promotion to ―Grand Chancelier‖ status in the 
prestigious légion d‟honneur society (originally inducted in 1997), Kristeva reflects:  
Je pense en effet à mon père, Stoyan Kristev, ce lettré orthodoxe qui poussa le 
byzantinisme jusqu‘à me faire apprendre le français dès mon plus jeune age, en 
m‘inscrivant à l‘école maternelle des religieuses françaises, afin de me 
transmettre l‘esprit de doute et de liberté dont se glorifie avec raison la culture 
française (2008).  
 
[Indeed I think of my father, Stoyan Kristev, this orthodox intellectual who 
encouraged Byzantism to the extent of making me learn French from a very early 
age, enrolling me in a French religious primary school, through which I was 
transmitted the spirit of doubt and liberty which French culture justifiably 
glories.] (my translation) 
 
This background is important for establishing some of Kristeva‘s earliest 
intellectual encounters, both in terms of sources and the context in which she might have 
possibly received them. Although Stoyan sent Kristeva and her sister to a school run by 
French-speaking Dominican nuns since kindergarten, they did not escape the new 
education policies characteristic of Eastern Bloc countries. In The Social Education of 
Bulgarian Youth, educational historian John Georgeoff lays out many of these curricular, 
administrative, and institutional changes in Bulgarian education policies, the most 
important of which, for our purposes, is the constitutional decree specifying ―the schools 
are state schools. The establishment of private schools may be allowed only by a special 
law, in which case the school in question is under state supervision‖ (1978,18). This 
meant that, while she may have gained important exposure to French texts and culture, 
Kristeva‘s early education prior to her departure to Paris in December 1965 fell under the 
domain of compulsory state curriculum requirements. Following Georgeoff, literature 
requirements in secondary and post-secondary education during these years called for the 
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explicit teaching of Russian texts that, while they were not specifically required to 
advance realism (compatible with Marxist-Leninist materialism), at minimum did not 
promote idealism (89-90). It is therefore highly likely in my view that Kristeva read the 
works of Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975) at this stage and was not, as some scholars have 
suggested, later introduced to Bakhtin by her fellow Bulgarian, Tzvetan Todorov.
39 
  
Unlike many of the Russian Formalists, Bakhtin‘s continued and overt emphasis 
on the social and historical dimension of speech communication seems to fit the bill for 
curricular requirements.  On closer inspection, however, Bakhtin‘s anti-monolithic, 
pluralistic view of human communication and language were tacitly nestled underneath a 
cobbled network of difficult terms and concepts: heteroglossia, dialogism, carnival, 
polyphony, and glossia— a practice which Bakhtin perhaps developed as a result of his 
exilic experience in Kazakhstan, precariously shifting publication conditions, and to 
further avoid the Stalinist purges of intellectuals in Russia that ultimately claimed the 
lives of many of his acquaintances (Holquist 1990, Vice 1997).  
Despite the difficult prose, young intellectuals like Kristeva already keen to anti-
hegemonic sentiment (and who were talented enough to read into the complexity of his 
assertions) were likely moved by the liberatory and transgressive undertones of Bakhtin‘s 
texts. We find evidence for such a sentiment in Kristeva‘s early works like Revolution in 
Poetic Language as well as in the many interviews she has given over the years. In a 
1992 interview for the French publication Nouvel Observateur, for example, she tells the 
story of early pressures on family life (especially for her Orthodox father) under the 
dogmatism of Soviet cultural policy, recounting the times she was forced to slip out of 
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the house ―before dawn so that I could take communion without being spotted.‖ Although 
Kristeva later goes on to reject the universal discourses of religion as ‗ideology‘, adding 
that ―poetic language…questions the very principle of the ideological [and] prevents its 
theologization‖ into sectarian forms (1984, 61), early experiences such as these most 
likely allowed Bakhtin‘s works to resonate at a much deeper level than typically 
acknowledged by Kristeva scholars, who emphasize instead her psychoanalytic roots.
40 
As Kristeva herself recounts:  
The experience in Bulgaria permitted me at once to live in an extremely closed 
environment (which is called totalitarianism for good reason, with enormous 
restriction), to understand the weight of social life, and at the same time to try to 
find the small spaces of freedom, which include, for example, the arts, the interest 
in foreign languages, even religion (1996, 49).
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The difference Kristeva finds between the French and Bulgarian intellectual 
scenes of the 1960s, she adds, is that in Soviet-ruled Bulgaria ―we had had Bakhtin and 
the interest in what I called intertext, history, and subjectivity‖ (50).  To this end, while 
there can be no doubt that the psychoanalytic framework is indeed crucial for 
understanding Kristeva‘s work as a whole, by her own admission, it was not until her 
arrival in France, two full years after the completion of an undergraduate degree in 
linguistics at the University of Sofia (and the beginning of graduate thesis work under 
Emile Guéorguiev), that she first read any text on psychoanalysis. During all her Sofia 
years, she writes, ―Freud was conspicuously absent from my intellectual training‖ (7). 
This also applied to the work of Jacques Lacan and Melanie Klein, with which she first 
came into contact through the French intellectual circle known as the Tel Quel group. It 
was the foothold of those ―deep discussion[s] until all hours of the night at 55 Rue de 
Rennes‖ (which included the literary critic and Tel Quel founder, Philippe Sollers, who 
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would later become Kristeva‘s husband), which helped initiate what she calls her 
―conversion from linguistics to psychoanalysis‖ (6-7).  
Kristeva‘s relatively late entry into psychoanalytic discourse theory, predated by 
her exposure to Bakhtin, helps to explain why she initially chose the question: ―how did 
the novel establish itself as a genre?‖ for her thesis topic; it is remarkably in keeping with 
Bakhtin‘s guiding concern in Discourse and the Novel (1934), where he explains: ―I will 
attempt below to approach the novel precisely as a genre-in-the making‖ (11). On a 
broader scale, however, the importance of Bakhtin as an early source of intellectual 
influence is important because it helps to set up a clearer background against which 
Kristeva‘s criticisms of structuralism—especially as they appear in Revolution in Poetic 
Language—make sense, especially given the well-known difficulty of the text. In fact, 
judging from her immersion in French intellectual circles, where structuralism 
predominated, it would seem difficult to untangle oneself (if not intellectually, 
academically) from the immense influence of those discourses.  
That is to say, Kristeva‘s relation to structuralism was more than tangential. Upon 
enrollment at the École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in the spring of 1966, 
Kristeva not only studied with theorists like Lucien Goldmann, Roland Barthes, and 
Jacques Lacan, but, by virtue of being funded by the social anthropology lab at the 
linguistics department, became a lab assistant for Claude Lévi-Strauss himself. And yet 
despite this, her first published article, appearing in the journal Critique of the following 
year, was on none other than Bakhtin (―Bakhtine, le mot, le dialogue et le roman‖).  
Certainly, a complex combination of many other factors, such as the political 
instability of France that gave way to the student revolts of May 1968, the changing 
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national climate against foreigners in France, or even her positionality as a gendered 
subject in a male-dominated field might have all led to Kristeva‘s rejection of 
structuralism. The way in which she rejects it—the approaches and responses she chooses 
over others— however, are remarkably consistent with what I am here describing as a 
Bakhtinian interpretation of psychoanalytic theory, one that was held up against what 
Kristeva perhaps saw as the most restrictive aspects of structuralism: the notion of a 
unified self-reflective subject and a static view of meaning based on objective, ahistorical 
structures. Her experience in Bulgaria would have provided Kristeva with sufficient 
reasons to be critical of philosophical frameworks that uncritically incorporated such 
elements—as in Lacan‘s use of structuralism to develop Freudian psychoanalytic 
theory— and to be more sharply aware of instances where those tendencies were arising 
amongst intellectual scenes.  
 
Structuralism, which employs models of analysis based on forms and their 
systematic interrelation within structures, was the order of the day in Parisian literary and 
intellectual circles during the 1960s and 70s (Hénaff 1998, 507). Influenced by the works 
of Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman Jakobson, Lévi-Strauss‘ structural analysis gained 
popularity in post WW-II France, in large part, because it constituted an ideal of scientific 
objectivism in the human sciences—that ―for the first time, a social science is able to 
formulate necessary relationships‖—which would lead the anthropologist, sociologist, 
psychologist, or even literary critic to ―achieve the same kind of progress in his own 
science as that which has taken place in linguistics‖ (1963, 33-34). Clearly referencing 
Saussure‘s structural linguistics, Lévi-Strauss‘ emphasis on form over content resonated 
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well with the psychologists of the Tel-Quel circle (due to Freud‘s emphasis on unraveling 
the mysteries of ―psychic structures‖) as well as with the literary critics like Solliers, as 
the form/content distinction was already in place in literature through the study of genres. 
Kristeva thus emphasizes the extent to which her arrival in France coincided with ―the 
period of the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss‖ (1996, 50).  
As one of many scholarship students to come to the École des Hautes Etudes from 
Eastern Europe at the time (including Todorov, who preceded Kristeva‘s departure from 
Bulgaria by a year), she became keenly aware how ―everything that we could bring 
which was connected to Russian formalism and all the predecessors of structuralism was 
extremely interesting‖ to faculty members like Levi-Strauss and Lacan. However, from 
the beginning, Kristeva asserts, ―what interested me was to go beyond structuralism, 
because what was immediately apparent to me were the limitations of structuralism‖ 
(ibid, my emphasis).  
If we take the hermeneutic position that philosophical production is socially and 
historically constituted, at least to some degree, then Kristeva‘s reservations about 
structuralism can be seen in the context of prior views that helped shape or inform those 
reservations. In a later interview she repeats she ―always had reservations about 
structuralism,‖ only this time adding that she ―was more interested in the post-formalists, 
particularly Bakhtin…[who] sought to go beyond linguistic structures by introducing 
historical questions (1996, 7).‖ On this account, Kristeva‘s solution to the problem of 
how, precisely, to go ‗beyond structuralism‘ was provided by Bakhtin. Consider, for 
instance, Bakhtin‘s suggestion in Discourse in the Novel:  
Once rhetorical discourse is brought into the study with all its living diversity, it 
cannot fail to have a deeply revolutionizing influence on linguistics and on the 
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philosophy of language…philosophy of language, linguistics and stylistics, have 
all postulated a simple and unmediated relation of speaker to his unitary and 
singular ‗own‘ language, and have postulated as well a simple realization of this 
language in the monologic utterance of the individual (268-9).  
 
 One way Bakhtin introduces ‗living diversity‘ to structural linguistics is through his 
concept of ‗carnival,‘ which he identifies as a pre-predicative temporal feature of 
existence characterized by ―becoming, change, renewal,‖ one that prevents stasis—
whether in the context of ahistorical linguistic structures, static views of literary texts, or 
dogmatic social discourses— by remaining ―hostile to all that is immortalized and 
completed,‖ rendering instead a constant state of questionability and unfinishedness 
(nezavershennost) he finds to be at the core of culture and the (historically distinctive) 
social practices that sustain it, such as art and literature (1984, 10). Like the ritual time of 
ancient Greek festivals, ―carnival time‖ [or the carnivalesque] is rooted in both the body 
and culture. It manifests itself through bursts of laughter or in avant-garde texts as 
transgressive parodies of ―hierarchical structure and all the forms of terror, reverence, 
piety, and etiquette‖ connected with those structures (122).42 
Carnivalesque discourses are integral to the health and vitality of culture because 
they prevent the ossification of social practices or totalitarian cultural traditions, thereby 
ensuring that ―the most intense and productive life of culture takes place on the 
boundaries of its individual areas and not in places where these areas have become 
enclosed in their own specificity‖ (1986, 2). In her 1967 essay on Bakhtin, Kristeva 
describes how  ―carnivalesque discourse breaks through the laws of a language censored 
by grammar and semantics and at the same time, is a social and political protest‖ (1980, 
65). In other words, it is a revolutionary feature of discursive practice.   
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But carnival is only one half the story of the ‗living diversity‘ of discourse; as 
Bakhtin points out in Rabelais and his Word (1965), carnivals and religious feasts make 
sense only against the backdrop of everyday time, the rigid flow of time we experience 
when immersed in the activities of ―official culture‖ (166). Although we should resist the 
homogenization of life and norms presented by official culture, as linguistic beings, 
Bakhtin does not think it is ever possible to transcend or escape our social and historical 
situatedness. In fact, ―the language collective, the plurality of speakers, cannot be ignored 
when speaking of language‖ insofar as meaning, on his view, is generated dialogically 
through our historical wovenness to others speakers: every utterance always presupposes 
an ‗other‘.  This is why ―there can be no such thing as an absolutely neutral utterance‖ in 
the way that structural linguistics proposes (1986, 84). For Bakhtin, no matter what one is 
talking about,  
a given speaker is not the first to speak about it…[the topic] has already been 
articulated, disputed, elucidated, and evaluated in various ways. Various 
viewpoints, world views, and trends cross, converge, and diverge in it. The 
speaker is not the biblical Adam, dealing only with virgin and still unnamed 
objects, giving them names for the first time. Simplistic ideas about 
communication as a logical-psychological basis for the sentence recall this 
mythical Adam (93).  
 
 This diachronic dimension is what structural linguistics leaves out. Against this 
view, Bakhtin proposes that language is always a ―multi-planar phenomenon‖ that 
incorporates both elements of ―speech life‖—carnival and the dialogic. Although he does 
not explain this sufficiently or in any systematic degree, it appears that through carnival‘s 
relation to the material body (laughter) and the view of the self as dialogical, an 
interactive link between language, culture and life is formed. As he writes in The 
Problem of Speech Genres,  ―language enters life through concrete utterances (which 
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manifest language) and life enters language through concrete utterances as well‖ (1986, 
63). All ‗concrete utterances‘ are always already historical, while carnival is the drive 
force behind ―moments of death and revival, of change and renewal‖ in the utterance 
(1984, 8). It is a symbiotic relationship that ensures historical specificity while promoting 
dynamism and change, much like Kristeva‘s inseparable oscillation between semiotic and 
symbolic elements of signification.
43 This interwoven reciprocity between carvinal and 
dialogic elements can also be seen in Discourse in the Novel. Bakhtin writes: 
Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal 
as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear. The process of centralization and 
decentralization, of unification and disunification, intersect in the 
utterance…linguistics, stylistics, and the philosophy of language that were born 
and shaped by the current centralizing tendencies in the life of language have 
ignored this dialogized heteroglossia, in which is embodied the centrifugal forces 
in the life of language‖ (272-73, my emphasis).  
  
 With this overview, we come to the point where Kristeva‘s response to 
structuralism can be seen as Bakhtinian, this time, by her own account: ―At the beginning 
of my research, when I was writing a commentary on Bakhtin, I had the feeling that with 
these notions of dialogism and carnival we had reached an important point in moving 
beyond structuralism‖ (1996, 189, my emphasis).   
Given the importance of other figures like Freud and Hegel in her writing, this 
contextualization of Kristeva‘s linguistic theories (through their deep intellectual debt to 
Bakhtin) might perhaps border on over-historization were it not for the fact that Kristeva 
does not make a single direct reference to Bakhtin in the entirety of Revolution in Poetic 
Language, whether in the French original or English edition. Important secondary 
literature on Kristeva‘s RPL either make pointed but passing references to Bakhtin (Moi 
1997; Oliver, 1993) or no reference whatsoever (Bearsworth, 2004).  
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In 1985, the year after the English translation of RPL was published, Margaret 
Waller asked Kristeva about this absence, and the actual role Bakhtin played in her work. 
In response, Kristeva comments, ―with as much intellectual honesty as possible,‖ that her 
concepts of ―intertextuality‖ and the ―subject-in-process‖ (as an ‗unfinishedness‘) can be 
traced back to Bakhtin (1996, 190). To this, I would add the notion of poetic language as 
a dynamic interaction between two different modalities of the signifying process and the 
polyvalent concept of genotext/phenotext. The latter is especially evident since she 
acknowledges Bakhtin ―was moving toward‖—I would say had— ―a dynamic 
understanding of the literary text that considered every utterance as the result of the 
intersection within it of a number of voices‖ or forces (ibid).   
Kristeva‘s reception of psychoanalytic discourse theory can also be largely 
understood though her ongoing dialogue with Bakhtin‘s core themes and ideas, a 
dialogue made possible to a great extent through her own experiences of social repression 
in Soviet-ruled Bulgaria.  Just as Bakhtin provided the scheme to move beyond 
structuralism by both pluralizing and nesting language within an interpretive web of 
social and historical practices, Freud provided Kristeva with the framework by which her 
commitments to semantic plurality, the dynamism of the speaking subject, and the 
importance of the autoerotic body could take shape. It was a way to go beyond limitations 
in Bakhtin‘s own account of carnival as transgression, particularly in Rabelais and His 
Word. That is to say, Bakhtin identified the carnivalesque in literary works and criticized 
structural linguistics for neglecting this dimension, but he did not offer a comprehensive 
account of this element in language, such as noting its preconditions, how it functions, or 
its ability to break up the ―inertia‖ of official or ―authoritative discourse‖ (1981, 344).  
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This helps explain what Kristeva largely meant by her assertion, ―the 
psychoanalytic experience struck me as the only one in which the wildness of the 
speaking being, and of language can be heard‖ (1997, 19, my emphasis). Freud gave us a 
tangible way to ‗get at,‘ so to speak, the carnivalesque through a formal theory of the 
unconscious. In Revolution and Poetic Language, Kristeva writes that ―it is nonetheless 
evident that this subject, in order to tally with its heterogeneity, must be, let us say, a 
questionable subject-in-process. It is of course Freud‘s theory of the unconscious that 
allows the apprehension of such a subject‖ (135, second emphasis added). Bakhtin points 
to it, but only with ―the theory of the unconscious‖ can we actually ―read in this rhythmic 
space‖ or talk about in any meaningful way (1984, 26). And yet, had Kristeva‘s cultural 
background or early intellectual influences been different, Revolution in Poetic Language 
might have taken a very different route. This insight will be important later on in this 
chapter, when the applicability of Kristeva‘s linguistic theories for postcolonial contexts 
is considered. First, though, a more detailed look at her landmark work is necessary.  
 
 III.  Revolution in Poetic Language: Strengths and Limitations 
 
Kristva‘s La Révolution du Langage Poétique: l'avant-garde à la fin du XIXe 
siècle, Lautréamont et Mallarmé (1974) was originally a sweeping 645 page doctoral 
dissertation comprised of two sections: a main, theoretical portion followed by a lengthy, 
applied analysis of modern (Anglo-European) literary texts based on themes and methods 
introduced in the first section. It is the first, theoretical part that forms the basis of 
Margaret Waller‘s English translation, Revolution in Poetic Language (1984).44 
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As a revision to Lacanian theories of language acquisition that posit a unitary, 
self-conscious subject behind (post-Oedipal) signifying activity, Kristeva‘s main thesis in 
RPL concerns the heterogeneity of the speaking subject, both prior to and after its 
entrance into the social realm. In dispelling the traditional Cartesian ―notion of the 
judging subject as a fixed point‖ (118) in structuralist views of language— one that is 
disconnected from both pre-predicative bodily drives and desires and the affective 
dimension of speech (i.e., rhythms, tones, intonation)—Kristeva‘s aim in RPL is to show 
that in fact, ―the subject never is; the subject is only the signifying process and he appears 
only as a signifying practice‖ that is as fluid and dynamic as the processes that constitute 
him or her as a ‗subject‘ (215). 45 
 
Historically, the psychoanalytic interest in subjectivity and its relation to language 
derives from Freud‘s psychological theories and his need, as a physician of nervous 
disorders, to develop a clinical model that could account for a range of somatic symptoms 
and conditions with no clear etiology in the material body (such as a brain lesion). As he 
describes in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), his patients often presented an array of 
bodily symptoms that spanned from syncope, fatigue and nausea, to ―pains in the neck, 
abdomen, stomach,‖ or even vomiting (93); to relieve his patient‘s suffering, a cure 
would have to be provided that medically linked these symptoms to abnormalities in 
processes originating within the individuals themselves, whether as organic conditions, 
biological processes, or some form thereof. In other words, as a trained neurologist, 
Freud sought to stay within ―the bounds of neuro-pathological interest‖ (ix) and the 
discursive paradigm of late nineteenth, early twentieth century neurophysiology, even 
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when modifying its assumptions or adding to its diagnostic vocabulary through expansive 
notions of ―psychic life‖ (466).   
Thus, for Freud, who viewed the brain as biological matter that functions through 
mind-dependent states that can be observed in their relation to human behavior, 
abnormalities in his patient‘s behavior like ―hysterical phobias, obsessions, and 
delusions‖ could be traced back to pathologies in the brain‘s activities —to process-
driven ―psychic structures‖ that form the basis for an individual‘s inner experience of 
themselves (their ‗psychic life‘) via their product: thought (v). By attributing 
‗pathologies‘ in behavior to psychic structures, Freud established a link between the mind 
(psyche) and the material body (soma) (hence the term ‗psychosomatic‟) that became 
deeply influential for twentieth-century neuropsychology. Psychosomatic symptoms were 
mentally induced symptoms. That is to say, they were brought on by a thought process 
that remained hidden from the sufferer‘s view. If they were not hidden and were instead 
transparent, then patients suffering from symptoms could, at least in theory, self-
reflectively gain access to the source of their own maladies, demystify their origin, and 
potentially gain therapeutic relief by identifying the source of their suffering. Patients, of 
course, experienced these symptoms as acutely as organic illnesses.  To solve this 
predicament, Freud famously postulated the existence of a split psychological subject 
whose unity (as an ‗I‘) is generated through various inner struggles and conflicts taking 
place at differing levels of consciousness, thereby dividing the mind into ―conscious‖ and 
―unconscious‖ parts.46 
 
 Using interpretive methods drawn from clinical models, the job of the 
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psychoanalyst is precisely to try to analyze her patient‘s symptoms and behavior in order 
to establish a link to primary processes and motivations residing in the unconscious part 
of her mind, which the patient cannot herself access but can manifest itself through her 
speech—through slips of the tongue, jokes, innuendo, double-entendre, or through 
dreams. However, to spot one of these slips or to know what her dreams are, the 
‗analysand‘ (psychoanalytic patient) must first communicate them to her analyst. Hence, 
under the psychoanalytic framework, gaining access to the patient‘s mind relies on a view 
of language as a vehicle or medium—a diagnostic vessel, without which, analysis of the 
psyche would prove impossible.  As Kristeva explains:  
Psychoanalysis sees the patient‘s speech as its object. The psychoanalyst has no 
other means within his reach, no other reality with which to explore the conscious 
or unconscious functioning of the subject, than speech and its laws and 
structures…while the psychiatrist may look for a physical lesion as the cause of a 
disturbance, the psychoanalyst refers only to what the subject says…he discovers 
in his discourse first the unconscious, then the more or less conscious motivation 
producing the symptoms. Once he has discovered this motivation, all the neurotic 
behavior denotes an obvious logic, and the symptom appears as the symbol of this 
finally rediscovered motivation (1989, 266).  
 
The interest in subjectivity thus stems from the type of psychic structures the 
psychoanalytic therapeutic model must postulate to address phenomena in terms of the 
‗inner‘ life or ‗psychic life‘ of patients. Given its roots in the medical sciences, which 
operates under a developmental model of the organic body, this interest led to theoretical 
speculation about the onset of the subject itself—its differentiation as an individual from 
the collective as well as its entrance into social structures like language and the family 
(i.e., kinship relations).  
 
For Freud, unconscious bodily drives do not manifest themselves in their original, 
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unmediated organic form— i.e., as pre-verbal energy discharges or ―drive pressure‖ 
[Triebdrang] on the psyche (which initiates Freudian ‗slips‘ of the tongue, etc.)—but 
rather in terms of already intelligible social structures that, coincidentally, also 
characterize the onset of the subject as an individual in culture. What this means is that, 
for Freud, there exists one universal social structure all humans are initiated into in order 
to be ‗social,‘ and which revolves around a series of family complexes described (in 
terms of the Sophoclean Greek tragedy) as the ―Oedipal situation‖. Although this model 
of the family drama is oddly more in keeping with eighteenth century upper-middle class 
Viennese society (and the correlate ethos of sexually repressive Victorian social mores), 
nonetheless, the Oedipal situation became the basis for the psychoanalytic understanding 
of the subject. 
  
For Freud as for his successor, Lacan, all subjectivity is ‗post-Oedipal‘ because it 
is the end result of processes initiated in the early developmental life of a child. These 
processes are governed by the universal laws of the Oedipal family drama, such as the 
fear of castration and the Law of the Father. They also provide the necessary motivation 
for humans to relinquish their reliance on the safe confines of the mother-child dyad and 
to begin speaking in terms of ‗symbolic‘ signifying structures like grammar (Oliver 1993, 
19-23).
47 
 Thus, under psychoanalytic discourse theory, language acquisition goes hand in 
hand with the onset of subjectivity. Specifically, for Lacan, subjectivity is initiated 
through the ‗mirror phase‘ that occurs between 6-18 months of age; before that, the 
human child is an aggregate bundle of unorganized impulses and energy drives that make 
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the child‘s experience of herself disorderly, jumbled, and fragmentary at best. Lacan calls 
this stage the ‗imaginary phase‘. As Kelly Oliver explains,  
In the ‗imaginary‘ phase, the child has only fragmented experiences and no 
unified sense of self. In the mirror stage the child held in front of a mirror by an 
adult recognizes its image in the mirror. At first it confuses the image with reality. 
After some experimentation, it realizes that the image reflected is its own image 
and not just the adult‘s. Finally, it realizes the mirror image is not real. The mirror 
stage is the first recognition of the ‗I‘…what is paradoxical in the mirror stage is 
that the realization that the child is unified comes through its doubling in the 
mirror. In a sense, it must become two (itself plus its reflection) in order to 
become one (a unified self) (1993, 20).  
 
For Lacan, the mirror stage sets up the conditions for a child to enter into 
language (understood here as a signifying practice) on account of this representational 
doubling between itself and the image of itself in the mirror. Following Oliver‘s 
explanation, because the image is in fact a stand-in and performs the function of a 
symbol, ―this substitution of the symbolic for the real body prefigures all subsequent 
development,‖ including the child‘s shifting identifications with different protagonists in 
the family drama, as well as language use (ibid). The idea that this representational 
doubling prefigures language use, however, is built on the assumption that language is 
indeed a representational structure or modeled on subject/object principles. Lacan, who 
famously asserted ―the unconscious is structured like a language‖ (1977, 234), holds this 
view because it is consistent with his broader intellectual framework. That is to say, 
Lacan develops Freud‘s theories by further systematizing the unconscious through 
principles gathered from Lévi-Strauss‘ structural linguistics, and a representational view 
of language is the only one compatible with such a model of the unconscious.  
 
For Kristeva, Lacan's theories ―fail to articulate [the infant‘s] transitional link to 
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the post-Oedipal subject ‖ accurately (22). Once the mirror stage is passed, Lacan 
assumes that the child is now a structured, unified self who is capable of conveying 
meaning through language. Although on Kristeva‘s view, the onset of the subject does 
occur upon its entrance into language, it is never unified, unaffected by forces that existed 
prior to the mirror stage. Along with the post-Oedipal subject, there is also a pre-
predicative ―psychosomatic modality of the signifying process‖ that continues to 
influence the developing infant even past its positing as a subject (28). For Kristeva, the 
onset of the subject is thus prefigured by a series of kinetic bodily processes that 
originate in the infant‘s relation to the maternal body, and which she explores at length in 
RPL.    
Kristeva‘s strategy in RPL is then to reinvest language with the full complexity 
and dynamism of pre-linguistic drives (which she borrows from Freudian drive theory) 
while at the same time identifying the material body as already replete with all the pre-
Oedipal structures and primary processes necessary to initiate the onset of signification—
to separate the developing infant from its reliance on the mother and usher them into the 
social practices and structures necessary to make speech ‗meaningful‘ in a culturally-
situated way.
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 Because of the infant‘s pre-verbal bodily history, on Kristeva‘s view, 
speech is always more than speech acts and involves deeper laws and processes than 
those acknowledged in structural linguistics. She writes:  
Linguistic semiology generally shares the thesis that meaning is a ‗substance‘ 
preexisting in its ‗formation‘ in an expression—either a sentence or a sign 
(morpheme, lexeme, etc.)—assumed by the thinking subject…by contrast, in our 
view, one must distinguish language from other signifying systems and consider 
the linguistic sign (and the dichotomies it can give rise to: expression/content, 
etc.) as only one stage of the signifying process (1984, 38-39). 
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To this end, in RPL Kristeva conceives of language as the dynamic unfurling of a 
signifying process whereby meaning is produced through an oscillating tension ―between 
two irreconcilable elements—separate but inseparable from the [signifying] process in 
which they assume asymmetrical functions‖ (82).  She terms these two elements ―the 
symbolic‖ and ―the semiotic‖. The symbolic element is the one more familiar to us, as it 
is ―imposed by the social realm‖ (48). It is what gives shape to language through an 
ordering principle [ordonancement] based ―on socio-historical constraints, such as the 
biological difference between the sexes or family structure‖ (26, 29). It takes the child‘s 
random echolalias and organizes them based on social and cultural pre-understandings, so 
that what the child says becomes intelligible in a particular cultural matrix. As a source of 
boundaries and constraints, it manifests itself most powerfully in syntax and grammatical 
categories, which impose further limits on what kinds of utterances one can say and how 
one can say them.  The symbolic thus ―appears in propositions‖ (41); the difference for 
Kristeva, is that while structural linguistics (and by proxy, Lacanian psychoanalytic 
theory) took this to be the fundamental factor in shaping the child‘s utterances after the 
mirror stage, for Kristeva, it is only one element of a larger signifying process. It is the tip 
of the iceberg rather than the base of the mountain, albeit a point without which one could 
not speak in any meaningful way at all.  
 
By contrast, the semiotic is Kristeva‘s contribution to psychoanalytic discourse 
theory. With it, she goes beyond structural linguistics and reinvests language with 
motility and bodily dynamism. The term, she writes, is taken from the Greek word 
semion, meaning ―distinctive mark, trace, index, precursory sign‖ (25). It consists of pre-
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linguistic drives and desires that are ―articulated by a flow and marks‖ and ―energy 
transfers‖ below the level of consciousness (40). Following Freudian drive theory, 
Kristeva believes the ―the human body is also a process. It is not a unity but a plural 
totality‖ which constitutes the ―place where the drives are applied‖ (101). That is to say, 
for both Freud and Kristeva ―discrete quantities of energy move through the body of the 
subject who is not yet constituted as such‖; consequently, it is replete with energy drives 
that, when discharged, motivate (in the literal sense of initiating movement) organic 
processes like digestion and metabolic functions. However, for Kristeva, these drives 
always  ―connect and orient the body to the mother‖ by way of gestational links—the 
vibration in the womb from the mother‘s voice is one example (27).   
 
 Thus, by semiotic, Kristeva means ―the effects of meaning that are not reducible to 
language,‖ such as the child‘s echolalias, ―the play of colors in an abstract painting or a 
piece of music that lacks signification but has meaning‖ in the broader sense of an 
inarticulable weight or import on us (1996, 21). If signification were only semiotic, 
however, our speech would manifest itself in meaningless babble or psychotic drivel.  
This means there is no one without the other: ―because the subject is always both 
semiotic and symbolic, no signifying system he produces can be either ‗exclusively‘ 
semiotic or ‗exclusively‘ symbolic, and is instead necessarily marked by an indebtedness 
to both‖ (24).  
The semiotic makes it possible for Kristeva to ―to disclose a fundamental stage—
or region—in the process of the subject, a state that is hidden by the arrival of 
signification‖ (40). This is the Pre-Oedipal maternal realm Lacan neglected as a 
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significant source of influence in the constitution of the subject. As Kristeva contends, 
before the onset of subjectivity in the mirror stage (followed by its completion in the 
Freudian stage of castration), the child‘s body is invested by a series of energy ‗waves‘ 
and ‗stases‘ that can be compared to the primary processes of condensation [Verdichtung] 
and displacement [Verschiebung] in Freud (60). This continuous rhythmic flow of energy 
transfers undergo ‗stases‘ when they are ―checked by the constraints of biological and 
social structures,‖ in other words, by the symbolic (28). In prenatal life that is not yet 
subject to the symbolic realm of signification, the repetition of these drive charges 
produces stases that allows the rhythmic flow to remain dynamic (27).   
This oscillating process of charges and stases—and not simply a Freudian fear of 
castration or the Law of the Father— are what motivate the subject to relinquish the 
attachment to the mother‘s body and initiate symbolic speech on their own. In this way, 
they ―produce‖ the subject (27). Kristeva refers to this dialectical process of semiotic 
drive charges and stases as ―negativity‖ to distinguish it from Hegelian ―negation, which 
is the act of a judging subject‖ (28).  Negativity describes the temporal axis of the Pre-
Oedipal, insofar as it is used to describe a process and an activity. For the metaphysically 
ambiguous pre-Oedipal spatial dimension, Kristeva borrows the term ―chora‖ from 
Plato‘s Timaeus.  
 According to Kristeva, the chora is the place where the oscillating process of 
charges and stases (negativity) can take place (28). It is an ―essentially mobile and 
extremely provisional articulation constituted by movements and their ephemeral stases‖ 
(25, my emphasis). That is to say, its existence as a ―nonexpressive totality‖ is a 
theoretical pre-requisite for understanding the processes that follow it: ―the chora is 
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generated in order to attain to this signifying position‖ that follows the mirror stage, and 
for this reason it must theoretically precede and underlie all figuration (the symbolic) (26, 
my emphasis). Put otherwise, one cannot order space without the theoretical positing of 
pre-creation space. The chora performs the theoretical role of pre-creation space. Thus, 
while the symbolic ―orders‖ [ordonancement] the semiotic elements of signification, the 
chora is the preverbal semiotic space where regulating process [réglemmentation] may 
occur. This is why the chora is associated with the mother‘s body: because its processes 
of motility in gestation are pre-Oedipal and pre-symbolic. Since the mother‘s gestational 
body already contains all the logic necessary to initiate the later processes Freud and 
Lacan ascribe to the mirror stage and castration, ―it is therefore what mediates the 
symbolic law organizing social relations and becomes the ordering principle of the 
semiotic chora‖ (27).  
Kristeva also refers to ―the signifying process as a thetic negativity‖ (55). 
According to her, the ―thetic‖ is a stage in the constitution of the subject that ―marks the 
threshold‖ between the semiotic and the symbolic (48). We can think of the thetic phase 
as a crucial moment of transition between ―heterogeneous realms‖ brought about by 
negativity (that is, by the oscillating tension between pre-linguistic drive charges and 
their stases).  It is a formal break or scission that ushers one into the symbolic realm of 
signification, ―which is always that of a proposition or judgment, in other words, a realm 
of positions‖ (43). Its counterpart in the mother-child dyad is the moment of separation 
from the maternal body during birth. For Lacan, this separation would be total and 
complete. Instead, Kristeva‘s semiotic realm ensures that, even past the thetic phase 
initiating the child into the symbolic order, an umbilical link remains that challenges this 
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order. The thetic phase requires the child to ‗take a position,‘ to think of herself as a self 
in order for ―the possibility of enunciation‖ to materialize (44).  In this way, Kristeva 
writes, ―the thetic is the precondition for both enunciation and denotation‖ in the formal 
sense (53).  
 
Here is where Kristeva‘s developmental, though dynamic, view of language 
acquisition and subjectivity begins to pose limitations for applications to Amerindian and 
postcolonial settings, where historically, ‗language‘ has come to mean something 
different that is perhaps obfuscated by Kristeva‘s model.  
We find this difficulty most strikingly in the thetic stage of the signifying process. 
According to Kristeva,  ―even if it is presented as a simple act of naming, we maintain 
that the thetic is already propositional (or syntactic) and that syntax is the exposition of 
the thetic‖ (54). This alone would not be problematic, as by including ‗syntactic‘ in the 
description Kristeva allows for grammatical formations that are not necessarily 
propositional. She follows this statement, however, with the claim that ―the subject and 
predicate represent the division inherent in the thetic‖ (ibid, emphasis mine). Again, to 
say something is inherent does not mean it will necessarily lead to its expression. Yet she 
insists, both in RPL and in the course of later writings of the 1970s, that the grammatical 
structures of ‗subject‘ and the ‗predicate‘ are ―indissociable from the thetic process‖ (54).  
If syntax is the exposition of the thetic, as Kristeva seems to suggest, then the 
polysemous syntax of Nahua lexical structure posits a very different kind of speaking 
subject than Kristeva‘s thetic seems to allow for—a speaking subject that is always 
already constituted by a semiotic-like state of in-betweenness and change that is not 
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propositional.  
Structurally, Kristeva needs to posit a symbolic realm that is characterized by 
subject-predicate grammar because only in this way can (semiotic) poetic language break 
up or destabilize the symbolic, whether through avant-garde art or the paratactic lexical 
structures of poems that displace the expectation of meaning in a text. Yet the problem 
with the colonial legacy in Latin America is that it obfuscated the ways in which the 
symbolic realm was always already invested with semiotic drive force, to use Kristeva‘s 
terms. It was already vested with ―drive, sensation, prelanguage, rhythm, melody, and so 
on‖ that Kristeva finds to be her contribution to theories of linguistic practice. Were it not 
for the fact that Kristeva‘s psychoanalytic model commits her to basic claims about the 
universal nature of her project—that the model of language acquisition and subject 
constitution she presents is true at the species-wide level— it would be far less of a 
problem for theoretical applications in North-South contexts because it would have no 
direct bearing on the Amerindian experience.
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Having said this, I have always been committed to the idea that no theoretical 
approach should be foreclosed in advance of its possible interpretation by different 
communities of interpreters—communities that may have very different needs as well as 
political, philosophical, and interpretive commitments. This is why I have taken the 
trouble of carefully situating Kristeva‘s work historically, within the broader paradigms 
of Eastern European and French intellectual history. It helps us get a glimpse of the 
context in which those projects may have originated, the mortar out of which they 
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formed, and hence the general spirit that supports them. For instance, we can say that 
given French intellectual history and her Bakhtinian roots, Kristeva‘s early work in RPL 
helps initiate a post-structuralist view of language in semiotics. She writes:   
When I worked within semiology, I was what you at present would call a 
postmodernist. That is, I had a dynamic view of meaning, where I took the 
speaking subject and its history into consideration. And when I considered the 
speaking subject, it was in order to penetrate further into the decisive situations of 
the psyche. You will find these decisive situations in, for instance, the process of 
a child learning language. In psychosis. Or in avant-garde literature, in Mallarme, 
Lautreamont, Proust, Joyce…  
 
But this was because, she continues, ―I was very influenced at this time by the works of 
Bakhtin, who…also tried to seize upon something specific in the literary text that did not 
necessarily appear on the level of language, even if it involved deep laws of 
communication that could also be attributed to this same level of language‖ (1996,19).  
 
But understanding the specific role a concept plays in the broader context of a 
thinker‘s work is, of course, not an argument against the possibility of deploying that 
concept creatively towards other ends and projects, even those the author did not 
originally envision. Kristeva‘s work, for example, allows us to get at one side of the 
‗double bind‘ of postcolonial communication by emphasizing, as Anzaldúa does, the 
present-day ruptures and lapses in the continuity of meaning that add an often 
unacknowledged layer of complexity to verbal communication. When asked why 
establishing the semiotic element of communication is important to the study of 
language, Kristeva replies that it is vital ―so as to recognize the phenomena that are so 
common in the daily life of subjective experience…where signification disintegrates, 
arriving at lower thresholds of meaning that do not coincide with normal communication, 
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if not a total eclipse of signification‖ (1996, 22).   
 
 As is so often the case, scholars working in marginal areas of philosophy are often 
initially drawn or pointed towards interpretive frameworks that are already established, or 
have been translated into the dominant languages of Western philosophic discourse, such 
as French, German, or English. Frustration may ensue when, despite finding multiple 
points of congruence, enough discontinuities emerge which initiate broader questions of 
applicability towards specific socio-political and historical contexts. I ask myself: if this 
framework accounts for the process of signification in general, can it account for the 
problem of postcolonial signification or meaning formation in particular? The question is 
often held in abeyance for lack of an established framework to offer as a response and is 
related to the lack (until very recently) of translated scholarly sources from Latin 
America and a tendency towards disciplinary conservatism in engaging philosophical 
discourses outside the tradition.   
 
On another scale, understanding the historical context and embeddedness out of 
which philosophical bodies of work emerge can help ease the burden of having to reject 
large parts of philosophical frameworks one otherwise finds empowering or useful for 
one‘s projects on account of applicability. We can bring this approach to Kristeva‘s work 
on linguistics by noting that Kristeva, from the beginning, is primarily a scholar that is 
interested in texts and textual practice. She is an interpreter of literature, writes on literary 
genius, and considers  ―Rabelais, Swift, Sade, Lautréamont, Kafka, and Bataille‖ as 
marginalized voices ―on the fringe of official culture‖ (1983, 86). Although one can 
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cherish such High Renaissance and modern European writers for their transgressive 
narratives in Western literature, they fail to capture what it means to be ―on the fringe of 
official culture‖ for subaltern, postcolonial peoples who cannot even include literacy as a 
category unencumbered by historical oppression. This is not to fault Kristeva for her 
positions, but rather to show how historical backdrops inform those positions, creating 
blind spots in areas our respective histories allow us to take for granted. Kristeva is not 
attuned to the ways literacy, textuality, or even the alphabet can be a source of oppression 
because she identifies with a Western European cultural context that is Byzantine:   
I learned from Bulgaria the importance of culture. Bulgaria is the country in 
which the Slavonic alphabet was created. It was two Bulgarian brothers, Cyril and 
Methodius, who gave the Slavonic alphabet to the world—it is now the alphabet 
that the Russians use. There is in Bulgaria a Feast of the Alphabet, probably the 
only one in the world. Every year on May 24, children parade through the streets 
of Sofia, each displaying a letter on their fronts, so we are identified with the 
alphabet (1997, 160-161).  
 
Finding sources that, in the absence of current scholarly alternatives, better speak to the 
concerns and ‗double binds‘ of postcolonial communication will hence be the subject of 
our next chapter. Having set up this problem, I want to suggest that Nietzsche‘s account 
of language is uniquely suited to address these issues of marginality, multiplicitous 
subjectivity, and complex communication and is able to overcome some of the theoretical 
prejudices associated with Kristeva‘s developmental position.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Hydric Life: Nietzsche on Language and Multiplicitous Experience 
 
She has this fear  that she has no names that she 
has many names that she doesn‘t know her names  She has 
this fear that she‘s an image…the fear that she‘s the dreamwork 
inside someone else‘s skull She has this fear   that if 
she takes off her clothes…    that if she digs  
into herself  she won‘t find anyone. 
     
--Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera, 65 
 
We are none of us that which we appear to be in accordance with the states 
for which alone we have consciousness and words. 
 
--Nietzsche, Daybreak, 71 
  
 
In this chapter I explore the applicability of Friedrich Nietzsche‘s views on 
language for Latin American postcolonial theory. By expanding on his theories of 
language and his related account of lived experience as fluid, multifarious and complex, I 
argue that Nietzsche is a valuable ally in discussions of postcolonial communication. In 
particular, I suggest that he provides us with a uniquely pluralistic theoretical model that 
is receptive to many of the concerns articulated by Latina writers (such as Gloria 
Anzaldúa in her Borderlands/La Frontera), who critically engage the lived-experience of 
the postcolonial subject.
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It is important to note that the idea to situate Nietzsche‘s anti-foundational and 
perspectival philosophy in a Latin American context is nothing new. In fact, as Diego 
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Vacano suggests, ―Nietzsche‘s influence in Latin America has been deep, even if not 
thoroughly comprehended or studied‖ on a large scale (2003). While Latin American 
philosophers working in the United States have been attuned to this influence (Acampora 
2006, Schutte 1984) in recent years, philosophers and social theorists working in Latin 
America have also made significant contributions in revaluating different strands of 
Nietzsche‘s thought (Bayona 2009, Hanza 2007, Barrenechea 2006, Casares 2001, 
Rivero-Weber 2000), some with considerable attention to its applicability in the region 
(Marton 2006).  While some of this interest can be attributed to the success of Michel 
Foucault‘s power/knowledge paradigm for analyzing the structural component of social, 
economic, and institutional problems in Latin America
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, it can also be seen as part of a 
continued engagement with the works of Latin American thinkers influenced by 
Nietzsche, such as José Carlos Mariátegui. What distinguishes my appropriation of 
Nietzsche from others is the suggestion that his views on language are uniquely suited to 
capture the embodied, communicative alterity and ruptures in meaning that are endemic 
to the postcolonial subject in Latin America.  Before turning to this analysis, however, we 
have to first get clear about the multiple accounts of language that Nietzsche gave 
throughout his career.  
 
The first account of language can be seen as part of his critique of metaphysics, 
which attempts to dismantle the underlying canonical assumptions behind the Western 
philosophical tradition, especially in the works of Plato and Descartes.  When he talks 
about language in this context, Nietzsche mainly relies on, what we have called, a 
designative view of language, described in terms of syntax, grammar, and rules of 
127 
 
orthography.  
The second account he gives is of language as a social background. This view, 
which appears as early as the winter 1869 – spring 1870 notebook of his unpublished 
writings and reappears consistently thereafter, relies on hermeneutic principles that see 
the individual speaking subject as inextricably bound to her socio-historical context. Due 
to the influence of, what I consider to be overly ‗existentialist‘ (i.e. Sartrean) readings of 
Nietzsche, however, this view is often overlooked.  
The third and most complex account is of language as a pre-conscious 
metaphorical activity. Influenced by Nietzsche‘s study of Greek rhetoric, nineteenth-
century physiology and Eduard von Hartmann‘s (1842-1906) notion of the unconscious 
in Philosophie des Unbewussten (1869), this view links dynamic, pre-predicative bodily 
drives and nerve impulses to speech through a series of metonymical transferences or 
transpositions. It is a relatively early view that begins to take shape in the 1860s and 
forms the backdrop for an important series of lectures on ancient rhetoric that Nietzsche 
gave in 1872-73 while a professor at the University of Basel. Although the emphasis on 
metaphor wanes in his middle and later writings—persisting only as a theory of drives, 
and later, as the ‗will to power‘—this third account is especially important for my project. 
This is because it not only provides the basis for understanding Nietzsche‘s overall 
attitude towards language as modeled on the Apollonian-Dionysian symbiosis (which 
captures the tension between the influence of the social dimension and each individual‘s 
concrete, bodily specificity in relation to the social), but because it paints a picture of 
human communication as a more complex phenomenon that traditionally conceived in 
the Western philosophical tradition. This will be the key to providing a theoretical 
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framework in which the contradictory and multiplicitous aspects of postcolonial life can 
be more meaningfully acknowledged, pointing us in the direction of what I call ‗hydric‘ 
life. With this introduction in place, we can now begin a closer examination of each of 
Nietzsche‘s three accounts of language.  
 
 I.  Language as Critique of Metaphysics 
 
According to Nietzsche, ―the philosopher is caught in the nets of language‖ (E 
133)
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 regardless of the nature of her individual philosophical projects. While, at a deeper 
level, this owes to the fact we can only ―express our thoughts with the words that lie to 
hand,‖ or, to be more precise, that as social beings ―we have at any moment only the 
thought for which we have to hand the words‖ (D 145), it is primarily attributed to her 
everyday entanglement in grammar. In order to relay concepts through speech or writing, 
she must employ a system of conventional rules that organize those concepts. This is 
similar to Foucault‘s idea that ―the grammatical arrangements of a language are the a 
priori of what can be expressed in it‖ (1970, 270). That is to say, prior to her positing of 
theories, there is always a background structure that has already delimited the ways in 
which those theories may come to be posited, thus negating any direct epistemological 
relation between our thoughts and knowledge of the ‗external‘ world. This is the net that 
Nietzsche thinks corralled all of Descartes‘ philosophy. 
 
 For Nietzsche, Descartes‘ bifurcation of immaterial and material substances, his 
positing of a necessary subject behind all subject-based activity, ‗thinking‘, is in turn only 
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conceivable through a language whose grammatical arrangements support those 
assumptions.  As Nietzsche writes, ―that when there is thought there has to be something 
‗that thinks‘ is simply a formulation of our grammatical custom that adds a doer to every 
deed,‖ and it is on account of ―the seduction of language (and the fundamental errors of 
reason that are petrified in it)‖ that Descartes ―conceives and misconceives all effects as 
conditioned by something that causes effects, by a ‗subject‘‖ (GM 481). Attributing 
causality to the bifurcation of active and passive grammatical constructs is, on this 
account, mankind‘s ―everlasting grammatical blunder‖ (D 76).  Yet it is a blunder 
Western culture continues to proliferate, making it increasingly difficult for each 
generation to see that ―language is built in terms of the most naive prejudices‖ (LN 110). 
This has reached such an extent in modern culture that Nietzsche thinks   
the last thing in metaphysics we‘ll rid ourselves of is the oldest stock, assuming 
we can rid ourselves of it—that stock which has embodied itself in language and 
the grammatical categories and made itself so indispensable that it almost seems 
we would cease being able to think if we relinquished it (LN 124). 
 
This includes the belief in ―reason‖ and ―truth,‖ so that ―philosophers, in 
particular, have the greatest difficulty in freeing themselves‖ from this framework (ibid). 
Thus, as a critique of metaphysics, Nietzsche‘s theory of language is foremost a criticism 
of the dominant conceptual frameworks he believed to be operative in modern Western 
culture. In particular, Nietzsche believed these frameworks, because of their underlying 
system of values and their deep calcification in Western culture, significantly restricted 
human articulative potential. This is especially the case for vital (Dionysian), polyphonic 
drives and affects that, for Nietzsche, are part and parcel with the dynamism of lived 
experience.
53 On his view, because the dominant linguistic frameworks of modernity 
operate on the basis of a particular set of metaphysical assumptions—assumptions which 
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play a delimiting role in the very mechanisms that structure signifying systems—what 
one can and cannot say is already being delimited by the very structures traditional views 
of language presuppose as neutral and value-free. Nietzsche could not be more clear 
when he says: ―up to now belief in grammar, in the linguistic subject, object, in verbs has 
subjugated the metaphysicians: I teach the renunciation of this belief‖ (LN 21). 
 
Again, the Cartesian subject and the division of subjects as separate entities over 
and against objects, and the inner/outer model of reality are all fictions made possible by 
linguistic ‗structures,‘ whose original basis as culturally situated social practices has been 
forgotten. This means they are not true in themselves. Rather, their appearance as ‗real‘ 
occurred over long periods of time and through the instilled habit of our daily practices. 
Thus, the example of grammar and the discursive effects produced by it also point to the 
social construction of truth, which Nietzsche illustrated by questioning ―the value of 
these values themselves‖ (GM 456). That is, he described how ―we put certain value into 
things‖ and then forget ―we were the ones who put them in‖ to begin with (LN 109).54 
Recovering the idea that ―we were the givers and the granters‖ of our social 
valuations is important because it calls into question essentialist and naturalistic 
explanations for our lives and the cultural practices that shape it (GS 171).  However, 
although Nietzsche thinks ―only we have created the world that concerns human 
beings!‖—i.e., that the things that show up as mattering to us do so on account of human 
valuations rather than otherworldly truths—it is ―precisely this knowledge we lack, and 
when we catch it for a moment we have forgotten it the next‖ (ibid).  In fact, beyond 
getting just a glimpse of it through a critical stance of constant questioning, we do not 
131 
 
just forget. We forget that we forget, making that much more difficult to de-automatize 
our everyday mode of engagement with language as a grammatical structure.  
 
And yet, paradoxically, Nietzsche thinks this is not an altogether dispensable 
dimension of experience, for ―only thus‖ do our valuations, acts, and practices ―have an 
effect‖ (GS 41). That is to say, for Nietzsche, while grammatical structures may only be a 
surface-level phenomenon characteristic of the conventional view of language in 
nineteenth century Germany, it is also the case that these structures operate as if they 
were true in themselves, lending a certain amount of order and structure to everyday life, 
without which, we could not live.
55 We will return to this concept in detail in the next 
section. Here, it is sufficient to note that for Nietzsche grammar (as a system of rules 
arranged through a particular logic), like other forms of conventional logics, does not 
constitute ―‗understanding‘, [Verstehen] but a designating in order to make oneself 
understood‖ to others in society, who also depend on these structures (LN 109). It is thus 
indispensable if one is to communicate through speech.  In a different way, it is also 
indispensable because ―this feeling‖ of being in the midst of things (or immersed in social 
valuations) ―produces life‖ in terms of lived experience (LN 109). It makes the world 
intelligible and allows us to go about our daily lives as social beings. But it is only one 
way of making lived experience ―graspable‖ in terms that can be communicated, leading 
Nietzsche to question whether the only kinds of experiences that exist are those that can 
be communicated (through grammatical speech)—whether there is ―an unknown, perhaps 
unknowable, but felt text‖ that also exerts an influence on us, but which cannot be named 
on account of its non-social origin (D 76, my emphasis). Nietzsche‘s answer to this 
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question will lead us to the importance of the body as a deeply influential, yet perhaps 
unnamable dimension of language later in this chapter.   
It should now be clear that by describing the sustaining role grammar plays in 
subject-object representational thinking, Nietzsche obviously does not endorse the 
designative view of language as correct, but merely uses it to stress the ways that deeply 
calcified assumptions can lead us to hold firm to particular conceptual frameworks, 
including the belief in a unified subject or in a two-world metaphysics. To lead us in the 
direction of Nietzsche‘s lifelong project of producing an account of language modeled on 
the oscillating tensions between the Apollonian and Dionysian dimensions of experience, 
we now turn to the social (Apollonian) dimension.
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 II.  Language as a Social Dimension 
 
In order to gain a broader understanding of Nietzsche‘s account of language as a 
social background, we have to first dismantle the conventional interpretation of Nietzsche 
as an existentialist. Along with Kierkegaard and Sartre, Nietzsche is typically seen as 
providing the philosophical foundation for modern existentialism. Given the emphasis on 
self-overcoming, critiques of mass conformism and active nihilism, his better-known 
writings like the Genealogy of Morals and Gay Science lend themselves more 
prominently to the view of the self as a radically free individual who has courageously 
―forsaken land and gone to sea,‖ even ―destroyed the bridge behind them‖ in efforts to 
unshackle oneself from conventional values and morality (GS 119). The assumption that 
it is possible, in principle, to detach ourselves from value-laden worldly relations 
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culminates in the idea of the self as not merely a reevaluator, but an active creator of new 
tables of values.  Thus, on the existentialist reading, Nietzsche‘s conception of the 
relation between culture and the individual is not thought to be one of mutual 
interdependence.  For instance, in Dialogues with Nietzsche Gianni Vattimo explains that 
for Nietzsche,  
to create values signifies tout court to create truth criteria. Only by creating new 
values, tearing herself violently free of the world of prevailing evaluations and the 
instincts, can the philosopher also engage in demythification…the new value 
stands radically outside the orbit of the old world. The philosopher who does not 
accept this responsibility to stand alone, who prefers the company of his 
contemporaries, who wants to belong to his time (or also to take action in his 
time) founds nothing; he contents himself with being the expression of his epoch 
or a certain society and codifies the dominant prejudices and instincts (2006, 67). 
 
 This interpretation of the ‗authentic‘ Nietzschean individual is, in my view, overly 
influenced by a quasi-Sartrean conception of radical freedom, one that often locates 
Nietzsche as the author of ―perhaps the most radical freedom-as-autonomy position‖ in 
modern philosophy (Guay 2006, 362). While this is not to suggest the interpretation 
Vattimo or Guay offer is wrong—as Nietzsche himself reminds us: ―the same text allows 
for countless interpretations: there is no ‗correct‘ interpretation‖ (LN 63)— Nietzsche‘s 
account of the relation between individuals and society, I believe, is more nuanced. 
Generally, what often gets overlooked in this approach is Nietzsche‘s assertion that we 
cannot detach ourselves entirely from our worldly relations and conceptual habits 
because they are dependent on both individual bodily attunements and ordinary social 
understandings. Since without these social understandings thought itself would not be 
possible, Nietzsche‘s solution, as we‘ll see, will be to draw on an altogether different 
dimension of experience that is pre-social, but which may perhaps be unnamable on 
account of this feature. His problematic, which finds congruence in his theory of 
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language, is to try to talk about this dimension—to flesh it out in a philosophical 
manner— despite the tremendous difficulties involved in such a task. This, of course, 
may require a whole new way of philosophizing.  
 
 According to Nietzsche, human consciousness ―is really just a net connecting one 
person with another,‖ but this bond does not originate with individual, self-encapsulated 
‗minds‘ communicating with one another through shared (yet arbitrary) symbols (GS 
213). As Nietzsche writes, it was ―only as a social animal that man learned to become 
conscious of himself‖ in the first place because ―conscious thinking takes place in words‖ 
that already serve as ―communication symbols‖ in culture: their meaning, so to speak, 
has already been delimited in ways particular to a given historical tradition (Ibid).  This is 
a position Nietzsche began cultivating quite early in his thinking. As early as 1871 he 
writes: ―a symbol that has been noticed is always a concept: one conceives what one is 
able to name and distinguish‖ (E 20). That is to say, to perceive something at the level of 
conscious thought is to have already interpreted its possible range of meanings.  ―What 
alone can knowing be? Interpretation,‖ he says, ―not ‗explanation‘‖ (LN 76) because 
explanation assumes a level of theoretical abstraction and detachment Nietzsche thinks is 
not possible when talking about our knowledge of human experience. Knowledge is 
always tracing ―something unfamiliar,‖ like a bare sound emanating from the woods 
―back to something familiar‖ (GS 214, LN 107) such as a twig crunching under an 
animal hoof or leaves rustling in the wind. ―Before a judgment can be made‖ about what 
something is, for example, ―the process of assimilation must already have been 
completed‖ (LN 43) in which a human being is absorbed into a familiar cultural context, 
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and, by proxy, is therefore subject to the ―unconscious domination and guidance by 
similar grammatical functions‖ (BGE 217).  
We think our thoughts are ‗our own‘ and feel frustrated when we think we can‘t 
express ourselves—that it is somehow our own inability to articulate or express things in 
the right way that is responsible for our feeling of distancing from moral codes and social 
understandings—even from other people. We fail to see how, in actuality,  ―knowledge is 
ossification‖ and ―action is involuntary epilepsy‖ (E 234) because it is guided by the 
social dimension of thought: ―that a multitude of persons seem to participate in all 
thinking—this is not particularly easy to observe: fundamentally, we are trained in the 
opposite way, not to think about thinking as we think‖ (LN 34, my emphasis)—yet it is in 
fact these social understandings that make our thoughts ‗make sense‘ to us in the first 
place. Nietzsche explains:   
My idea is clearly that consciousness actually belongs not to man‘s existence as 
an individual but rather to the community and herd-aspects of his nature…our 
thoughts themselves are continually as it were outvoted and translated back into 
the herd perspective (GS 213).
57
 
 
 
From the early 1870‘s all the way up to late 1880‘s, Nietzsche is consistent in his 
assertion about the dialogical
58
 nature of language—that it is, at minimum, mutually 
interdependent with social understanding. We have, for example, Nietzsche‘s early claim 
that ―it is not true that language is created by need, the need of the individual. If at all, it 
is created by the need of the whole herd, a tribe…it must want to speak before it speaks, 
and this will is nothing individual‖ (E 201). He develops this in an important allegory in 
the following way:  
If one imagined primal man in the form of a mythical primal being with a hundred 
heads and feet and hands it would be speaking to itself; and it was not until it 
realized that it could speak to itself as to a second, third, indeed hundredth being 
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that it allowed itself to disintegrate into its parts, the human individuals, because it 
knew that it could not lose its unity: for the unity lies not in space as does the 
multiplicity of these hundred people, but when they speak the mythical monster 
again feels whole and one (ibid, my emphasis). 
 
What this means is that the mythical monster of language speaks us each time we 
speak. It even provides the basis for our thinking that it is us who ‗speak‘ or ‗have‘ 
language—or that we are ‗individuals‘ in the first place. Thus, contrary to the 
existentialist/Sartrean view of a striving, willful individual that is able to create new 
tables of values that are radically outside the horizon of cultural norms and mores, for 
Nietzsche, the social dimension of language ensures that the quest for self-knowledge 
begins with a hermeneutic situation. That is to say, we do not start from the assumption 
that we know exactly who we are, what we value, the exact nature of what oppresses us, 
and so forth, because, for one thing, as social beings we are caught in the noose of 
language ourselves. ―Do you recognize yourself?‖ he asks—―each of us, even with the 
best will in the world to understand ourselves as individually as possible, ‗to know 
ourselves‘, will always bring to consciousness precisely that in ourselves which is ‗non-
individual,‘ that which is ‗average‘‖ (GS 213)—and which, being consistent with the 
‗herd-aspect‘ of our nature, will limit our ability to do things like advocate in ‗our own‘ 
best interest. What is our ‗own‘ best interest, if we have never weighed the question? We 
―misunderstand ourselves,‖ says Nietzsche, ―we misread ourselves‖ (D 71). But this 
misreading is not on account of an alienated consciousness or ideological veil which, in a 
Marxist sense, could be pulled back to reveal the true essence of the human condition 
along with a structural account of the forces that affect it.  
Anticipating the hermeneutic view of language later expressed by Heidegger and 
Gadamer, that every understanding is necessarily a ―misunderstanding,‖ Nietzsche writes, 
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―we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we have to misunderstand ourselves‖ because 
it is an inextricable part of what it means to be a social being: “for us the law ‗each is 
furthest from himself‘ applies to all eternity‖ precisely because it is constitutive of 
sociality (GM 451). ―The untruthfulness of man towards himself‖ is, in this way, a kind 
of ―prerequisite ignorance‖ that is ―necessary in order to exist (oneself—and in society),‖ 
to make sense of one‘s lived experience and to be able to share that experience with 
others through our social acts and practices (E 153). Moreover, this is a starting point that 
should not cause fears of political paralysis or a loss individual agency, but should bring 
to light the more frightening paradox that, everyday and for the most part, the more we 
talk the more silent we become. The agency we may attribute to acts of social resistance 
or political revolution, for example, may in fact turn out to be modes of what we can 
describe as ‗mobilization without emancipation‘ because they are acts that rely on the 
background assumptions inherent in particular conceptual frameworks and which 
replicate themselves—unbeknownst to us—throughout the ‗new‘ frameworks by way of 
our very own actions. Thus, Nietzsche reiterates his claim:  
For since we are the outcome of earlier generations, we are also the outcome of 
their aberrations, passions and errors, and indeed of their crimes; it is not possible 
wholly to free oneself from this chain. If we condemn these aberrations and regard 
ourselves as free of them, this does not alter the fact that we originate in them 
(UM 76, my emphasis).  
 
For the reevaluator of values (who may herself be a latecomer historically) it may 
feel as if, untethered from past moral codes and guiding values, we are adrift at sea. But 
as Zarathustra wisely reminds us, ―to create new values—not even the lion is capable of 
that: but to create freedom for itself for new creation—that is within the power of the 
lion‖ (Z 17, my emphasis).59 
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 In other words, while we cannot create entirely new values, we can for the 
moment rebel against the oppressive character of many current ones by realizing they are 
not truths in themselves, and by dislodging their ossified nature from our everyday lives 
and practices. This resonates strongly to Foucault‘s approach to the problem of 
emancipation:  
It is not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would 
be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from 
the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at 
the present time. The political question, to sum up, is not error, illusion, alienated 
consciousness or ideology; it is truth itself. Hence the importance of Nietzsche 
(1980, 133).  
 
 Indeed, for Nietzsche this is a pluralistic, perspectival, and most importantly, for 
my purposes, a liberational project that will in fact require an individual to radically 
question her relation to social mores and normative conventions—to try to demystify 
them as normative. But she will require normative language to critique the concepts 
themselves and to unravel their impact on her life. She may in fact discover that the 
socio-historical frameworks she relies on to formulate ideas do not allow her to talk about 
experiences outside those frameworks, and that the very thinkability of such a conclusion 
also relies, in large part, on those frameworks as well.
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 Although this seems like an impasse the perspective alone that we gather from this 
process of questioning can offer us some relief. Seeing, for example, that ‗‗truth‘ was 
formerly experienced differently because the lunatic could be considered its mouthpiece‖ 
should ―make us shudder and laugh‖ (GS 132). And we may even need not go that far, 
for the act of taking up a stance of resistance, of active questioning, has value in itself: 
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―that a human being resists his whole age, stops it at the gate and demands an 
accounting—that must exercise an influence!‖  (133).  But for Nietzsche, it can also 
liberate us in a much deeper sense. If we come to understand that the conceptual 
frameworks underlying our grammatical arrangements filter out particular modalities of 
experience—modalities which we may not be able to name on account of the 
grammatical foreclosure itself—we may at bottom rest assured that our experiences are 
no less ‗real‘. He writes:   
That thinking is even a measure of the real—that what cannot be thought is not—
is the crude non plus ultra of a moralist credulity (trusting in an essential truth-
principle at the fundament of things), itself an extravagant assertion contradicted 
at every moment by our experience. The point is precisely that we can‘t think 
anything at all to the extent that it is… (LN 77-78).61  
 
 This insight can be particularly helpful for marginalized, postcolonial subjects, 
whom Mariana Ortega describes as those beings ―who live a life that is in-between 
because they are multi-cultural, multi-voiced, multiplicitous, because their being is 
caught in the midst of ambiguities, contradictions, and multiple possibilities‖ that must be 
negotiated on a daily basis (2004, 299). It may, for instance, alleviate some of the psychic 
stress caused by having to inhabit multiple, perhaps conflicting frames of cultural 
reference, but of being unable to find the words to describe such an experience to those 
with a less fractured sense of what Charles Taylor calls ―our home culture‖ (1995, 147).  
 
And yet, while this insight can offer a certain measure of relief, the larger problem 
for marginalized, postcolonial subjects remains the pressing need to find words that can 
approximate lived experience in the wake of social and political violence, and to 
communicate this experience to others. That is to say, the problem with articulating 
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liberational social projects in general and the multiplicitous embodied experience of the 
postcolonial subject in particular, is that, as Nietzsche writes, with every account, ―one 
has to stumble over dead, petrified words, and one will sooner break a leg than a word‖ 
(D 32). 62Nietzsche explains this predicament in the following way: 
[What] has caused me the greatest trouble and still causes me the greatest trouble: 
to realize that what things are called is unspeakably more important than what 
they are. The reputation, name, and appearance, the worth, the usual measure and 
weight of a thing—originally almost always something mistaken and arbitrary, 
thrown over things like a dress and quite foreign to their nature and even to their 
skin—has, through the belief in it and its growth from generation to generation, 
slowly grown onto and into the thing and has become its very body: what started 
as appearance in the end nearly always becomes essence and effectively acts as its 
essence! (GS 69-70). 
 
The postcolonial subject faces a doubled form of this problem insofar as ―what 
things are called‖ is foreign in two ways: first, as Nietzsche describes, and second, as 
colonial imposition. Thus, the problem that remains is: how does one articulate new 
values that can operate effectively at the level of culture if we are already enmeshed 
within a prior cultural background? And what kind of effort does this require on the part 
of modern enunciative subjects who are caught at the crossroads of different cultures due 
to European colonization? If it is the case, as Nietzsche states in Twilight of the Idols, 
that, ―our true experiences are completely taciturn. They could not be communicated 
even if they wanted to be… because the right words for them do no exist,‖ (TI 205) then 
how is it possible, as Sarah Kofman asks, ―to communicate ‗personal‘ views using a 
language which, despite the displacements to which it is subjected, remains common and 
vulgarizing?‖ (1993, 5).    
 
To address these questions we have to look more deeply into the role of the 
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individual in language. For this, we turn to Nietzsche‘s third account of language as 
process-driven, metaphoric activity that addresses the corporeal (Dionysian) dimension of 
human experience.    
 
 III.   Language as Metaphoric Activity  
 
Nietzsche‘s third view of language serves as an explanatory model for the 
multiplicity of physiological, bodily forces he believes, along with the social dimension, 
also exert an influence on human perception.  It restores balance to the social view of 
language by emphasizing the embodied, incarnate aspect of our interpretive lives.  
Broadly construed, it is a figural and dynamic process that links pre-predicative bodily 
drives or ―stimuli‖ [Empfindungen] to linguistic utterances, but in a versatile manner that 
does not reify reductive notions of language or the body: it merely stresses their 
interdependence.  It incorporates different elements of his views on consciousness, 
rhetoric, and the body developed during the 1860s and 70s, especially as those views 
germinated from his studies of nineteenth century physiology, the theory of tropes in 
ancient rhetoric and classical oratory, and the theory of the unconscious originating in 
post-Cartesian European thought (and, in particular, in German Romanticism).  While 
Nietzsche‘s influences are quite diverse, the unique way he integrates these different 
theoretical elements together leads to a theory of language that, in its most basic form, 
attempts to account for human understanding—for how one makes sense of their worldly 
experiences in the context of a corporeal, bodily being situated in specific socio-
historical circumstances.  However, because of its complexity, to better understand 
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Nietzsche‘s metaphoric view of language it is helpful to first expand on this broader, 
epistemic aspect of Nietzsche‘s linguistic panorama.  
 
As I have shown in the preceding section, Nietzsche developed an explicit 
(though unsystematic) account of the social dimension of language.  However, he viewed 
this account as incomplete because it could not attend to the role of the corporeal body in 
shaping human understanding (D 74).  It only disclosed one particular modality of human 
existence, one that required the herd, sociality and the movement of history as pre-
conditions for intelligibility. This ‗hermeneutic situation,‘ to use Heidegger‘s terms 
again, is true to such an extent that, as Nietzsche acknowledges, ―we cease thinking when 
we no longer want to think within the constraints of language‖ as a social background 
(LN 110).  The problem, for Nietzsche, is that this background also covers over the 
unique ―penumbra‖ of individuality he finds to be at the core of each human being (UM 
143, D 73), and which he bases on the distinctive manner each individual recodes bodily 
drives and ―nerve impulses‖ [Nervenreiz hervorgerufen] into personal experience (which, 
for Nietzsche, is always heterogeneous) (RL 21).  
  
Foreshadowing a lacuna in the hermeneutic view of language outlined by 
Heidegger, Gadamer, and Taylor, Nietzsche‘s concern is that, under the social 
interpretation of language, only that which is articulable (from the standpoint of culture 
and history) can be articulated: beyond that, what cannot be expressed through our social 
acts and practices (with speech communication being perhaps the most prominent of 
these practices for Nietzsche) falls to the domain of silence: ―Language, it seems, was 
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invented…only for communicable things,‖ Nietzsche laments (TI 205).  This is why 
Nietzsche expresses concern that ―where words are lacking, we are accustomed to 
abandon exact observation because exact thinking there becomes painful; indeed in 
earlier times one involuntarily concluded that where the realm of words ceased the realm 
of existence ceased also‖ (D 71, emphasis mine).  By pointing to the insufficiency of 
words to relay experience, Nietzsche is not referring to a view of language as a mere 
repository of glossa, of words found in a dictionary.  Rather, he is referring to the fact 
that, as social beings, ―one conceives what one is able to name and distinguish‖ in the 
first place (E 20, D145).  This puts the embodied, incarnate individual in a peculiar bind 
of not being able to give voice to a range of primordial bodily experiences which, strictly 
speaking, cannot even show up for her as intelligible experiences at the level of speech.  
All she has, at best, are vague, unstructured suspicions and a cavernous sense of 
inarticulacy that surrounds lived experience. Nietzsche was preoccupied with this idea for 
much of his early and middle writings.  In a moving account from Daybreak, for 
example, Nietzsche describes this sense of inarticulacy with the following metaphors:  
The sea lies there pale and glittering, it cannot speak. The sky plays its everlasting 
silent evening game with red and yellow and green, it cannot speak. The little 
cliffs and ribbons of rock that run down into the sea as if to find the place where it 
is most solitary, none of them can speak…my heart swells again: it is startled by a 
new truth: it too cannot speak, it too mocks when the mouth calls something into 
this beauty….I began to hate speech, to hate even thinking; for do I not hear 
behind every word the laughter of error, of imagination, of the spirit of delusion? 
(D 181). 
 
Two things are important here.  First, Nietzsche‘s descriptions of the pale sea, the 
colors of the sky, and the rivulets of rock that run into the sea are more than stylistic 
flourishes or the indulgence of poetic sensibilities; they point in the direction of 
phenomenology—of giving close descriptions of phenomena in the flow of everyday 
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life—as a possible resolution to this bind of ‗speechlessness‘ or ‗inarticulacy‘.  But 
beyond this, the passage also problematizes the adequacy of giving concrete, descriptive 
accounts of lived experience as sufficient for mitigating the effects of inarticulacy on the 
individual.  That is to say, although Nietzsche believed poetry and artistic practice could 
alleviate some of this suffering (i.e., of ‗hating speech‘) by touching upon certain features 
of pre-predicative experience, the all-encompassing totality of the social sphere makes it 
too difficult to self-actualize on the basis of heterogeneous, multiplicitous intuitions 
drawn from corporeal life.  As a consequence, one is left with ―a grain of contempt in all 
speech,‖ mistrustful of speaking, of one‘s own voice, or of even trying to think through 
this predicament because of the inevitable limitations placed by grammatical conventions 
and the social dimension (TI 205).  For Nietzsche, this can lead to experiences of 
alienation, of being a fragmented individual severed from one‘s bodily attunements.  
Thus, he writes: ―Do you recognize yourself?—this feeling accompanies every sentence 
of the speaker, who is attempting a monologue and dialogue with himself.  The less he 
recognizes himself the more silent he becomes, and in the enforced silence his soul 
becomes poorer and smaller‖ (E 200, my emphasis).  
Throughout his works, Nietzsche is remarkably consistent in criticizing this 
‗silencing‘ aspect of the social sphere63. Taken together, all of these remarks express a 
general concern over the tension between culture and the individual when language is 
construed simply as social background—as the broader historical discourses that make 
meaning possible for the individual.  To clarify again, because, as a social practice, all 
spoken language is enmeshed within this historical background, no amount of speech will 
unravel this framework completely—in fact it makes it impossible to do so if one is to 
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speak at all. And yet, rather than describing this predicament neutrally, as one where 
human beings are simply ‗situated‘ in a particular interpretive context, Nietzsche 
describes it as one of imprisonment.  He explains:  
In prison—My eyes, however strong or weak they may be, can see only a certain 
distance, and it is within the space encompassed by this distance that I live and 
move, the line of this horizon constitutes my immediate fate, in great things and 
small, from which I cannot escape.  Around every being there is described a 
similar concentric circle, which has a mid-point and is peculiar to him.  Our ears 
enclose us within a comparable circle, and so does our sense of touch.  Now it is 
by these horizons, within which each of us encloses his senses as if behind prison 
walls, that we measure the world…these again are the basis of all our judgments 
and ‗knowledge‘—there is absolutely no escape, no backway or bypath into the 
real world! We sit within our net, we spiders, and whatever we may catch in it, 
we catch nothing at all except that which allows itself to be caught in precisely 
our net (D73). 
 
 In this passage, Nietzsche cites sensory experience, but by this he means the 
patterned ―habits of our senses,‖ or rather their ―average‖ quality that we attribute to our 
senses through social life, rather than as raw empirical data (ibid).  For instance, in saying 
―our ears enclose us‖ within a particular ―circle‖ or ―horizon‖ that determines how we 
make sense of the things we hear (how we ―measure the world‖) in advance of our 
hearing them, Nietzsche is foreshadowing Heidegger‘s hermeneutic assertion that ―only 
he who already understands is able to listen‖ (BT 164).  In addition, this passage lends 
credence to the interpretation of Nietzsche as a hermeneutic philosopher, as it contains 
the basic principles of what Gadamer describes as an interpretive ‗horizon‘, Heidegger‘s 
a hermeneutic ‗circle‘, and Taylor‘s ‗web of meaning‘.  And yet, it also reveals an 
important clue for differentiating him from these thinkers and the hermeneutic position 
(the circle, after all, is a prison!).  For Nietzsche, while there in fact exists, ―around every 
being‖ a hermeneutic ―concentric circle‖ that guides all their interpretations in advance, 
this circle nonetheless ―has a mid-point‖ that is ―peculiar‖ to the individual herself.  This 
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mid-point is the corporeal body, which, for Nietzsche, also enters into human 
understanding.  
As an aside, in emphasizing the tension between culture and the individual, it 
might seem as if Nietzsche is here moving in the direction of Habermas, who emphasizes 
the autonomy of each individual without rejecting the importance of culture.  To recall 
from chapter one, Habermas criticizes Gadamer‘s philosophical hermeneutics precisely 
because he believes him to be offering an ostensibly restrictive picture of human 
experience, one where ―the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of 
historical life‖ (TM 245). Habermas therefore attempts to restore equilibrium between 
culture and the individual, which he understands in terms of a self-reflective, individual 
moral agent and the community she belongs to—a community she also depends on for 
furnishing the normative content of all her propositional speech acts (Habermas 1999, 
200).
64 
  Despite this similarity, Nietzsche differs significantly from Habermas on many 
levels, but mainly because he does not commit himself to the reflective powers of 
consciousness, whether as a solution to this problem or in principle.  Instead, he combats 
the problem of the hermeneutic emphasis on culture (over the individual), not by setting 
up a new, equally foundational episteme, but by getting underneath it and radicalizing 
each component of its basic assumptions, especially those about the nature of individual 
experience, consciousness, and the body.  Methodologically, his goal is to paint a picture 
of human existence so multifarious and complex that it becomes nearly impossible to 
accept the social dimension as the only valid framework for making sense of lived 
experience—thus opening the way for a new conception of human understanding based 
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on metaphorical, interpretive activity, one that incorporates both the social dimension and 
the corporeal self.
65
  It is to these assumptions, and to Nietzsche‘s radicalization of them, 
that we now turn.   
 
According to Nietzsche, the modern philosophical tradition in the West has 
operated largely under the Cartesian assumption that a single, unified subject or ego-
consciousness lies at the heart of individual experience.  The social construction of truth 
and the subject (especially through conventional, subject-predicate grammatical 
categories that posit a doer behind every deed) has shown this to be a fiction.  However, 
because this approach of critically appraising human subjectivity is rooted in Nietzsche‘s 
larger project of critiquing Western metaphysics, its descriptive terms are mainly 
negative rather than productive.  That is to say, another way to address the same problem 
positively is to pluralize (rather than destroy) the concept as a type of thought experiment 
to see what avenues and possibilities are opened up.  Thus, seen as a type of perspectival 
thinking, for Nietzsche, ―the assumption of the single subject is perhaps unnecessary; 
perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects on whose interplay 
and struggle our thinking and consciousness in general is based?‖(LN 46).  Again, this 
does not mean, that there exists a one true consciousness that is then multiplied to 
produce a many-headed subject with multiple extensions of that one, foundational 
consciousness.  Rather, creatively conceiving of ―the subject as a multiplicity‖ allows 
Nietzsche to radicalize the concept of consciousness itself by introducing the possibility 
of multiple spheres of knowledge that are also metaphysically discontinuous with one 
another (ibid).  After all, he asks, ―why should one not be allowed to play 
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metaphysically?‖ especially if we are plagued by inarticulate suspicions that our current 
conceptual frameworks might conceal other dimensions of lived experience, those that 
touch upon equally important bodily drives and corporeal intuitions (E 236)?  
Following this account, for Nietzsche, the subject is multiplicitous in at least two, 
very different but interrelated ways: as a corporeal body replete with unique and dynamic 
physiological drives, and as a heterogeneous ‗self‘ made up of irreducibly diverse 
psychological forces (or ‗consciousnesses‘) that are always affected, at least to some 
extent, by those bodily drives.  This is what Nietzsche means when he says ―there are 
thus in man as many ‗consciousnesses‘ as—at every moment of his existence—there are 
beings which constitute his body ‖ (LN 26).  On his view, the reason we do not readily 
interpret ourselves as a multiplicitous subject is that, due to long-standing conceptual 
orthodoxies in the West, ―the distinguishing feature of that ‗consciousness‘ usually held 
to be the only one, the intellect, is precisely that it remains protected and closed off from 
the immeasurable multiplicity in the experiences of these many consciousnesses‖ (ibid, 
my emphasis).
66
 In other words, we are accustomed into thinking that there is only one 
way to think—to measure the weight of our interpretive life via the categories that our 
socio-historical communities make meaningful in advance, and which we grow into as 
public, social selves. 
 
Because this type of inculcated, pre-reflective thinking gives shape and import to 
our daily lives, we do not think to question it, despite contradictions we may encounter at 
the level of unconscious, bodily experience.
67 That is to say, for Nietzsche, we are not just 
public selves; our corporeal body also enters into our thinking.  This is very difficult to 
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express through a thought, however, as only those concepts that have already been 
shaped in some way by the social dimension are accessible to us. This is why knowledge 
of the body can never be more than a poetic attunement or intuition, and why it registers 
most powerfully when we are not fully conscious, as in dream life, when ―the motions of 
the blood‖ or the ―nervous stimuli‖ that ―give scope and discharge to our drives‖ produce 
a particular kind of ―text‖ we can interpret at a very different level than when we are fully 
awake (D 75).
68 
   
For Nietzsche, the unconscious is thus not part of a hierarchical binary (whereby 
he privileges unconscious over conscious experience) or a foundational truth claim; it 
only pluralizes a prior conceptual restriction in order to expand the range of possibilities 
for understanding selfhood—to decalcify a concept rather than set up a new one.  To be 
clear, the problem is not that different, perhaps better modalities of making sense of 
lived-experience exist (they may or may not)—the problem is that ―we are accustomed to 
exclude all these unconscious processes from the accounting and to reflect on the 
preparation for an act only to the extent that it is conscious‖ (D 80).69 The emphasis is 
thus on coming to terms with the various hermeneutic restrictions that, for Nietzsche, 
both sustain and (unduly) limit us as interpretive, human selves.  His reasons for seeing 
this limitation as negative, as we‘ll see in a moment, comes from his views on the body 
as a constant source of dynamic, Dionysian influence—a view he weaves into his 
understanding of language as metaphorical activity.  
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 IV.  Synthesizing Language: Nietzsche and the Hermeneutic Body 
 
Using a theory of tropes drawn from Greek rhetoric and classical oratory,
70
 in his 
1872-73 lecture course, Darstellung der antiken Rhetorik,
71
 Nietzsche put forth a view of 
language as a type of multilayered transference [Übertragung] between conscious and 
unconscious realms of experience. This transference can be understood as a pre-
predicative process-driven metaphorical activity that incorporates both unconscious 
bodily drives and ordinary social understanding.  For instance, in this lecture Nietzsche 
explains that ―what is usually called language is actually all ―rhetorical figuration‖ 
[rhetorischen Figuren]; language is created by the individual speech artist, but it is 
determined by the fact that the taste of the many makes choices‖ (RL 25, my emphasis).72 
 As we saw already, the ‗taste of the many,‘ or the social, ‗herd aspect‘ of thought, is 
what gives shape and recognizable meaning to language.  It is what brings language out 
of a state of general inchoateness and allows it to function in ways familiar to us. For 
Nietzsche, language ―discloses‖ certain features of experience at the expense of others 
(BT 55), and this disclosure depends on ‗the taste of the many‘—on the fact that ―every 
kind of culture begins by veiling many things‖ (E 109, my emphasis).  To recall, we 
cannot arbitrarily choose what we want language to express because this is already 
guided in advance by our historical situation.  However, along with spelling out the 
socio-historical dimension of language, Nietzsche is careful to insist that ―to experience‖ 
is also ―to invent,‖ (D76) meaning that there is always a part of human experience that is 
not shaped by the hermeneutic situation, but rather is ―created by the individual speech 
artist‖ (R 25).  This is where organic, bodily drives and nervous impulses, which (on 
151 
 
Nietzsche‘s view) are unique to each individual, come in.   
According to Nietzsche, the organic, physical body is the starting point of all 
human knowledge; it supplies us with a series of nervous impulses that, unbeknownst to 
us, act as a type of stimulus or ―drive‖ (Triebe) that help shape how we take in the 
conceptual schemata given to us by our social backgrounds. On this view, our bodies are 
a complex constellation of various chemical elements and organic compounds that 
register their effects uniquely in each individual via their autonomic nervous system, 
producing a series of ‗instinctive‘ impulses that—like charged positive or negative flows 
of electrical currents—stamp individual perception with underlying inclinations. This is 
why, for Nietzsche, all of our moral valuations and pre-reflective interpretive activities 
are also ―a symptom of particular physiological conditions‖ rooted in the body (LN 96).73 
 However, when this view of the body is not followed by Nietzsche‘s distinction 
between the ―corporeal body‖ (Körper) and the ―lived body‖ (Leib), it often leads to 
charges of reductivism (or naturalism) as some Nietzsche scholars have claimed.
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  In The Gay Science, for example, Nietzsche remarks that ―our body after all is nothing 
but a social structure of many souls— L‟effet c‟est moi,‖ and that because of this, ―every 
act of willing is simply a matter of commanding and obeying, based on a social structure 
of many ‗souls‘‖ (GS 19, my emphasis).  The body that makes up the lymphatic, 
endocrine, or nervous system is thus not the body that is ‗experienced‘ at the level of 
everyday, social understanding.  It is a discursive effect that we make sense of on the 
basis of a larger social structure we are enmeshed in, so that a pain in the middle of our 
chest might today be understood as (and therefore felt as) heartburn, whereas in medieval 
Europe it might have expressed a misalignment of the soul, for which one sought remedy 
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through religious council rather than the physician‘s instruments.75 This distinction is 
important on several levels. First, for the purposes of my project, it seems to open up the 
possibility of a tension or ambiguity in the postcolonial subject‘s sense of their own 
embodiment due to rapid cultural shifts and historical ruptures like colonization, which 
we will return to at the end of this chapter. Second, for Nietzsche, the distinction is also 
important because it implies that, against the naturalist reading, ―the relation of a nervous 
stimulus to the image produced is inherently not a necessary relationship,‖ as it will 
always be mediated by the social sphere (OTL 249, my emphasis).
76
 In a section entitled 
Verhältniss des Rhetorischen Zur Sprache of his lecture on ancient rhetoric, Nietzsche 
explains: 
Man, who forms language, does not perceive things or events, but only stimuli: he 
does not communicate sensations [Empfindungen], but merely copies of 
sensations. The sensation, evoked through a nerve impulse, does not take in the 
thing itself: this sensation is presented externally through an image….however, 
since it is something alien—the sound—how then can something come forth more 
accurately as an image?….Instead of the thing, the sensation takes in only a sign. 
That is the first aspect: language is rhetoric, because it desires to convey only 
doxa, not an episteme (RL 22-23, first emphasis mine).  
 
On this reading, although language (as a metaphoric process) begins with nervous 
impulses, the individual ‗language artist‘ (or speaker) cannot translate these stimuli into 
meaningful feelings, concepts, or impressions on her own.  For this, she must have 
consciousness.  For consciousness she must have language, and for language there must 
be context, beings, history, and so forth (since all conscious thought is always already 
dialogical).  This is why Nietzsche believes ―our sensory perceptions are based on tropes, 
not on unconscious conclusions‖ (E 151), because no direct correspondence between 
individual perception and nervous stimuli is ever possible. Consequently, for Nietzsche, 
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―tropes are not just occasionally added to words,‖ he writes, ―but constitute their most 
proper nature‖ (RL 25). This is why it‘s metaphor, all the way down, why language is 
always already set up to convey only doxa, opinion, rather than knowledge, episteme,
77 
and why, for Nietzsche, ―there are no ‗literal‘ expressions and no knowing in the literal 
sense without metaphor (E 154).
78 
 As Sarah Kofman explains, for Nietzsche, our access to the most basic sensory 
perceptions are always colored in advanced by a social pre-understanding of those 
perceptions, so that  
on hearing a foreign language one transposes into the words that one hears 
familiar sounds which are intimate to the ears; when reading, one guesses more 
than one reads. One does not see a tree, one imagines it lazily without looking at 
the original details The familiar, which by its repetition passes for necessary, 
assumes the status of the proper and metaphorically and metonymically 
transported everywhere—from one sphere to another, from the conscious to the 
unconscious, from man to the world, from one specific sphere of activity to 
another—through assimilation and generalization which are ‗illegitimate‘, 
treacherous, and unjust; metaphoricity, by its exercise of sole mastery, implies the 
loss of individuality and the reduction of differences. It is again to this same 
unconscious metaphorical activity that man owes his ‗truth drive‘ (1983, 34, my 
emphasis). 
 
What should not be lost in this account is the fact that, in light of its historical 
devaluation in the Western philosophical tradition, Nietzsche placed unprecedented 
emphasis on the corporeal body (Körper).
79 That is to say, although we have no direct 
access to it sufficient to ever make propositional truth-claims about it, for Nietzsche, the 
corporeal body remains the primordial mortar or wellspring behind all human interpretive 
activity, and this is what he means by ‗language is created by the individual speech 
artist‘. It does not mean that language is a propositional act brought about by a willing, 
intentional, self-reflexive, Cartesian subject (which are all fictions for Nietzsche), but 
rather that our finite, irreducibly complex corporeal bodies also contribute to our 
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―individual perspectives‖ of reality (BGE, preface). For Nietzsche, it is the 
physiologically attuned body rather than the ego cogito, social practices or a hermeneutic 
horizon that is ―to be given methodological priority, without determining anything about 
its ultimate significance‖ (LN 113, my emphasis).  On this view, before there can be 
interpretations that matter to us in particular ways, there have to be bodies, flesh-and-
blood beings that can live out those very (socially-constructed) interpretations. 
In ―Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks‖ (1873), Nietzsche writes that 
―Being must be given to us somehow, must be somehow attainable; if it were not so we 
could not have the concept,‖ but we must not forget that ―esse basically means ‗to 
breathe‘‖ in the context of incarnate, bodily beings (84). His emphasis on the corporeal 
body serves to remind us that ―what lives is being, there is no other being‖ (LN 56).  
 
Thus, while the social dimension is important for understanding language as a 
metaphorical, interpretive activity, it is also the case that Nietzsche believed ―the 
physiological process is absolutely necessary‖ to it (Kofman, 30).  As Christian Emden 
explains, ―Nietzsche seems to suggest that, subject to the dynamics of order and change, 
the interpretive assimilation of our cultural and natural environments cannot result from 
mental processes alone, for our physiological makeup and drives play a role, too‖ 
(2005,138).  If this is difficult to grasp, one way to understand the role of the body in 
interpretation is through individual reading practices.  That is to say, often, philosophers 
interested in the history of ideas make the argument (myself included) that understanding 
the historical backdrop against which a particular thinker‘s ideas emerged is essential to 
apprehending the actual content of those ideas. We must find out who a thinker read, 
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what books were in their library, who their colleagues and teachers were, what schools of 
thought their teachers subscribed to, the politics of the era, etc., if we are to weave 
together a rich narrative context to accompany and illuminate their work. We can, for 
instance, archive books we know Nietzsche read, encountered at school in Pforta or 
Leipzig, checked out from the Basel municipal library, and therewith make historically-
situated claims about the thinkers or ideas Nietzsche was actually responding to in his 
philosophy.  
 
When carried too far, especially for a philosopher with such a ―physical style of 
thinking,‖ (L 206) what gets lost in this approach is the way in which a philosopher‘s 
own body helps interpret what they read—that how they read and their bodily attunement 
is vitally important. For instance, someone stricken with epilepsy or plagued by illness 
may experience different levels of concentration, sufficient to focus more on a small 
section or even a single sentence during the course of an hour. In turn, that person may 
have been more intensely shaped by one (perhaps arbitrary) paragraph from Dostoevsky 
than from the sections underlined and revisited during periods of better health, which 
perhaps required less mental effort. How it is that something enters us, what aspect of its 
character gets encoded in our memory, can be indeterminately varied depending on our 
individual physical constitutions (which are themselves not static) and historical 
background. Thus, for Nietzsche, ―studying the body gives some idea of the unutterable 
complication‖ involved in the question of interpretation and its relation to the body (LN 
3)— and it is this complicated relationship that he tries to work out in his theory of 
language as a metaphoric activity.  
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This is what makes Nietzsche‘s hermeneutical approach to language radically 
different, specifically his incorporation of individual physiology as a pre-linguistic source 
of influence. Whether it can be spoken or not, for Nietzsche, ―everything exerts an 
influence: the result is man himself‖ in his complex multiplicity (LN 1). Just because we 
are unable to name or give a grammatical account of the bodily dimension does not 
therefore mean that things no longer exert an influence on us, for as Nietzsche writes, 
―we are bent and tormented worst by invisible hands‖ (Z 29). That is to say, for 
Nietzsche, as an interpretive animal, ―man must interpret, and thereby assess his life and 
experiences from a specific point of view‖ rooted in culture and the movement of history 
(E 219)—this is not in question— but what if it‘s possible that what is most important 
about our interpretations is not the feature which brings them to the threshold of language 
(as inherited vocabularies) or conscious thought—but an altogether different feature, one 
that takes the body as the starting point for human knowledge?  As Zarathustra teaches, 
―behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands a powerful commander, an 
unknown wise man—he is called self.  He lives in your body, he is your body.  There is 
more reason in your body than in your best wisdom‖ (Z 23, my emphasis). Following this 
wisdom, for Nietzsche, the hermeneutic aspect of language is true but only from the 
perspective of conscious thinking.  That is to say, the problem of inarticulacy—of the 
difficulty one sometimes feels in describing lived experience— rests on 1) the 
assumption that the sole—or at least, privileged— sphere of language is also the sphere 
of intelligibility and consciousness (which is always ‗collective‘) and 2) the assumption 
that selfhood is homogeneous or at least not fractured, disunified, or multiplicitous.  
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Nietzsche‘s disparagement of words therefore coincides with his concern that 
spoken language only addresses one particular sphere or ―realm of existence‖—the one 
congruent with the social realm. He disagrees with the conclusion that the limit of one‘s 
language is the limit of one‘s world because it leaves a person with a conflicting sense of 
their own embodiment: we can acknowledge only the products of our embodiment that 
can be made intelligible by our socio-historical situation, but on his view there are always 
going to be residues of meaning, something that eludes and elides this framework. On my 
view, what Nietzsche affords us with is an acoustic glimmer of this silence, with the idea 
that its thinkability is perhaps not silence itself—that while it does not ‗say‘, perhaps it 
gestures, indicates towards the subterranean, insists that it is, at the very least ‗not 
nothing,‘ and that it must be taken into account when considering the complexity of 
human experience.  
Thus, Nietzsche‘s view of language as metaphoric activity can be seen as an 
attempt to meld together both the social and bodily dimension of human experience on 
the model of an Apollonian-Dionysian reciprocal duality. According to Nietzsche, 
―Apollo could not live without Dionysus‖ (BT 27) and vice versa; both ―are required to 
unfold their energies in strict, reciprocal proportion‖ (116). If we understand the social 
sphere as the form-giving Apollonian dimension and the Dionysian as the pre-predicative 
bodily drives that resist stasis, language, in this broadest sense of the term, is constitutive 
of all human activity precisely because it takes into account both social interpretation and 
bodily interpellation. Specifically, Nietzsche argues ―these two very different drives exist 
side by side, mostly in open conflict, stimulating and provoking (reizen) one another to 
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give birth to ever-new, more vigorous offspring in whom they perpetuate the conflict 
inherent in the opposition between them.‖ (BT 14) On my view, it is this dueling, yet 
complementary exchange that forms the basis what he calls the ―primal unity,‖ or the 
―primordial contradiction that is concealed in all things,‖ and which lies as the heart of 
human existence (BT 55, 60).   
By synthesizing different dimensions of experience, Nietzsche produces a more 
nuanced and complex model of human communication than traditionally conceived in 
Western philosophical discourse. Although it shares some points of congruence with 
Kristeva‘s notion of the ―symbolic‖ and the ―semiotic‖, Nietzsche‘s account is built on 
different (i.e., non-developmental) assumptions about the nature of language. He writes:  
in any case the emergence of language is not a logical affair, and if all the 
material with which and in which the man of truth, the scientist or the 
philosopher, later works and builds does not come from cloud-cuckoo-land, 
neither does it come from the essence of things (OTL 256). 
 
Again, from the outset, the question Nietzsche has been after is the adequacy of 
language to account for the full complexity of human experience— whether, in fact, our 
social acts and practices can actually account for ―all realities‖ (OTL 255). We see that, 
whether language is viewed as a critique of metaphysics or as a social background, the 
answer is always no because the corporeal dimension of experience is excluded.  This is 
why Nietzsche thinks that social practices like ―language, and the prejudices upon which 
language is based, are a manifold hindrance to us when we want to explain inner 
processes and drives: because of the fact, for example, that words really exist only for 
superlative degrees of these processes and drives‖ (D 71).  Nietzsche‘s view of language 
as metaphorical activity recognizes the pre-linguistic domain of inarticulacy—understood 
in terms of the ambiguous, multiplicitous energies and drives of the physiological body—
159 
 
that underlie and inform our meaningful expressions. It is, for this reason, better equipped 
at doing justice to the psychic confusion, fragmentation, and dislocation of the 
postcolonial subject. Although the latter results from inhabiting multiple, yet 
contradictory cultural spaces, the theoretical framework opened up by Nietzsche‘s views 
on language create a discursive space capable of answering Mariana Ortega‘s call ―to 
demand that our thoughts, our theories, our ways of knowing, what fancily we call our 
epistemologies, do justice to the lives we live‖ (2008, 238). 
 
Nietzsche argues that language will never render the ―precise word,‖ that the very 
medium of thought sets limits on what one can come to express in words (E 14, GS 148). 
And yet, he also tells us we must body forth nonetheless as incarnate examples of 
multiplicitous resilience: that we have a right to insist on our words, as words, as ours, as 
the first and last testament of our bodies, and what our bodies have lived through. And 
yet, although he avoids reifying the developmental model of language that (on my view) 
limits the applicability of Kristeva‘s work for Latin American contexts, Nietzsche faces a 
different problem. That is to say, there remain questions as to the extent that Nietzsche‘s 
insights on language and the multiplicitous nature of the body are able to relate to the 
particularity of postcolonial lives due to his problematic political philosophy, one that 
might include the sanctioning such oppressive cultural institutions as slavery, or the 
devaluation of certain social groups on the basis of race, sex, social caste, etc. (Schutte 
1984, 162). One might ask whether he is indeed able to reconnect the multiplicitous body 
back to the social realm without his problematic cultural politics.
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With this problem in view, I am suggesting a strategic or heuristic reading that 
focuses not on Nietzsche‘s problematic cultural politics but on his multiplicitous 
configuration of selfhood and his conception of language as metaphor, as it is these 
theoretical strands that can prove helpful when brought together with other aspects of 
postcolonial theory.
81
 In the context of postcolonial Latin America, for instance, one way 
to reconnect the multiplicitous body back to the concrete social and political demands of 
everyday life is through Gayatri Spivak‘s concept of ―strategic essentialism‖82 (1987, 
205), or, alternatively, (as an example of ―evaluative‖ models) by compounding it with 
―participatory‖ models of feminist research discussed in chapter two (Schutte 1993).  
 
 V.   Conclusion: Responding to the Postcolonial Bind 
 
As I have argued in the preceding chapters, there exists a need for pluralistic 
theoretical models of human communication that can better accommodate the multivalent 
and contradictory aspects of postcolonial life. This includes the ―multiplicitous‖ 
experience of selfhood that is fragmented, split, yet burdened with the need to make 
politically meaningful claims in communicative contexts that privilege a cohesive, stable, 
narrative self-identity. I have referred to this problem as one feature of ‗the postcolonial 
bind,‘ describing it (in chapter two) as a multi-tiered problem requiring a plurality of 
theoretical and practical approaches capable of simultaneously engaging issues of gender, 
race, cultural difference, and the concrete particularities of social and political life.   
To date, this problem has been engaged by the social-scientific discourse of 
―hybridity,‖ which was developed to help theorize the impact of European colonization in 
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Latin American culture, as well as to formulate strategies of resistance to neocolonial 
forces like neoliberal economic policies and (the more pernicious aspects of) 
globalization.
83 
  As Alfonso de Toro explains, ―‗hybridity‘ can be understood within the theory 
of culture as the strategy that connects ethnic, social and cultural elements of Otherness 
to a social-political context where power and institutions play a fundamental role‖ [La 
‗hibridez‘ puede ser entendida dentro de la teoría de la cultura como la estrategia que 
relaciona y conecta elementos étnicos, sociales, y culturales de la Otredad en un contexto 
politico-cultural donde el poder y las instituciones juegan un papel fundamental] (2006, 
17). It can be placed alongside a family of diversifying concepts that include 
―transculturality [transculturalidad]‖ or ―transtextuality [transtextualidad]‖ (Welsch 1999) 
and which recently have been placed under the umbrella of, what de Toro calls, a 
―transversal science [una ciencia transversal]‖ of culture (19). According to de Toro, the 
concept of a transversal science is not static or prescriptive, but rather ―offers us 
instruments for broadening the category of ‗hybridity‘ as a theoretical construction that 
was lacking to date‖ [nos ofrece instrumentos para ampliar la categoría de la ‗hibridez‘ 
como una construcción teóretica que hasta la fecha faltaba‖] (ibid). To this family of 
concepts that further augment the theoretical scope of hybridity, I add the concept of 
―hydricity,‖ or ―hydric life.‖84  
 
 Through a strategic appropriation of Nietzsche‘s conception of multiplicitous 
selfhood and his view of language as metaphorical activity, the concept of hydric life 
provides a theoretical framework that emphasizes the interdependence of the complex, 
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pre-predicative affects and drives of the physiological body on the one hand and the 
socio-historical background that gives meaning to these bodily affects and drives on the 
other. This view recognizes the fractured, contradictory, and multiplicitous aspects of 
postcolonial life, but it also holds these divergent and ambiguous aspects together in a 
meaningful way so that the notion of selfhood can still be applied. Hydricity, as I am 
envisioning it, opens a discursive space for a self that is both multiplicitous and unified, 
fragmented and held together. It allows us to recognize that the self is, as Ortega explains, 
―complex, multiplicitous, ambiguous, and sometimes even contradictory, and that even 
thought we are multiplicitous, there is still a togetherness to our multiplicity‖ (2001, 16). 
Yet, for the postcolonial subject, as for Nietzsche, the experience of being unified and 
held together is always, at bottom, illusory. Language always begins with the dark and 
unintelligible drives of one‘s own experiential body, and these drives are translated and 
made intelligible by a socio-historical horizon of meaning, but it is a horizon that is not 
necessarily one‟s own.   
 
In this way, Nietzsche‘s views on language and selfhood are especially helpful 
when placed in theoretical interaction with postcolonial thought because they articulate 
the complex and multivalent notion of selfhood as well as the ambiguities and 
contradictions inherent in North-South communication (such as the postcolonial subject‘s 
attempts to meaningfully express her needs and demands to others in the language of her 
own oppressors). Moreover, knowing full well that, as Nietzsche writes, ―there is no 
general recipe for how each man is to be helped‖ (L 23) it is important to note that, while 
offering new terminology, this project does not attempt to set up a new foundation for 
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discourse ethics, but simply to broaden the range of perspectives and possibilities for 
thinking about communicative practices, especially with regard to emergent postcolonial 
and North-South contexts. In this manner, my analysis can be seen as an extension of 
Spivak‘s project of ―critical historiography‖ to Latin America, meaning that, in giving an 
account of the effects of colonialism on Amerindian languages,    
this is not to describe ‗the way things really were‘ or to privilege the narrative of 
history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to continue the 
account of how one explanation and narrative of reality was established as the 
normative one (1999, 267).  
  
Thus, my aim has not simply been to show the extent to which the forceful 
imposition of colonial linguistic frameworks affected non-Western cultures, but how it is 
that the imposition of such frameworks bears on the ability of modern-day postcolonial 
subjects (especially subaltern women) to give voice to the unique, concrete concerns of 
lived-experience—concerns with are marked, not just by the multiple intersections of 
race, class, migratory status and ethnicity, but also by life and death consequences. The 
challenge for discourse ethics today is to articulate a communicative modality and 
corresponding theoretical framework that—rather than severing the ―rules of discourse‖ 
from the ―conditions of their application‖— can be attentive to the historical realities of 
postcolonial peoples, who still face subaudible levels of social, historical, and political 
oppression.    
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In this dissertation, I have argued that European colonization of native Amerindian 
discursive practices laid the groundwork for conditions of communicative 
marginalization in intercultural dialogue, particularly when communication takes place 
between subaltern, multicultural subjects (such as Rigoberta Menchú or Gloria Anzaldúa) 
and members of dominant, North-American, Anglophone culture. This is because the 
expressive medium that the multicultural, postcolonial subject relies on for such 
communication is the result of a problematic plurality of cultural traditions that, because 
they are often conflicting and contradictory, limit her ability to speak and be heard in 
North-South contexts.  
 
Following the hermeneutic view that language should be understood primarily as 
a discursive background or horizon of worldly meanings that the subject tacitly grows 
into and becomes familiar with, I have argued that the experience of discursive 
familiarity is problematic for the postcolonial subject because, as suggested in chapter 
two, she is always precariously positioned ‗in between‘ at least two cultural realities 
—between the older Amerindian world marked by its own rituals, cultural practices, 
unique conceptions of gender, class, ethnicity and race, and the new European world that 
has been forcibly imposed on her by colonialism—and, thus, is not fully at home in either 
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of them.  As a result, the postcolonial subject inhabits a unique domain of inarticulacy 
and psychic dislocation that Homi Bhabha calls a state of  ―unhomeliness‖ (1994, 9).  
  
To this end, because the dominant Western philosophic paradigms for 
understanding selfhood in the modern era have relied on a conception of the self that is 
unified, stable, coherent, and whose inner workings as a rational mind can be made 
transparent through introspective reflexivity, subjects whose lived-experience is 
structured by flux, change, and cultural discontinuity have a sense of selfhood that does 
not map onto these dominant frameworks.  In fact, as I have argued, the multicultural 
subject feels muted by these frameworks because they do not account for her sense of 
ruptured subjectivity that comes as a result of being straddled in multiple, yet 
asymmetrically valued cultural contexts (such as the Anglo, the Mexican, and the 
Indigenous). It is this constant clash of differently-positioned cultural norms that make 
lived-experience painful for postcolonial subjects because one is never fully able to 
engage tacitly or pre-reflectively with one‘s own worldly context, having to stop 
frequently to negotiate the various social standards encountered though everyday 
activities—a situation which I have described through the concept of ―discursive 
liminality‖.   
Along with pointing to colonization processes as a historical source of oppression, 
in the context of cross-cultural communication, the idea of ―discursive liminality‖ 
concretizes the psychological aspect of maneuvering between different cultural norms 
and standards. That is to say, the loss of narrative continuity in the experience of selfhood 
means that, to maneuver in different cultural contexts (whether successfully or not) one 
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often has to frequently shift states, thus suffering from a form of psychic restlessness or 
psychological exertion. In this regard, the experience of being multicultural in the sense I 
describe is homologous to border-line states of consciousness, where one is neither neatly 
situated in one state nor the other, but rather finds oneself at the limen, ―caught between 
los intersticios, the spaces between the different worlds‖ one is forced to inhabit due to 
legacies of conquest and imperialism (Anzaldúa 1987: 42). Giving an account of this 
problem, as I have done, is thus an important step in pluralizing intercultural discourse 
ethics because it takes into account the complex positioning of one‘s voice along with the 
historical roots of oppression that, owing to European colonization, underlie North-South 
dialogue.   
From a political perspective, the problem is that, in the wake of colonialism, this 
new hybrid, multicultural self has the added burden of reconciling different strands of 
one‘s identity at the same time that she is forced to address pressing issues of domination 
and social violence, which generally require one to speak, make claims, or advocate for 
particular interests or on a group‘s behalf. This is particularly difficult if one‘s voice is 
constantly under erasure, or if the normative categories in which social and political 
demands are publicly articulated do not accommodate certain realities or experiences of 
oppression. The task, then, is to produce bodies of work that can speak to the complex, 
heterogenous experiences that emerge from postcolonial life, and which help rethink 
difference and identity in the context of multiple oppressions like race, gender, class, 
migratory status and ethnicity.  
In chapter three, I presented the work of Julia Kristeva (and her concept of ―the 
semiotic‖ in particular) as providing a theoretical opening for thinking about the complex 
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experience of selfhood as ruptured rather than stable and unified. Thorough it, I also 
problematized the hermeneutic notion of ‗fusing horizons ‘ as not maximally suited to 
capture the embodied sense of alterity, narrative discontinuity and rupture that pervades 
the subaltern experience. However, I was also careful to point out that the hermeneutic 
model of language presented in chapter one through the works of Gadamer, Heidegger, 
and Taylor, is an important theoretical corrective to the subject-object, representational 
model of language employed in Spanish colonization of Amerindian culture and 
communicative practices. This practice of highlighting or cultivating some aspects of a 
philosophical framework while rejecting other aspects is a methodological feature of 
postcolonial theory in general, because performing social and cultural analyses in regions 
like Latin America means always wrestling with the historical imprint of European 
colonization in contemporary life. I refer to this problem as ―the postcolonial bind.‖ In 
this respect, while certain aspects of a theory can help decalcify prejudices and 
assumptions instituted by colonial history, and which are essential if one is to unravel the 
imprint left by those assumptions in cultural values, social institutions and public life, the 
concrete social urgencies and contexts of oppression prevalent to these regions often 
necessitate social and political frameworks that are not offered—at least in a robust 
sense—by frameworks like philosophical hermeneutics.  
 
Hence, in the context of Latin American social theory, in which this work is 
situated, the political and the philosophical are not easily divided. This means that 
philosophical as well as political questions have served as a motivation for this project.  
Understanding politics in the Foucauldian sense of power relations, I have explained the 
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unique forms of psychic violence and oppression that emerged for the postcolonial 
subject, especially women, who, caught in multiple and even incommensurable horizons 
of meaning, were unable to articulate their own concrete demands and needs at a time of 
great political urgency. Reading first-person accounts of this experience by Amerindian 
women such as Rigoberta Manchú attest to the fact that discursive frameworks are never 
neutral and value-free but contain tacit power relations that can create serious psychic 
conflicts regarding what counts as a ‗legitimate‘ and ‗valid‘ descriptions of lived-
experience. But in a wider sense my project was also motivated by philosophical 
concerns regarding the nature of language and meaning-formation in particular and the 
concept of selfhood in general.  This can be seen in my turn to the philosophic framework 
of Friedrich Nietzsche.  
Specifically, as a way to resolve some of the problems of discursive liminality, 
and echoing Alison Jaggar‘s (who follows Gayarti Spivak) concern that ―what the 
subaltern woman needs is a conceptual framework, a language capable of articulating her 
injuries, needs and aspirations,‖ (1998,6) I employed what I called, a ‗strategic reading‘ 
of Nietzsche‘s works. I argued that Nietzsche‘s views of language and lived-experience 
address the extent to which communication is always situated in a particular discursive 
context—a context that, as I argued, results in a relatively unified and cohesive sense of 
self-identity for Westerners— and, at the same time, explores the ways in which 
conceptions of meaning and selfhood can be fragmented and multiplicitous. Not only 
does this reading of Nietzsche allow us to unsettle taken-for-granted assumptions about 
the nature of language and meaning (which is helpful in epistemic decolonization 
efforts), but it allows us to rethink the conception of selfhood and expressive space to 
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accommodate the fluid, complex and ambiguous experiences of the postcolonial subject, 
experiences that often fall outside or between dominant discursive contexts and, 
consequently, remain functionally ‗meaningless.‘ The concept of what I call ―hydric life‖,  
as an extension or complement to the discourse of cultural hybridity that arose in 
twentieth-century Latin American social theory, serves this end.  
This is because the account of lived-experience as hydric provides a theoretical 
framework that recognizes the fractured, contradictory, and multiplicitous aspects of 
postcolonial life (represented through the hand-like radial fragments at the tubular 
base/mouth of biological hydras) while at the same time holding these divergent and 
ambiguous aspects together (represented in the stalk-like base) in a meaningful way so 
that the notion of selfhood can still be applied at the narrative level. This is key for 
models of political agency that necessitate a sense of self that, while not a Cartesian 
subject, can still have a cohesive narrative identity that allows one to speak, act, and 
make claims on one‘s own or other‘s behalf.  
With this concept I go far beyond Nietzsche‘s own philosophical project, applying 
it, through dialogue with postcolonial theory, to concrete social and historical needs and 
the particularities of specific regions like Latin America. As a conceptual framework that 
helps to more robustly theorize the complex experiences of beings marginalized on the 
basis of multiple oppressions, including historical oppressions like European 
colonization, it can be seen as a necessary prelude to political change, as well as an 
example of theorizing from within ―the postcolonial bind‖.  
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 Overall, my goal has not only been to problematize the difficulty in giving voice to 
the ambiguous and multiplicitous experiences of the postcolonial subject (because she is 
compelled to give an account of these experiences in the language of her own oppressors, 
for example); I have also challenged some of the universalizing tendencies of mainstream 
―discourse ethics.‖ Through the interdisciplinary approaches I have taken, I reinforced 
the idea that there is no simple solution to this problem that can be arrived at, particularly 
by adopting some general (i.e. rational) principles. Rather, following in the spirit of 
theorists like Mariana Ortega (2008), I have argued that the challenge for postcolonial 
theory is to first and foremost do justice to the embodied confusion and dislocation of the 
postcolonial subject. My strategic appropriation of Nietzsche, in this regard, is simply 
one of many possible attempts.   
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     POSTSCRIPT 
 
…why doesn‘t your poetry 
talk to us about dreams, leaves, 
the huge volcanoes of your native land? 
Come look at the blood in the streets. 
 
-- Pablo Neruda 
 
 
Sometimes, when someone speaks in the course of everyday life— where that 
everyday life cannot settle into a patterned ‗everydayness‘ used to theorize life, and the 
structures that disclose it, due to the daily epistemic assaults from extreme poverty, 
servitude, illegality, from the forced separation of families and the traumas of forgotten 
wars: in short, from a webbed host of material conditions mawing and tearing at the 
lining of the bearable, and which make anxiety a condition for life —it is often the case 
that the resources of linguistic expression available to one fail, painfully. And that 
comma between fail and painfully is important because it draws one to the sphere of lived 
experience that hangs suspended, almost a weight ready to drop, over language.  
 
  ―And where one did not know how to explain…‖ 
 
 How, then, to negotiate this tension, vertiginous in scope, between 
phenomenological life, in all its ghostly spectralities, and the boundaries set up by 
language? Not just propositional language, whose limitations have at times been 
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bypassed by invention, but by the event of language, the language before language that 
gives breadth and range to naming as such, and which invokes the very things we name 
into being— the question is, how to account for the vaporous aphasia that laps over one‘s 
larynx, that wets every word with the painful inchoateness of a word without a world, 
without a home? That there are experiences that slide, elude, elide, verbalization, but that 
cannot be left at that—perhaps prostrated before the eternal mystery or ‗awe‘— when 
those experiences are shaped by both tangible oppressions and yet unearthed codes of 
subjugation…  
 
What is to be done, I ask, when one does not, cannot explain and yet must 
explain? It is a double bind often answered with the call to carefully describe. ―To the 
things themselves!‖ says Husserl, ―don‘t think: look!‖ says Wittgenstein: so I describe. I 
describe how Nurjahan Khatun lay quietly besides her cousin, the girls 9 and 13, in a 
straw bed in Kashipure, Bangladesh. Perhaps the moonlight filtered lightly through the 
broken window of their small bedroom, perhaps not. I describe how a tin cup, tied to end 
of a broken broom pole was slowly fished in through the window and held right above 
their heads, how the man whose hands at the end of that pole tightened and released as 
the cup, filled with hydrochloric acid, poured over their heads like rainfall. Shall I add 
sounds to this description? And perhaps he felt himself saying, as the acid filled crevices 
that before did not exist on their taut bodies, ‗she should not have rebuffed my advances,‘ 
or perhaps he felt very little, as maybe the girls did too from shock: I do not know. I do 
not know the way those who did not survive the rainfall cannot know, cannot deliver 
themselves before an audience and describe.  John Beverley and Paul Ricoeur remind us 
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of this problem of representation, of the politics of narrating history when those most 
affected by it are not alive to narrative, to give their testimony or first-person 
descriptions. Yet they also remind us, like Lyotard, that ―one‘s responsibility before 
thought‖ consists in grappling as much with what elides communication than with what is 
easily commensurable, that in cases where ―what remains to be phrased exceeds what 
[one]can presently phrase…one must be allowed to institute idioms which do not yet 
exist‖ (1988, 13) and that so much of our task today, because we are privileged enough to 
talk about the problem of communication, resides in ―finding the  (impossible) idiom‖ for 
phrasing these differences—for Lyotard, ―that is what a philosopher does‖ (142).  
 
And so yes, I do not know. I do not know the way the Allied ‗liberators‘ of 
Auschwitz, with their words like ―unimaginable,‖ and ―unspeakable,‖ could never know 
just how much ―the full essence of things will never be grasped,‖ and yet how much they 
must be grasped, strangely acknowledged, if one is to bear the weight of the unspeakable 
planked over one‘s throat.  How hurtful the word ―unimaginable‖ is to those who have 
not imagined, but had to live, and yet, when pressed before a microphone, fall silent 
(Kofman, 1998, 36-8). With what language can one express what language does not 
disclose to express? It must not have been experienced to begin with. But it was 
experienced. What was? I cannot explain. A quandary…. 
 
 ―And where one did not know how to explain, one learned…‖ 
 
--to go on, open mouthed, attempting to describe—despite the fact that by means of 
174 
 
descriptions one is already inscribed—because something more than words depends on it. 
Something like what slips out of Amanda Pineda‘s testimony when she says, with a 
coolness that fractures even fault lines, my name in Amanda Pineda… ―I‘m 36 and have 
been married for eighteen years. I‘ve had nine children; only four are left‖ (Randall, 
1981, 81). Something like what Alenka Bermudez approaches, or tries to approach, when 
she asks: 
 
where is the word that will fill in for hunger 
and what name can you give to this daily wanting 
how to describe the empty table the abysmal eyes 
…what substantive to use… 
how to name a finger cut off to get the insurance 
what adjective for the holocaust 
in what tense do you conjugate the verb to kill 
what predicate what future what pluperfect…(2003, 263) 
 
And is not all this what Sarah Kofman teaches us, the pain accrued to signification 
when, to signification, words no longer accrue, and yet, as an enunciative subject, one 
must still live, must still speak?   
 How is it possible to speak, when you feel a ‗frenzied desire‘ to perform an 
impossible task—to convey the experience just as it was, to explain everything to 
the other, when you are seized by a veritable delirium of words—and yet, at the 
same time, it is impossible for you to speak. Impossible, without choking 
(Kofman, 38).  
 
And here so many that can will point out the ‗perfromative contradiction‘ involved in 
talking about the difficulty of talking, will reduce it to a substrate of logic, forgetting the 
herculean labors enunciative subjects often undergo to come back from the very edge of 
signification, the razor-thin chances of making it back sane, employable, unmedicated—
forgetting, Sarah Kofman, in the end, took her own life, and on Nietzsche‘s birthday. We 
forget Primo Levi. We forget Paul Celan, and Susan Brison painfully reminds us of this, 
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that 
those who have survived trauma understand the pull of that solution to their daily 
Beckettian dilemma—‗I can‘t go on, I must go on‘—for on some days the 
conclusion ‗I‘ll go on‘ can be reached by neither faith nor reason. How does one 
go on with a shattered self, with no guarantee of recovery, believing that one will 
always stay tortured and never feel at home in the world… (2001,66).  
 
Not all ‗go on‘ to make their performative contradiction. I cite here Nietzsche‘s words to 
his friend, Gersdorff: ―my writings are said to be obscure and unintelligible! I thought 
that, when one speaks of distress, people in distress will understand‖ (1969, 126). 
But our present historical juncture in the global South, which is penetrated by a 
bundled network of live nerves that still to this day transmit impulses carried over from 
the Colonial legacy, dictates that we cannot here leave it at that, at the foothold of a lit 
beacon, waiting for the wounded to gather.  We, who have learned the codes of various 
tongues, cultural, academic, disciplinary, who have bore witness to both stammering 
translations of experience and inventive responses to it; we, this party of one, to which I 
limit my discourse, finds it necessary to clarify, to disinter the subjugated, precisely by 
showing how murky, difficult, how complicated and far from settled things are…that, for 
instance, it is difficult enough for speakers ushered into dominant historical traditions, 
who have experienced the incoherence of meaning brought on by violence, physical and 
epistemic, to speak about their experiences: What, then, of the subaltern, the 
peripheralized subjects of history? What are the psychological effects of violence, when 
violence shatters cultural frameworks erected on the basis of a prior shattering of 
frameworks? How is the constitution of the speaking subject to be negotiated on the basis 
of this shattering? How, if in any way, can the canonical frameworks of the Western 
philosophical tradition respond to the dissonances emerging from post-colonial life?   
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If, as Wilfrid Sellars put it, ―the aim of philosophizing is to become reflectively at 
home in the full complexity of the multi-dimensional conceptual system in terms of 
which we suffer, think, and act,‖ (1975, 295) how can one feel at home in the world if 
one‘s own ―conceptual system‖ is not simply ‗given‘ but itself the product of complex 
constellations of Imperial History? At what point does the layering of dislocative 
experiences, material strife, social oppression and epistemic trauma, become thick 
enough, visible enough, to call for a new philosophy? And why does the ―unhomely‖ 
aspect ―that is a paradigmatic colonial and post-colonial condition‖ consistently turn to 
literature as form of recognition? (Bhabha, 1994, 9). Is it because, as Gloria Anzaldúa 
suggests, ―living in a state of psychic unrest, in a Borderland, is what makes poets write 
and artists create‖(1987, 95)? But whence the need for this modality, for this complex 
alphabet of survival that holds ―art as the only remaining form of existence: because [it 
is] indissolvable through logic‖ (Nietzsche, 2009a, 22)? That we are brought to the 
―saving sorceress‖ of art, knee-scraped and stitch-mouthed, eyes watering with words 
only art can interpret, does not lessen the blow of having been cast out of a homeland, 
forced to search out a new linguistic subsistence: in this respect, there is still accounting 
to be done. But how to account for this accounting if not within the constrains of history 
and the grammatical arrangements of language?  
 
 ―And where one did not know how to explain, one learned to …‖ 
 
Describe? For some time now, the response to these concerns has been to describe 
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experience on the basis of a more plural phenomenology, one that does not believe you 
can bracket out any pre-theorietcal assumptions—that words are always already colored 
and distorted— and where the descriptions of the phenomenological subject are not 
meant to unearth (as Husserl had hoped) the structures of consciousness. Moreover, 
instead of concerning ourselves with the kind of descriptions that are primarily 
conceptual, we could perhaps gain greater expressive mobility by focusing on 
descriptions of everyday, practical activities, whose context-dependent nature allows the 
things we talk about to emerge in ways that are indicative of our complex web of worldly 
relations. Hence, because there would be no ‗getting it right‟ in any description, surely, 
this mode can better accommodate even the most ghostly contradictions of experience, 
which might show up in terms of anxiety or awe.  
 
And so I describe the act of putting on socks. That is to say, I describe how a man 
who washed up on the north side of the Rio Grande, who celebrated his brother‘s 
birthday with drink made from home-fermented corn the night before, awoke at dawn the 
next day and put on his best pants, which were green. How timing the currents of the Rio 
is essential to bear across it, and how that day, he was fatefully late in his timing, for he 
delayed his departure, not wanting to leave the house until finding his socks. You see, 
they were green, and he wanted to make sure his socks matched his pants. 
 
 And what does this matter to philosophy, that a man awoke one day wanting to 
assure his faded green pants matched his socks? That his life weighs less than his corpse, 
that his corpse means less to philosophy than his ‗death‘--this should concern us. But it is 
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difficult to concern ourselves with, so we are told, what we are not attuned to; that one is 
able to hear only what one already understands. And perhaps it would matter if this 
narrative had been inscribed within a narrative that already matters politically, a narrative 
wherein I describe this man‘s ‗death‘ by referencing dominant practices of exclusion: 
race, sex, gender, poverty, and so on—practices that themselves have taken centuries to 
be acknowledged as exclusionary, and, which many argue (myself included), are still not 
adequately acknowledged as such. But the possibility that these may be, in fact, only 
superlative degrees and manifestations of other exclusionary practices encoded at the 
capillary, most apparently ‗neutral‘ and benign levels of culture must also be explored. 
Here we hear Nietzsche‘s echo: ―I fear we shall not rid ourselves of our belief in God so 
long as we believe in grammar‖ (2009d, 170).   
 
In trying to describe our experiences, we may come to the painful realization that 
―the word itself barely hints: it is the surface of the choppy sea, while the storm rages in 
the depths‖ (Nietzsche, 2009a, 15). Hence, ‗giving voice‘ exposes a quandary of its own, 
for here, to express, to ‗state thoughts or feelings in words‘ cannot itself begin to 
express—to ―expectorate‖ when the ―heart is downright congested with aversion and 
oppression,‖ as Nietzsche says— because words are precisely the problem; they attempt 
to establish a direct correspondence between names and things when such a 
correspondence is based on a metaphysical illusion, corroborated, as Nietzsche points 
out, by language itself. How, then to respond to this predicament ―so as not to suffer from 
staying silent‖? (Nietzsche, 1986, 212).  Can we hold a suspended coda over the lone 
musical note which asks: with what „language‟ can one express what language, as 
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historical tradition, does not disclose to express? The problem is all too clear: it must not 
have been experienceable to begin with—not, at least, for the purposes of social 
understanding and naming. 
 
But it was experienced.  
What was?  
 Account. Explain 
I cannot.  
 
From the subterranean depths of ‗dawns that have not yet broken,‘ Nietzsche‘s 
underground man briefly surfaces from his hiding grounds, into the Daybreak, and 
whispers:  
 
 ― and where one did not know how to explain, one learned to create‖ (1997, 28).  
 
And yet it is this tension between the expressive potential and limitations of 
language that brings Alexander Nehamas to conclude ―Nietzsche‘s view is deeply 
flawed,‖ for ―either language succeeds in describing reality, in which case we can say 
some true things about it, or it does not, in which case the best we can do is to remain 
silent‖ (2009a, xxviii).  But there lives in the lungs of peripheral peoples and 
communities a deep suspicion—a type of ‗air hunger‘ or pleural effusion— that this 
epistemic underdeterminism comes at their expense, that silence is a luxury for those 
who‘ve already experienced life as speakers, whose cultural history already places them 
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in the main corridors of Alexandrian libraries, on a large desk, poised before a leather-
bound book—an encyclopedia— a pen in their hands, ‗expansion‘ on their mind. Silence 
is not an option for those whose metaphors are not even their own, whose experience of 
continuity in the flow of everyday life is systematically shattered by multiple levels of 
epistemic and material violence.  
Historically, these experiences of what I call discursive liminality have been 
relegated to the realm of the ―unspeakable,‖ the ―unsaid,‖ and which gained some level of 
articulation through the emergent paradigms of drive theory and the unconscious in the 
late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but which are largely discounted by the natural 
sciences today (or usurped within biopsychiatry). We find this legacy, for instance, in 
Lacan‘s assertion that madness is a type of communication—an articulative attempt at 
signification when signification no longer operates within the structures of continuity 
(Lacan 2004, 68). Dream life is another example, in the sense that ―waking life does not 
have this freedom of interpretation possessed by the life of dreams‖ (Nietzsche, 1997, 
75). And so, in a very broad way, I am interested in those weak and distant, foreign 
decibels one stammers out in response to the net ‗waking life‘ tangles and ensnarls us in; 
that webbed mesh of codes and historical assumptions that bring us back to land when, in 
our dry nocturnal madness, we strike out to the darkest seas. I want to speak of this 
darkness, and how we were forced to hunger for it when the language that things have no 
longer allowed us to think of it as part of our lived experience. The ‗slippage,‘ the ‗gap,‘ 
the ‗in-between‘— the metaphoric resilience against all final accounts of things — are all 
metonymies for the same experiential sphere. How, then, are we to address this sphere at 
the philosophic level, without, as earlier mentioned, reifying the conventions of the 
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Western philosophic tradition?  
 
I begin where I have already gestured—towards Nietzsche, for many reasons, not 
the least of which concerns ―Nietzsche‘s radical reflection on language,‖ as Foucault puts 
it (1970, 305).  I do so, in large part, since on my view, only with Nietzsche is it 
impossible to ‗choose‘ Nietzsche, to hold him up as ‗the way‘—because he would object 
to any case that begins with the assertion ‗only with Nietzsche….‘; it is a methodological 
point, a starting point, a point of embarkment that allows me to begin the unraveling, to 
slowly pull the string from the spool of history while remaining committed to the 
assumption that ―we are none of us that which we appear to be in accordance with the 
states for which alone we have consciousness and words‖ (1997, 71). Even more 
importantly, it allows me put forth a strategic vocabulary, an enunciative mode that gives 
breath to the notion: ―everything excessive must be given a voice‖  (2009a, 20)—
everything, that is, that slides or elides signification, from nocturnal drives and bodily 
affects to the blood on the streets.   
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ENDNOTES: 
 
 
1
  Dussel first levied this criticism against communicative ethics in general, and Apel in 
particular, during a conference organized around the topic ―discourse ethics and the philosophy 
of liberation‖ in November 25, 1989 in Frankfurt. The papers from this conference have since 
been published in Raúl Fornet-Betancourt‘s Ethik und Befreiung (Aachen: Augustinus-
Buchhandlung 1990). See, specifically, Dussel‘s comments in this volume, ―Die 
Lebensgemeinschaft und die Interpellation der Armen: Die Praxis der Befreiung,‖ 69-96. 
 
2
  Deliberative democratic theories are those which make public discourse, as an idealized form of 
reasoned communication, central to democratic processes and institutions. They are an 
alternative to rights-centered, Western liberal democratic frameworks that focus on individual 
interests, and where individual claims and preferences are expressed through voting 
mechanisms such as referendum or election. As an alternative to this framework, deliberative 
theories seek to base the legitimation of political institutions—as well as ensure democratic 
political ideals like equality and freedom—through consensus and public dialogue rather than 
private interests. This will involve real-life people engaged in actual, concrete situations, so that 
the potential for deep disagreement is here mitigated by grounding discussions on forms of 
deliberation that could, in principle, guarantee equal and fair conditions for conducting 
conversations, so that all affected by the outcome of deliberations may participate. This 
egalitarian safeguard, then, becomes the rules of dialogue that, owing to their ‗impartial‘ (i.e., 
rational) nature and their capacity to be made explicit in formal terms, allow decision-making 
processes to be recognized as free and fair amongst discussants. 
 
3
  Consider, for example, Charles Taylor‘s hermeneutic claim that, while ―cultures are not closed 
worlds and borrow a lot from each other,‖ it is also the case that ―successful borrowing requires 
a home culture in which new ideas are integrated, and without a functioning home culture 
people are incapacitated‖ (1996, 408, my emphasis). The problem for many postcolonial 
subjects like Gloria Anzaldúa, who are straddled in between two or more cultural horizons 
(such as the Anglo, the Latin American, and the indigenous), is that there is no ‗functioning 
home culture‘ in the robust sense that Taylor describes: ―to which collectivity does the daughter 
of a dark-skinned mother listen to?‖ Anzaldúa asks (1987:78). Moreover, while I agree with 
Taylor that all understanding (including self-understanding) takes place against a broader 
backdrop that allows one to pick out differences in the first place, or to make comparisons and 
contrasts between the different cultures one inhabits, the problem for multi-ethnic, multi-culural 
peripheral subjects like Anzaldúa is that European colonialism has made it difficult to neatly 
differentiate between what is acquired, borrowed, or imposed in that ‗broader‘ cultural 
backdrop (as the resources of expression by which one comes to terms with these distinctions 
have themselves been colonized). That means thinking of oneself as ‗multicultural‘ or shifting 
group identification to suit a particular discursive situation is not as simple a solution as it 
might first seem, suggesting a need for a conceptual framework that does not relegate large 
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numbers of the world‘s inhabitants to a functional state of ‗incapacitation‘, left to wrestle with 
what Anzaldúa calls, ―the agony of inadequacy‖ (67). It is in this sense that the concept of 
―Hydric life‖ can be of assistance, but only as a critical term that does not rest on binary 
oppositions between multi-cultural peoples, and those who are not multi-cultural. 
 
4
  I acknowledge that there are many important theoretical concerns that, due to the limited scope 
of this project, could not be given due consideration. I would like to touch briefly on just one of 
these concerns, as it carries a methodological component as well. The question centers on what 
might be called ‗the problem of recovery‘ or the ‗recovery of origins‘ with respect of Native 
Amerindian cultures that have been covered-over or destroyed by European colonization. This 
problem holds that modern-day efforts to interpret and understand the significance of (in our 
case, Pre-Columbian) cultural practices or artifacts falls apart when considering the loss of the 
thick contextual backdrop that originally sustained the meaning of those acts and practices. 
While I acknowledge the interpretive difficulties that arise when engaging pre-colonial cultural 
contexts, I likewise point out the wide range of stances on this problem, most notably by 
postcolonial historiographers like Gayatri Spivak, Ranajit Guha, and Homi Bhabha.  For this 
question, I refer the reader to endnote 22. I should like to add that, although a great deal of my 
argument in this dissertation hinges on empirical knowledge of non-Western world views and 
in particular, Amerindian languages, my aim is not to present this knowledge in the context of 
scientific paradigms or as falsifiable truth-claims. My concluding comments in chapter four, 
which reinforce Spivak‘s reflections on her own historical project as a counter-hegemonic 
practice, rather than as a way to ―describe the way things really were‖ (1999, 267) are 
particularly important in this regard. 
 
5
  For the purposes of this work, by ‗colonized world‘ I am referring specifically to regions such 
as Latin America that were colonized under Western European (i.e., Spanish, French, and 
Portuguese) rule. Yet it is still possible, under the definition I am suggesting, to be a 
postcolonial subject outside of Latin America if one is an immigrant from the region or if one is 
a multi-cultural subject living in borderland regions where two or more cultures (one being 
Latin American) meet, such as the U.S.-Mexico border. To be clear, I use the term ―multi-
cultural‖ in the strong sense of being multiply-positioned in two or more cultural horizons one 
has to negotiate, as in a self ―that is pulled in different directions by norms, practices, beliefs‖ 
that arise form being multi-ethnic, multi-racial or ―hybrid‖ in the Latin American context 
(Ortega 2008, 71). In this regard, I employ the term ―multi-cultural‖ (to characterize 
postcolonial subjects) in the same way Mariana Ortega defines ―multiplicitous subjects‖, where 
―multiplicity refers to the existence of two or more cultural and/or racial 
views/understandings/values, etc., that the individual has to negotiate, as Ofelia Schutte puts it‖ 
(ibid).   
 As an important note, Ann Ferguson, responding to Ortega‘s definition, has argued that ―this 
definition leaves unclear the difference between those born in a country in a subordinate 
subculture, such as African Americans, and those who move from one geographic location and 
culture to take residence in another location with a different culture‖ (2008, 86). What is 
difficult about my use of the term ―postcolonial subject‖ is that, to a limited extent, it 
encompasses both aspects of Ferguson‘s distinction, as in immigrants from Latin America and 
members of a ―subordinate subculture‖. This is because indigenous populations in Latin 
America are subordinate to the more dominant mestizo culture, yet they do not have to move 
from one geographic location to another in order to be faced with ―a new language and new 
cultural norms‖ (ibid) they must often negotiate on a daily basis. The best way to clarify this 
term, then, is to specify what it does not account for. In particular, I do not include in the 
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definition members of subordinate subcultures that reside within dominant groups or cultures in 
such a way that the dominant culture informs a large ―part of a background of intelligibility that 
makes it possible for us to carry on with our daily affairs‖ (Ortega 2008, 70). Tiger Woods, to 
use Ortega‘s example, is multi-cultural and multi-racial, although he is not marginalized on the 
basis of class nor does he identify (at least publicly) with African-American culture; instead he 
is able, due to his robust familiarity with Anglo-American cultural norms and values, to tacitly 
rely on them for his everyday activities and narrative continuity in his sense of self. This is not 
to suggest in any way that African-Americans are not oppressed on the basis of race, class, sex, 
gender, etc., (or that African-Americans do not experience some sense of cultural discontinuity) 
but that what is involved in part of the definition of ―postcolonial‖ I am suggesting is a sense in 
which daily life is structured by a significant element of rupture or discontinuity due to 
different cultural norms and standards.  
 By contrast to English-speaking African-Americans, for instance, Afro-Latin zambos (or 
cafuzos, as in the racial mixture of Amerindian and Afro-descendants from the Atlantic slave 
trade) often lack the expressive resources of the dominant culture to be able to operate pre-
reflectively within it, particularly in Central and South America; Aymara-speaking Afro-
Bolivian women are for this reason a paradigmatic example of postcolonial subjects, and who 
are also subaltern.   
 Moreover, because identities are never fixed and static and can change over time, my use of the 
term also carries a gradation component, whereby it is acknowledged that, as Ortega writes, 
―the longer I have to exist in my new culture/place, the more I might become accustomed to the 
norms and practices of the dominant group and the more transparent those practices may 
become, to the point that they may be part and parcel of our everyday experience‖ (70).  For 
instance, as an immigrant from Latin America from age 11, my degree of comfort and ease with 
different cultural understandings was radically less than it is now as a Latina academic writing 
in English and with privileged access to academic culture, and the social standing that 
accompanies it. Yet, because I often still inhabit social contexts shaped by Latin American 
cultural practices, there remain ways in which I experience contradictions, tensions, and lapses 
when faced with everyday, Anglo-American cultural norms and understandings. But while I 
still suffer a degree of marginalization (particularly in mainstream Anglophone philosophy) as a 
Latina, I was never, nor am I now, ‗subaltern‘.  
 The crucial point to make here, in which I follow Ortega, is a rejection of the idea that this sort 
of cultural assimilation (whether on a full scale or to a lesser extent) is indeed ―natural and 
inevitable,‖ (71) as such a notion is structured by a developmental model of progress over time. 
One does not simply ‗arrive‘ and stay within this cultural understanding, as the temporality of 
postcolonial subjects is not linear on account of having to continually shift –or ―travel,‖ as 
Maria Lugones describes—between different cultural contexts. Finally, a large part of why I 
was able to learn many of the different social norms and standards of Anglo-American culture 
is that I spoke Spanish, which, as a European language with certain Western assumptions built-
in (such as subject-predicate grammar, exclusionary subject-object dualisms, etc.) provided 
many points of compatibility and reference. What, then, of native Amerindian speakers whose 
languages are structured by very different hermeneutic horizons? What of the violations of 
those horizons by European colonialism? Although I take up this question in chapter two with 
respect to native Amerindian languages, the question of how the hermeneutic horizon of Afro-
decedents was also shattered, in addition to the Amerindian, is an added layer of complexity 
that needs to be taken into account, but which exceeds the present scope of this work.  
 
6
  It is important to note that more recent Continental views of language (post 1960), which 
inherit many of the basic features of hermeneutic thought, are generally more heterogeneous 
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and shaped by multiple philosophic traditions, most notably structuralism, post-structuralism, 
deconstruction and post-modernism. This diversity of viewpoints means that it is altogether 
possible to be a Continental thinker and not employ, what I have been calling, a ―Continental 
view of language.‖ A Continental thinker shaped by hermeneutic thought, for example, may 
still retain a reductive, structural view of language that relies on a universal conception of 
reason, as is the case of the critical theorist, Jürgen Habermas. Thinkers situated within post-
modern traditions can also fall within this framework, as Roland Barthes‘ ‗new criticism‘ or 
Roman Jakobson‘s structural linguistics show. 
 
7
  As Jill Buroker explains, Descartes‘ influence in this tradition can be seen, specifically, ―in the 
view that thought is prior to language, that words are merely external, conventional sings of 
independent, private mental states. On this view, strictly speaking, linguistic utterances signify 
the thoughts occurring in the speaker‘s mind. Although the association between words and 
ideas is conventional and thus arbitrary, language can signify thought insofar as both are 
articulated systems: there is a correlation between the structure of a complex linguistic 
expression and the natural structure of the ideas it expresses‖ (1996, xxiii). 
 
8
  By the term ‗text,‘ Gadamer does not mean simply logographic, written artifacts. For him,  
―‗text‘ must be understood as a hermeneutical concept. This implies that the text is not regarded 
from the perspective of grammar and linguistics, and as divorced from any content that they 
might have; that is, that it is not to be viewed as an end product the production of which is the 
object of an analysis whose intent is to explain the mechanism that allows language as such to 
function at all. From the hermeneutical standpoint…the text is a mere intermediate product 
[Zwischenprodukt], a phase in the event of understanding‖ that coincides with interpreting 
worldly contexts, acts, and practices‖ (1986, 389). 
 
9
  The view of language as providing ―finite means‖ for ―infinite possibilities‖ of linguistic 
expression comes from Wilhelm von Humboldt, whom Chomsky also credits, not without 
controversy, with an instrumental view of language. The actual passage from Humboldt‘s On 
Language reads as follows: ―but the procedure of language is not simply one whereby a single 
phenomenon comes about; it must simultaneously open up the possibility of producing an 
indefinable host of such phenomena, and under all the conditions that thought prescribes. For 
language is quite peculiarly confronted by an unending and truly boundless domain, the essence 
of all that can be thought. It must therefore make infinite employment of finite means, and is 
able to do so through the power which produces identity of language and thought. But this also 
necessarily implies that language should exert its effect in two directions at once, in that it first 
proceeds outwards to the utterance, but then also back again to the powers that engender it‖ 
(2000, 91, my emphasis). 
 
10
 The claim here is certainly not universal—that all philosophers of language in this tradition 
subscribe to the precepts of Chomskian generative grammar—or meant to gloss over the 
important differences between them; it merely draws on the assertion of a common conceptual 
heritage drawn from the rise of scientific objectivism in modern thought. The much stronger 
claim, as Chris Lawn argues in his comparative analysis of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, is that ―philosophy of language is disguised philosophy of mind. The analytic 
philosopher‘s interest in language is not to language for its own sake but in its capacity to 
expose the various dimensions of the mind‖ (9). 
 
11
 In On the Distinction between Poetic and Communicative Uses of Language (1985), Jürgen 
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Habermas draws such a distinction in support of (John Searle‘s interpretation of) John Austin‘s 
speech-act theory, criticizing Jacques Derrida‘s attempt to call ―the usual distinctions between 
serious and simulated, literal and metaphorical, everyday and fictional, and customary and 
parasitic modes of speech‖ into question (384).  For Habermas, the attempt to collapse these 
boundaries ―dulls the sword of the critique of reason‖ and opens the floodgate for 
misunderstandings between speakers, as well as—perhaps more importantly— for coercive acts 
of speech communication (where an interlocutor is ‗tricked‘ into agreement based on 
manipulated or distortive language) (399).  To be more specific, the worry, on Habermas‘ 
account, is that saying things like ―I promise‖ in a poem or a play effectively neutralizes what 
Austin calls the ―illocutionary‖ aspect of the speech-act—it‘s ability to function as such, as a 
‗real‘ promise that guarantees to other social actors the validity contained in the performance of 
that utterance. Without this guarantee, language can have little ‗action-coordinating‘ effects 
between speakers and can pose a threat to the emancipatory capacity of critical reason against 
ideology.  The distinction must be made because, at day‘s end, one cannot pose a counterfactual 
to a poem, nor beg a reason from a song. As we‘ll see in chapter two, this distinction between 
figural and literal language did not exist in Amerindian languages, and was instead imported 
from the West.  
 
12
 For Descartes, ―reason is a universal instrument‖ that can guide us to epistemic certainty, 
provided one makes ―a firm and constant resolution not even once to fail to observe‖ a finite set 
of rules of discovery; it is ―the strict adherence to these few precepts‖—to method—that 
underlies infallible knowledge for Descartes (Discourse on Method II, 18-19). The universal 
character of method renders the world, as a possible domain of knowledge, transparent, for, as 
limited, finite beings we can nonetheless inquire into ―all the things that can fall within human 
knowledge‖ in such a way that ―there cannot be any [truths] that are so remote that they are not 
eventually reached nor so hidden that they are not discoverable‖ by us (ibid). Under this view, 
individuals, and not the language they tacitly employ, are in control. Consider, for example, 
Leibniz‘ position in The Art of Discovery (1685) that language ―is the greatest instrument of 
reason,‖ that ―the only way to rectify our reasonings is to make them as tangible as those of the 
mathematicians, so that we can find our error at a glance, and when there are disputes among 
persons, we can simply say: Let us calculate (calculemus), without further ado, to see who is 
right" (1951, 50).  In Truth and Method, Gadamer critiques this notion of calculative method as 
providing the infallible foundation for truth (i.e., by rendering its acquisition a matter of 
objective procedures and rational principles). For Gadamer, what is at stake between these two 
traditions of viewing language is the way in which (1) language and knowledge are related and 
(2) how that relation informs our understanding of our life-world and lived experience 
(Erleibnis). As Gadamer explains:   ―That the ideal of scientific knowledge, which modern 
science follows, came out of the model of nature as mathematically ordered (a model that was 
first developed by Galileo in his mechanics) meant that the linguistic interpretation of the 
world, that is, the experience of the world that is linguistically sedimented in the lived-world, 
no longer formed the point of departure and the point of reference for the formulation of 
questions or the desire of knowledge; rather, it means that the essence of science was 
constituted by that which could be accounted for, or analyzed by, rational laws‖ (1986, 385). 
 
13
 Man, then, is a being that has language, not as a tool, but as a basic condition for their nature. 
In Poetry, Language, Thought, Heidegger explains: ―Man is said to have language by nature.  It 
is held that man, in distinction from plant and animal, is the living being capable of speech. 
This statement does not mean only that, along with other faculties, man also possesses the 
faculty of speech.  It means to say that only speech enables man to be the living being he is as 
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man‖ (187). To put it otherwise: ―where there is understanding, there is not translation but 
speech‖ (TM, 386). That is to say, when things (including us) present themselves ―as‖ the kinds 
of things that they/we are, understanding has already taken place; to try and point to language 
as ‗discoverable‘ is to somehow try and stand outside of it, and this, in turn, would be to try and 
‗step out‘ of our hermeneutic situation. Again, any experience we undergo is always already 
colored by a hermeneutic situation— a socio-historical, cultural, and linguistic context that is 
bound up with lived experience (Erlebnis) and provides the background for intelligibility, for 
‗making sense‘ of things. Thus, we begin to differentiate hermeneutic conversation from 
instrumental conversation by first recognizing that it is on the basis of being thrown (geworfen) 
into a shared situation that human beings make sense of things through being routinely engaged 
in familiar, public practices, rituals, and institutions. This shared situation allows things to 
―emerge-into-being‖ as such, including things like ‗speaking‘ itself, so that conversations (even 
a simple question-answer exchange) are already complex cultural practices rooted in particular 
traditions. 
 
14
 As Taylor explains, ―Something is expressed when it is embodied in such a way as to be made 
manifest. And ‗manifest‘ must be taken here in the strong sense. Something is made manifest 
when it is directly available for all to see,‖ which is different from ―when there are just signs of 
its presence‖ or when we can ―infer that [something] is there,‖ like when you infer that ―you are 
in your office because your car being parked outside‖ (1985, 219). 
 
15
 It is important to note that when we understand spoken conversation from the hermeneutic 
perspective, a number of crucial implications for interpersonal dialogue arise. The first is the 
possibility that certain forms of ‗conversation,‘ by virtue of the matter at hand, are going to 
constrain or limit the genuineness of the conversation. On Gadamer‘s view, ―the more genuine 
a conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner‖ (TM, 385). Business 
negotiations and conversations one has with a therapist are two such examples. In a business 
negotiation, the conversation is limited by the objective aims and partial interests of the 
speakers: one listens in order to find a way to negotiate or undermine the appeals of the other in 
favor of one‘s own interests. In a therapeutic setting, such as a patient speaking to their 
psychotherapist, what can count as talk is guided in advance by the diagnostic paradigm used to 
frame the therapist‘s questions. What the patient can say in response is thus limited, not only on 
account of the question asked, but on account that the therapist is not really listening openly, 
but only fishes for a diagnosis in the patient‘s descriptions. The second important implication, 
already suggested above, is the possibility that the person with whom one is conversing can 
always be ‗right‘ in his or her opinions, that ―what is to be grasped is the substantive rightness 
of his [or her] opinions‖ (387, emphasis added). Because both speakers come into the 
conversation with background prejudices and assumptions (without which, both would be at a 
loss of what to say),  ―the important thing [in conversation] is to be aware of one‘s own bias‖ so 
that what the other has to say ―can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth 
against one‘s own fore-meanings‖ (271-72). In a well-known passage, Gadamer insists: ―we 
cannot stick blindly to our own fore-meaning about the thing if we want to understand the 
meaning of another…All that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the other 
person or text‖ (271). The extent and nature of this ‗openness‘ towards the (culturally different) 
Other will be critically engaged in chapter three.  
 
16
 In order to differentiate between objective propositional statements (which correspond to 
objective states of affairs in the empirical world) and subjective ones like moods or personal 
tastes, Habermas subdivides the linguistically-constituted realm of experience into three 
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‗worlds‘. Using Karl Popper‘s terms, he calls them:  ―1. The objective world (as the totality of 
all entities about which true statements are possible); 2. The social world (as the totality of all 
legitimately regulated interpersonal relations); 3. The subjective world (as the totality of the 
experiences of the speaker to which he has privileged access)‖ (1984, 100). 
 
17
 Habermas‘ philosophic program of ―universal pragmatics‖ is thus based on the universal 
character of the (structural) forms of rule-based argumentation and not on any claim of the 
universal validity of cultural norms and standards. For Habermas, ―the circle of intersubjective 
recognition that forms around cultural values does not yet in any way imply a claim that they 
would meet with general assent within a culture, not to mention universal assent‖ (1984, 20). 
 
18
 For his part, Habermas cannot accept, as Guignon explains that, ―the prior articulation of the 
world in language is so all-encompassing that there is no exit from the maze of language. We 
cannot encounter a world as it is in itself, untouched by the constituting activity of linguistic 
schematizations‖ (1986, 119) the same way Gadamer, by is own admission, cannot disentangle 
himself from the ―romantic tradition of the humanities and its humanistic heritage‖ that help 
situate his philosophical perspective and positions (1983, 381). 
 
19
 He continues: ―I [have] become acutely aware of just how much I am caught up, one might say, 
in the tradition of German Romantic and post-Romantic philosophy. I live, as it were, in a 
closed horizon of problems and lines of questioning, which still understands itself to be 
philosophy, and which recognizes neither a social-scientific nor a skeptical questioning of 
philosophy itself‖ (ibid). 
 
20
 See also her influential ―Feminism and Hermeneutics,‖ Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist 
Philosophy, vol. 8 no.1 (winter 1993): 81-98 and ―Discourse Ethics and Feminist Dilemmas of 
Difference,‖ in Feminist Readings of Habermas: Gendering the Subject of Discourse, ed. 
Johanna Meehan (New York: Routledge, 1995): 247-261. 
 
21
 The term predates Warnke‘s use; for other uses see, for example, Nancy Theriot, ―The Politics 
of Meaning-Making: Feminist Hermeneutics, Language, and Culture‖ in Sexual Politics and 
Popular Culture, ed. Diane Raymond (Bowling Green State University Press, 1990): 3-14, and 
Feminist Hermeneutics: Papers presented at the Feminist Biblical Hermeneutics Workshop in 
Bangalore, India, eds. Lalrinawmi Ralte and Evangelne Anderson (ISPCK, 2002). 
 
22
 There is a great amount of contention regarding the degree to which Pre-Columbian thought 
and traditions, despite colonization, still exist. Angel Rama, for instance, holds that European 
colonization did not prevent many aspects of indigenous cultures ―from surviving quietly to 
infiltrate the conquering culture later,‖ (1996, 2), and Walter Mignolo bases a more robust 
account of cultural resilience on the oral quality of native Amerindian culture, holding that, due 
to paratactic and polysemous qualities, ―oral language and orality cannot be suppressed‖ (1989, 
65). A hermeneutic perspective challenges this notion of ‗surviving fragments‘ insofar as the 
background web of shared social practices that gave meaning to those fragments is irretrievably 
gone through colonization, and so, like armless Greek statutes in metropolitan museums, 
indigenous practices apart from their contexts are simply just pottery shards in anthropology 
collections, or rain dances in gymnasiums. These ‗fragments‘ make sense in Western terms 
(e.g., as ethnohistories or displays of multiculturalism in social-democratic societies) and 
cannot call up their original contexts of use. I take a middle approach. First, I argue that the 
assumption modern Amerindians simply ‗grew‘ into a Western understanding of being (by 
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virtue, for example, of speaking Spanish) is misguided (there are over 40 million peoples in the 
Americas that still speak native languages)—that in fact, these practices were inscribed by 
force, were traumatic on physical and epistemic levels, and as a consequence did not neatly 
settle into an unproblematic, ‗ongoing historical tradition‘. Second, while the monolithic effects 
of colonialism cannot be denied on many levels (social, political, institutional, etc.,), the 
amount of Pre-Columbian cultural ‗fragments‘ that exist number to such a great extent they 
themselves, over time, have formed a backdrop against which postcolonial life makes sense (or 
against which postcolonials make sense of their worldly experiences). The consequence should 
be clear: postcolonials often dwell ―in a constant state of mental nepantilism‖ or in-between-
ness that cannot be adequately articulated or expressed because their resources of expression 
have also been colonized (Anzaldúa 1987, 100). 
 
23
 Feminists committed to a physicalist or materialist interpretation of the body as the primary 
basis for understanding women‘s oppression, generally speaking, find it difficult to accept 
Butler‘s account of the subject out of fear of reducing the gendered victim of battery, poverty, 
rape, illiteracy and discrimination to a mere ‗discursive effect‘ disconnected from bodily harm. 
Without necessarily relying on materialist commitments, the question of how one would 
practically go about petitioning for political rights on the basis of an absent body, or worse, a 
‗rhetorically-constructed body‘ undergirds some feminists‘ larger concerns (Bordo 1992). 
 
24
 We should be reminded of the ways in which philosophers in the Continental philosophic 
tradition have also used difficult prose, yet with perhaps less resistance; Heidegger, for 
instance, makes the memorable claim that ―with regard to the awkwardness and ‗inelegance‘ of 
expression in the analyses to come, we may remark that it is one thing to give a report in which 
we talk about entities, but another to grasp entities in their Being. For the latter task we lack not 
only most of the words but, above all, the „grammar‟ (1967, 39, my emphasis). 
 
25
 Irene Silverblatt and Jorge Klor De Alva have given similar examples of mimicry and 
misappropriation as a form of contact-era indigenous resistance in the Americas (2004; 1992). 
 
26
 Hélène Cixous has also echoed this position, arguing that a ―woman must put herself into the 
text --as into the world and into history --by her own movement. The future must no longer be 
determined by the past. I do not deny that the effects of the past are still with us. But I refuse to 
strengthen them by repeating them, to confer upon them an irremovability the equivalent of 
destiny… writing is precisely the very possibility of change, the space that can serve as a 
springboard for subversive thought, the precursory movement of a transformation of social and 
cultural structures‖ (1975, 33). 
 
27
 What this example does not address, however, is that problems of social violence often involve 
multiple oppressions marked by complex intersections of racial, sexual, and linguistic 
vulnerabilities, but which may not be readily articulable at the level of official culture. In a 
culturally asymmetrical speaking situation, indigenous women‘s voices may be put under 
erasure in ways that cannot be easily accounted for through traditional frameworks of 
understanding social oppression. Consequently, solutions and collective practices for social 
change may emerge which, because they do not speak to or address these complex issues, prove 
ineffective or, in the long run, reify neo-colonial practices of exclusion, especially towards 
women and other marginalized groups. Part of the answer, then, involves increased 
attentiveness to both the powerful asymmetries that exist between differently situated speakers 
in culture as well as to how those differences are shaped by history.  
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28
 Bernstein‘s alternative, I find, is equally problematic or unhelpful for colonial situations, as it 
simply gestures towards Habermas‘ concern for removing all forms of oppression and 
domination from discursive situations. He writes: ―Gadamer sometimes writes as if it is always 
possible to engage in undistorted dialogue. But here I think Habermas has been much more 
realistic and penetrating about ‗systematically distorted communication‘ … it is Habermas who 
stresses the social and political conditions that are required if we are to engage in the type of 
hermeneutical understanding of different cultures‖ (39). The lacunae here is that even if the 
social and political conditions for freely performing criticizable utterances are secured, many 
modern Amerindians must still use the alphabet to communicate their needs, wants, and desires. 
Of course, Habermas‘ point is that what secures equitable dialogue are not words, their syntax, 
or even the morphemes that comprise them; what secures equitable dialogue are the structures 
of rationality he believes to be implicit in the argumentative structures of communicative 
utterances. Form this, it follows that for Habermas, intercultural communication is always (at 
least in principle) possible because ―adult members of primitive tribal societies can acquire 
basically the same formal operations as the members of modern societies, even though the 
higher-level competences appear less frequently and more selectively in them‖ (1984,44-5). 
 
29
 Other influences include George Balandier‘s seminal article, ―La Situation Coloniale: 
Approche Théorique,‖ Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, ix, 1951: 44-79, as well as 
Edmundo O‘Gorman‘s The Invention of America: An Inquiry into the Historical Nature of the 
New World and the Meaning of Its History (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1961) and Leopoldo 
Zea‘s Discurso desde la marginación y la barbarie (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1988). 
 
30
 In the 1492 original: ―cuando bien conmigo pienso muy esclarecida Reina: y pongo delante los 
ojos el antigüedad de todas las cosas: que para nuestra recordación y memoria quedaron 
escritas: una cosa hallo y saco por conclusion muy cierta: que siempre la lengua fue compañera 
del imperio: y de tal manera lo siguió: que juntamente comenzaron, crecieron, y florecieron, y 
después junta fue la caída de entrambos y dejadas agora las cosas muy antiguas que apenas 
tenemos una imagen y sombra de la verdad‖. 
 
31
 Although he also draws from historical linguistics, Mignolo puts forth a concept of language 
that is broader than Western semantic theory. He writes: ―Amerindian languages are also tied 
up with territoriality, if by territoriality we understand a sense of being and belonging beyond 
the administrative and legal apparatus by which the land is owned by a handful of 
people…[rather] it is in and by language that territories are created (or invented) ... recent 
investigation on the ethnography of speaking has shown that the customs and traditions of 
communities are imbedded in their own linguistic tradition‖ (1995, 66-7, my emphasis). 
 
32
 Interestingly, Hegel bestows a more privileged cognitive status to blacks than native 
Amerindians: ―the weakness of the American physique was a chief reason for bringing the 
negroes to America, to employ their labor in the work that had to be done in the New World; 
for the negroes are far more susceptible to European culture than the Indians, and an English 
traveler has adduced instances of negroes having become competent clergymen, medical men, 
etc., while only a single native was known to him whose intellect was sufficiently developed to 
enable him to study, but who had died soon after beginning, through excessive brandy-
drinking‖ (82). One reason for this may have to do with the long history of cultural contact with 
Africans through the Northern centers of classical learning, like Alexandria. Despite this, as is 
well known, Hegel does not credit Africans with ‗history‘ proper. 
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33
 The Spanish chronicler Tomás de Torquemada (1420-1498), for instance, observed that ―one of 
the things which causes the most confusion in a republic and which greatly perplexes those who 
wish to discuss its causes, is the lack of precision with which they consider their history; for if 
history is an account of events which are true and actually happened and those who witnessed 
them and learned about them neglected to preserve the memory of them, it will require an effort 
to write them down after they have happened, and he who wishes to do so will grope in the dark 
if he tries, for he may spend all his life collating the version which he is told only to find that at 
the end of it he still has not unraveled the truth. This (or something like this) is what happens in 
this history of New Spain, for just as the ancient inhabitants did not have letters, or were even 
familiar with them, so they neither left records of their history‖ (qtd. in Mignolo 1989, 76, my 
emphasis). 
 
34
 This is not to be confused with noun substitution based on social categories or secondary 
meanings, such as using the noun ―pauper‖ in a sentence to substitute for the meaning ―one 
who is a very poor person or without means‖. There are simply no absolute nouns in Nahuatl. 
 
35
 This is different, as Maffie explains, from ―Zoroastrian and Manichean-style dualisms,‖ which 
see the binaries such as light/dark, life/death as ―mutually contradictory‖, or supplant them with 
the idea that ―at the end of history, one or the other…will or ought to defeat‖ the other. Under 
Nepantla processes, Nahua dualisms ―alternate endlessly and interdependently without 
resolution,‖ as ―it rejects as foolish the ideas that life is inherently good and that death is 
inherently evil…it rejects as equally foolish the quest for eternal life‖ (15). 
 
36
 Moreover, it might be argued that because members of religious orders, in the early period of 
colonization, held possession of the instruments of teaching alphabetic literacy, native 
Amerindians could not themselves appropriate these instruments in their particular contexts of 
use, as ―the Synod of 1555 formally forbade the ordination of mestizos, Indians, and negroes‖ 
into religious orders (Abbot 1996, 43). Joan Rappaport extends this concern by arguing 
―mnemonics gave way to alphabetic literacy, not because the latter was [morally and 
epistemelogically] superior, but because its inception in America was accompanied by the 
spread of legal ideology, born of colonial domination and carried by the written word‖ (2004, 
286). 
 
37
 A striking example comes from the vast number of supplicant letters sent to King Philip II; one 
such letter, written by council members in the Nahua town of Huejotzingo, pleads for 
intervention form the abuses of local Spanish authorities: ―Our Lord sovereign, you the king 
don Felipe…may you hear these our words…so that you will exercise on us your rulership to 
console us and aid us in [this trouble] with which daily we weep and are sad. We are afflicted 
and sore pressed, and your town and city of Huejtozingo is as if it is about to disappear and be 
destroyed…[the old governor] told us many times he would help us and inform you of all the 
ways in which we have aided and served you…But perhaps before you he forgot us. How then 
shall we speak? We did not reach you, we were not given audience before you. Who then will 
speak for us? Unfortunate are we. Therefore now we place ourselves before you, our sovereign 
lord...your poor vassals who bow down humbly to you from afar…(157-58).‖ Consider now, to 
return to our earlier example, Rigoberta Menchú‘s plea for intervention, and her attempt to give 
an account of violence against her community five centuries later: ―In Guatemala, this is what 
happens with the poor, especially Indians...The Indian can‘t speak up for what he wants...There 
is what we call the mayor who represents the authorities which administer justice when they 
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say someone has broken the law…to see the mayor you have to get witnesses, sign papers and 
give him a mordida [bribe] so he will support your case. To see the ‗governor‘ you need not 
only witnesses from the village, and money, but also lawyers or other intermediaries to talk for 
you…as he‘ll only believe something if a lawyer or educated person says it…the most 
distressing thing for us was not being able to speak‖ (103-110). 
 
38
 In this respect, Foucauldian analyses of culture have been particularly helpful in Latin America 
for their ability to speak to ―the historical contents that have been buried and disguised‖ by the 
―established regimes of thought,‖ regimes which range from Eurocentric interpretive 
frameworks to neoliberal economic practices and globalization (1980, 81). 
 
39
 See Caryl Emerson‘s Rethinking Bakhtin (1997) and The First Hundred Years of Mikhail 
Bakhtin (2000). While many Bakhtin scholars cite Todorov alone, by and large, most Kristeva 
scholars describe a simultaneous or ‗co-introduction‘ to Western audiences. 
 
40
 A notable exception concerns Toril Moi‘s references to Bakhtin, which, although brief and 
passing, are stronger than most: ―Kristeva‘s own linguistic and psycho-linguistic work in the 
late 1960‘s and early 1970‘s can be said to be produced as a result of her active dialogue with 
Bakhtin‘s texts‖ (1997, 34). 
 
41
 Responding to Ross Guberman‘s question as to which of her works has been the most 
personally and intellectually rewarding, Kristeva cites her autobiographical novel, The Old Man 
and The Wolves, as the most influential. The book left a ―deep impression‖ on Kristeva 
―because it enabled me to reveal a part of the secret of my profound debt to my father and to 
suffering in Bulgaria‖ (1996, 238). As for the reference to religion as an expression of ―a small 
space of freedom,‖ Kristeva is most likely referring to the repression of Eastern Orthodox 
culture during communist rule—a repression whose antithesis shows up in her own work 
through a psychoanalytically-inflected interest in Byzantine religious art, architecture, and 
Renaissance paintings (see ―Giotto‘s Joy‖ and ―Motherhood According to Giovanni Bellini‖ in 
Desire and Language). 
 
42
 According to Bakhtin, the French Renaissance writer François Rabelais typifies the breach of 
carnivalesque discourse into traditional literary discourse by utilizing grotesque realism, sexual 
puns and highly unconventional syntax. Kafka‘s absurdist narratives or Dostoevsky‘s multi-
voiced, deeply layered character structure are also examples. 
 
43
 Some critics, like Patricia Yaeger, would perhaps disagree with this claim, emphasizing instead 
Bakhtin‘s early Kantian influences and his ‗philosophy of action‘.  She argues, for example, 
that ―for Bakhtin the source of unrest within the subject does not come from the unconscious, 
from the drives, from repression, or even from a revised Hegelian negativity, as it does for 
Kristeva, but from the communicative revision of consciousness itself, through the self‟s 
capacity to see other languages „through the eyes of another language‟‖ (1986, 252, my 
emphasis). I think Bakhtin moves significantly away from this notion in his later works. In my 
opinion, his early interest in Kantianism was due in part to intellectual restrictions on any kind 
of idealist philosophy in Stalinist Russia. This is well documented by Bakhtin scholars like 
Michael Holquist. Another problem, for both Yaeger and myself, is that the working conditions 
under which Bakhtin wrote made it difficult, if not impossible for him to sustain the 
development of his ideas in a more unified manner, one that, while not advocating pure 
‗systematization,‘ would have given his audience a chance to see his heterodox and novel 
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synthesis of different intellectual traditions worked out more robustly. Finally, there is what 
Caryl Emerson and Sue Vice have called ‗the problem of the canon‘— the fact that not all of 
Bakhtin‘s works currently attributed to him may be his. Despite this, I find strong evidence for 
this comparison in Bakhtin‘s concept of language as ―dialogized heteroglossia‖ and the 
supporting descriptions of carnival as capable of producing a plurality of meanings 
(heteroglossia). 
 
44
 A major shortcoming of this translation, as Kelly Oliver points out, is the lack of 
disambiguation between the Symbolic and the symbolic modality within the Symbolic (1993, 
9). 
 
45
 This ‗unfinishedness‘ can bee seen, again, as a Bakhtinian inflection into psychoanalytic 
theory.  
 
46
 Kristeva views this struggle between conscious and unconscious forces as the key element of 
Freudian drive theory. In a Hegelian interpretation, Kristeva insists that ―what interests us is the 
materialist dialectic he thereby establishes, hence the heteronomy of drives—not their 
dichotomy‖ because these struggles and tensions are productive; that is to say, the ―repeated 
scissions‖ and ―successive shocks of drive activity produce the signifying function‖ as such 
(1984, 167). 
 
47
 The term ‗Symoblic‘ to designate a kind of social structure comes from Lévi-Strauss (1949, 
1951), and is taken up by Lacan.  
 
48
 Oliver refers to this two-fold approach as ―Kristeva‘s double strategy for bringing the speaking 
body back into structuralism: putting symbolic logic within the body, and putting semiotic 
bodily drives within the Symbolic‖ (1993, 4). 
 
49
 Kristeva goes on to claim that the oscillating symbiosis between the semiotic and the symbolic 
can be seen in modern genetic theory. It can be ―represented,‖ in other words, ―in the 
configuration of the DNA and RNA molecule as a tetrad or as a double helix, as the 
configuration of the DNA and RNA molecule makes the semiotized body a place of permanent 
scission‖  (27). 
 
50
 For some scholars, there are possible reservations about relying on ideas imported from outside 
Latin America to address problems brought about, historically, by the very importation of non-
Amerindian conceptual frameworks into Latin America. In fact, one of the main concerns 
throughout twentieth century liberation movements was to weigh the impact of European 
social, economic, and political frameworks in Latin American culture, often resulting in the 
rejection of these frameworks in favor of a cultural identification with a Pre-Columbian or 
indigenous heritage. In 1979, for example, the Nicaraguan Frente Sandinista de Liberación 
Nacional (FSLN) called for a ―revolution in culture‖ alongside strategic armed revolt, arguing 
for the need to ―rescue progressive intellectuals and their works‖ from a kind of Western, ―neo-
colonial penetration in our culture‖ (cited in Marcus 1985, 16-17). The irony, of course, is that 
in this effort liberation fronts frequently employed totalizing notions of cultural identity to fit a 
desired identification with the party vanguard (Schutte 1993). In this particular case, 
Nietzsche‘s anti-essentialist conceptual framework can be seen as a positive counterthrust to 
essentialist identity politics in Latin America. 
 
194 
 
 
51
 See, for example, Benigno Trigo‘s Foucault in Latin America: Appropriations and 
Deployments of Discursive Analysis (Routledge, 2001). 
 
52
 I have used the following abbreviations for referencing Nietzsche‘s texts: A = The Antichrist, 
BT = The Birth of Tragedy, D = Daybreak, E = Writings from the Early Notebooks, EH = Ecce 
Homo, GM = The Genealogy of Morals, GS= The Gay Science, HH = Human, All Too Human, 
L = Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, LN = Writings from the Late Notebooks, OTL = 
On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, PT = On the Pathos of Truth, RL= Lectures on 
Ancient Rhetoric, TI = Twilight of the Idols, UM = Untimely Meditations, Z = Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. Citations refer to page numbers of cited editions. 
 
53
 Here we come upon a long-standing criticism in Nietzsche interpretation which holds that, 
behind his critique of normative values, Nietzsche himself held a normative value-system based 
on health and amplification— on the ―ascending‖ form of life, for instance. The first thing to 
say is Nietzsche did not think it was possible to have a value-free, criterion-less attitude or 
stance in life because we are foremost historically-situated beings already nested in value-laden 
contexts. Language—and what language draws out as the ―mattering-to-us‖ (LN 109)— is one 
example. The question for Nietzsche is: to what extent are these earlier interpretations unduly—
perhaps unutterably— restrictive for individuals? What I want to suggest here is that for 
Nietzsche, the normative criterion of ascending and declining health are not literal, but in many 
ways reflective of his concern for the narrowing of options in culture, and what this signifies 
for an individual wishing to overcome and speak about those restrictions. He is clear to say, for 
instance, that  ―every heightening of man brings with it an overcoming of narrower 
interpretations; that every increase in strength and expansion of power opens up new 
perspectives and demands a belief in new horizons—this runs through my writings (L 80, 
second emphasis mine)‖. In a deeper sense, if one were to then ask why it is ‗life‘—whether 
ascending or decadent—that is chosen as the ultimate criterion, we would quickly be reminded 
of his oft-quoted claim that life needs no justification. To posit a justification is to continue to 
evaluate life at the epistemic level. As knowledge, Nietzsche wishes to  ―leave [these] 
distinctions to those epistemologists who have got tangled up in the snares of grammar,‖ even 
to ―folk metaphysicians‖ concerned with the nature of reality and human perception; in the end, 
he writes, ―we simply have no organ for knowing, for ‗truth‘: we ‗know‘ (or believe to imagine) 
exactly as much as is useful to the human herd, to the species: and even what is here called 
‗usefulness‘ is finally also just a belief, a fiction, and perhaps just that supremely fatal stupidity 
of which we some day will perish‖ (GS 214). 
 
54
 By ‗we‘ here, Nietzsche does not mean the individual in terms of intentional acts. Rather, the 
‗we‘ refers to the social and historical communities we grow into. This will be outlined further 
in the next section on the social dimension of language. 
 
55
 For Nietzsche, it is not necessary to accept these structures as true in themselves in order to still 
rely on them for coherence and the ordering of our speech; we can simply rely on them as 
conventions without also accepting them as foundational to produce the same effect of 
continuity and intelligibility. Thus, for Nietzsche,  ―however habituated‖ a particular ―fiction‖ 
may be, ―that in no way disproves its having been invented: something can be a condition for 
life and nevertheless be false‖ (LN 21, see also BGE 202). After all, Nietzsche writes that ―if 
men had not built houses for their gods, architecture would still be in its infancy‖ (E 228). 
 
195 
 
 
56
 This view is not conventional, as the theme of language is typically not seen as a unifying 
concern in Nietzsche‘s thought, However, as Alan Shrift (the new editor of Stanford University 
Press‘ English translation of the Colli-Montinari Kritische Studienausgabe) has argued, due in 
great deal to issues of translation and accessibility, ―few have related Nietzsche‘s early insights 
into the nature of language to the work of his so-called ‗mature‘ period. More often than not, 
Nietzsche‘s break with the academic world of classical philology is taken to indicate a 
significant turn in the Nietzschean project, dividing his earlier strictly ‗scholarly‘ pursuits from 
his more ‗philosophically‘ significant later work as the revaluer of values and philosopher of 
the Ubermensh and the eternal recurrence. This strict division between the ‗young‘ and the 
‗mature‘ Nietzsche needs to be brought into question, as several of Nietzsche‘s early views on 
language, while no longer pursued as a specific topic of inquiry, reappear throughout the 
entirety of his writings‖ (1990, 123). That said, I would like to stress caution in my own 
‗cohesive‘ narrative of Nietzsche‘s views on language, as Nietzsche is not a systematic thinker 
that can fall under a single, narrative account of ‗what Nietzsche means‘ or ‗believes‘. 
 
57
 Mikhail Bakhtin, who traces the history of nineteenth-century linguistics to the assumption that 
thought emerges independently of communication (thereby producing ―plastic notions of 
speech life‖), would perhaps express Nietzsche‘s claim as the idea that all thought and human 
understanding is inherently dialogical—that ―speech is a necessary condition for reflection, 
even in solitude‖ (1986, 67, my emphasis). For Bakhtin, ―a speaker presupposes not only the 
existence of the language system he is using, but also the existence of preceding utterances—
his own and others‘—with which his given utterance enters into one kind of relation or another 
(builds upon them, polemicizes with them, or simply presumes that they are already known to 
the listener). Any utterance is a link in a very complexly organized chain of other utterances‖ 
(69). 
 
58
 I use the term ‗dialogical‘ in the Bakhtinian sense of an extra-linguistic, social element that 
pervades all speech communication. On such a view, any possible utterance made by a speaker 
is already shaped and guided in advance by a prior network of utterances that allow the new 
utterances to have a particular kind of significance for both speaker and listener; when Bakhtin 
remarks that ―these extra-linguistic (dialogic) aspects also pervade the utterance from within,‖ 
(Bakhtin 1986, 109), he is referring to the dialogical nature of all thought—that even thinking 
in silence requires the previous existence of other speakers (from whom one inherits the 
cultural vocabularies used to formulate utterances in the first place). To be sure, Bakhtin‘s 
notion of the dialogic (which he also applies to literary theory) relies on an abstract, generalized 
‗other‘ rather than a concrete, particular ‗other‘ (as in a specific, conversational partner in 
speech communication or dialogue). 
 
59
 To create new values, one would need the third aspect of spirit‘s metamorphosis: the child. To 
recall, the child signifies ―innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a wheel rolling 
out of itself, a first movement, a sacred yes saying‖ (Z 17). 
 
60
 Although it is the start of a formidable liberational project for the individual, Nietzsche 
suggests that human beings are not radically free. This is because consciousness of one‘s own 
freedom ties us to ―the values of millennia‖; like Zarathustra‘s tree standing alone on the 
mountaintop, having grown beyond humans and animals, ―if it wanted to speak it would have 
no one who understood it‖ (Z 30). Seeking ‗freedom‘ and being ‗free spirited‘ or a free spirit 
are thus different things. While the former seeds psychological efforts that often lead to simple 
value inversions or the adoption of immortality schemes, the latter requires great courage and a 
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series of deep, transformative efforts on the part of the linguistically-nested individual (or 
enunciative subject). It is not a simple task to take up. Neither is it something one ever ‗arrives 
at‘ in a static way. 
 
61
 In a similar vein, Nietzsche asks: ―an assumption may be irrefutable—why should that make it 
true? This proposition may outrage logicians, who posit their limits as the limits of things; but I 
have long since declared war on this optimism of logicians‖ (LN 35). 
 
62
 ―The way people usually are,‖ Nietzsche reminds us, ―it takes a name to make something 
visible at all‖ (GS 151), and, according to him, there has been no shortage of naming in the 
Western intellectual tradition since the rise of Milesian philosophy and Greek reason in Asia 
Minor in the 5
th
 and 6
th
 centuries BCE. Aristotle himself recounts this history (see Metaphysics 
I, 983b, 7). The prejudice of formal naming holds strong in this tradition, Nietzsche tells us, 
because it is undergirded by a conceptual system based on, for example, Aristotelian principles 
of identity and non-contradiction and views of substance that privilege what appears over what 
does not. This, in turn, is also made possible by a prior bifurcation of concepts along 
dichotomies, but where one side of the dichotomy is always valued over the other (as in 
good/evil or light/dark). We are accustomed to drawing our attention to what appears, to what 
‗is‘ the case to the point where, ―to the extent that it is‖—―we can‘t think anything at all‖.  This 
is what Nietzsche is trying to get at here, that centuries of ossified prejudices and assumptions 
have made it extremely difficult for individuals in the modern age to self-legislate because we 
cannot even grasp the extent to which ―the intellectual activity of millennia is set down in 
language‖ (E 128). The things ‗names‘ make visible in the modern age are thus not ‗things‘ at 
all, but rather the sedimented valuations inherited from past epochs—valuations whose original 
relation to truth and meaning are themselves concealed from view: ―whatever is some being‘s 
‗external world‘ consists of a sum of valuations; green, blue, red, hard, soft are inherited 
valuations and their emblems‖ as opposed to ‗facts‘ or objective truths (LN 15). This view is 
echoed in Luce Irigaray‘s assertion that ―language is a product of the sedimentations of 
languages of former eras. It conveys methods of social communication. It‘s neither universal, 
nor neutral, nor intangible. There are no universal linguistic structures in the brain of the 
speaking subject; rather, every era has its specific needs, creates its own ideals, and imposes 
them as such‖ (1993, 30). 
 
63
 This is the case, whether in his early notebooks or throughout late works like Twilight of the 
Idols .  See, in particular, ―The Wanderer and His Shadow‖ where Nietzsche begins with the 
line ― …it is so long since I heard your voice, I would like to give you an opportunity of 
speaking‖ (UM 301-302). 
 
64
 According to Habermas, it also furnishes every individual‘s validity claims (which she can then 
independently accept or reject by taking a ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ position). The passage, in full reads: 
―since moralities are tailored to suit the fragility of human beings individuated through 
socialization, they must always solve two tasks at once. They must emphasize the inviolability 
of the individual by postulating equal respect for the dignity of the individual. But they must 
also protect the web of intersubjective relations of mutual recognition by which these 
individuals survive as members of a community. To these two complementary aspects 
correspond the principles of justice and solidarity respectively. The first postulates equal 
respect and equal rights for the individual, whereas the second postulates empathy and concern 
for the well-being of one‘s neighbor. Justice in the modern sense of the term refers to the 
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subjective freedom of inalienable individuality. Solidarity refers to the well-being of associated 
members of a community who intersubjectively share the same life-world.‖ 
 
65
 To be clear, Nietzsche never relinquishes the importance of the social framework; he only 
objects to its status as the only possible one. However, by not giving up the hermeneutic 
element of our understanding, Nietzsche commits himself to the idea that, while we may gain 
insights into our concrete, corporeal specificity and individuality through attunement to our 
bodies, this will not lead to a clear positing of an autonomous self. For example, he is careful to 
use the word ―penumbra‖ to describe the individual self. This is in keeping with Nietzsche‘s 
anti-foundationalist philosophy. Although the self (whether the Cartesian self or as 
multiplicitous subjects) can never be thought of as true-in-itself, we can nonetheless use the 
concept strategically to live more resilient, affirming lives ‗in spite of‘ the forces that constrain 
us. 
 
66
 Although Nietzsche never develops this at length, he seems to suggest an alternative mode of 
thinking that is pre-lingual and relies heavily on the ―psyche” as a differentiated form of 
incarnate consciousness (LN 113, 133). He terms this ―primal thinking‖ (E 153).  Primal 
thinking is a Dionysian-like phenomenon that gestures towards ―a sphere which is beyond and 
prior to all phenomena‖ (BT 55)—and which can never be properly symbolized through 
denotative language. In his earlier work, art, especially poetry and music, can tap partially into 
this sphere, and can alleviate some of the feeling of being ‗silenced‘ by giving breadth to the 
notion that something can be ―unknowable‖ or ―unspeakable‖ but nonetheless ―felt‖. As his 
well-known quote suggests: ―here, where the danger to his will is greatest, art approaches as a 
saving sorceress, expert in healing‖ (BT 60). However, by the summer of 1877, five years after 
the publication of his Birth of Tragedy and reflecting his turn away from Wagner, Nietzsche 
writes: ―to the readers of my writings I want to declare unequivocally that I have abandoned the 
metaphysico-artistic views that essentially dominate those writings: they are pleasant but 
untenable. If one takes the liberty of speaking in public early one is usually obliged to 
contradict oneself in public soon after‖ (E 228). 
 
67
 In making the distinction between conscious and unconscious realms it is important to note that 
Nietzsche did not bifurcate the two realms along Platonic lines. Just like he does not rule out 
the possibility ―that somewhere else other interpretations than merely human ones may be 
possible‖ (LN 80), Nietzsche does not think the idea of multiple consciousnesses is true in 
itself; it is a perspectival mode of engaging lived experience in the face of our current 
conceptual orthodoxies. 
 
68
 Here, the objection might be raised that even ―unconscious‖ dream life requires interpretive 
frameworks based on historical contexts. We do, after all, talk about the meaning of our dreams 
and attempt to decipher what first appear to be hazy, causally fragmented chains of signs, 
events, and so forth, but which nonetheless can be communicated as such. In talking about a 
dream we had of a nebulous aura or strange alien, for example, we come to see that the 
perceptibility of the alien or nebulae was predicated on our capacity to recognize attributes, 
qualities, and situational cues that allow such images to make sense as those kinds of things 
versus others.  However, the difference comes from Nietzsche‘s emphasis on the primacy of the 
body. It is the body, understood as a kind of incarnate consciousness, that interprets faint 
sounds of ―church bells‖ and recodes the stimuli through various complex physiological 
functions, which, in turn, are themselves interpreted in dream life (D 75). One way I understand 
what Nietzsche means here comes from an experience I had recently. I was away from home 
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and staying in quarters for visiting faculty inside a university student union building. As the 
building was unoccupied at night, it was peculiarly quiet.  One night, I had what appeared to be 
a very strange dream: for what seemed like hours I could perceive no identifiable image or 
memorable impression, like an idea about where I was or how I felt. The dream had only an 
acoustic dimension wherein I heard the same sound over and over. Although I described it as a 
‗drumbeat‘ to my partner when waking, it did not possess those qualities in the dream. I had no 
other means of describing it except in those terms. The sound merely followed a sequence of 
(what I can describe as, post facto) iambic patterns (.—, .—, .—, etc.). It was only on account 
of a sudden arousal that I happened to notice the pattern was in fact, the sound of my own 
heartbeat. 
 
69
 It is important to note that the idea of multiple ‗consciousnesses,‘ or of an ‗unconscious‘ 
dimension, is not original to Nietzsche. Although we can find early traces in Christian 
Platonism and mysticism, historically, it arose in European thought as a response to Cartesian 
philosophy, whether as a reaction to Descartes‘ theory of ideas, or the more general rejection of 
first principles in German Romanticism. [In New Essays Concerning Human Understanding 
(1704), for example, Leibniz gives an account of human volition defined by both perceptible 
and imperceptible inclinations (or ‗volitions‘) in the individual (II, xxi, §39). He writes: 
―Various perceptions and inclinations combine to produce a complete volition: it is the result of 
the conflict among them. There are some, imperceptible in themselves, which add up to a 
disquiet which impels us without our seeing why. There are some which join forces to carry us 
towards or away from some object, in which case there is desire or fear, also accompanied by 
disquiet but not always one amounting to pleasure or displeasure. (1996, 192, my emphasis).] 
However in Nietzsche‘s case, the influence came directly from Schopenhauer‘s notion of the 
unconscious and from German Romantic thought. The latter, particularly through the figures of 
Goethe, Schelling, and Hölderlin, became systematized in Eduard von Hartmann‘s classic 
study, Philosophie des Unbewussten (1869). As Julian Young notes, ―now forgotten, this book 
by someone who took himself to be a disciple of Schopenhauer, enjoyed enormous celebrity in 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century and contributed to the process of making 
Schopenhauer‘s ideas widely known‖ (2005, 241). Although he rejects and criticizes many of 
Hartmann‘s core ideas, this may explain Nietzsche‘s initial interests in his work.  
 
70
 Rhetorically, a trope is a figure of speech or play on words that derives from the Greek tropos, 
meaning a ―turn‖ or ―change‖. Specifically, Nietzsche relied on Aristotle, Quintilian, and 
Cicero as his models for his theory of rhetoric, which he outlined in several lectures given at the 
university of Basel under the titles ―Einletung zur Rhetorik des Aristotles,‖ ―Geschichte der 
griechischen Beredsamkeit,‖ and ―Darstellung der antiken Rhetorik‖. Although Nietzsche‘s 
theory of tropes is intricate and heterodox to his day, as Christian Emden explains, broadly 
speaking, Nietzsche saw rhetoric as an explanatory model capable of ―formulating relationships 
among the external world, physical stimulation, nervous processes, mental representations, and 
knowledge‖ (Emden, 90).To this end, as Emden continues, ―the most important aspect of 
rhetoric—namely, the tropical nature of language—is a form of transference or transposition, 
and metaphor became a master trope for Nietzsche insofar as it accurately describes such a 
transference‖ (2005, 105-106). For the purposes of this chapter, I will focus only on this 
transference aspect of metaphor.  
 
71
 Carol Blair first translated these lectures into English in the 1980s. Although established from 
the original manuscripts in Weimar, William Calder and Anton Bierl took issue with the critical 
aspects of Blair‘s independent 1983 translation, sufficient to promote the publication of a new 
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bilingual edition five years later in 1989: Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, ed. 
and trans. Carole Blair, Sander L. Gilman, and David J. Parent (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989). It is this latter edition which I follow (Hereafter RL). Because of the striking 
similarities of Nietzsche‘s views on language with contemporary French thought, it is also of 
some importance to note the wide availability of these texts in French by the early 1970s, due in 
large part to efforts by Jean-Luc Nancy, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Paul de Man, Gilles 
Deleuze and Michel Foucault. See, for example, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe‘s ―Friedrich 
Nietzsche. Rhétorique et langue: Textes traduits, presénts et annotés,‖ Poetique 5 (1971): 99-
142 and Gilles Deleuze‘s (ed.) Nietzsche: Cahiers du Royaumont, Philosophie No. VI (Paris: 
Editions de Minuit, 1967). The latter is a compilation of important papers given at an 
international conference on Nietzsche held in 1964 in Royaumont, France; participants included 
Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Karl Löwith, Gianni Vattimo, Gabriel Marcel, G. Colli and 
M. Montnari, to name a few. 
 
72
 Although Nietzsche makes well known remarks on individual creation (i.e., that ―in the long 
run it is enough to create new names and valuations and appearances of truth in order to create 
new ‗things‘ ‖ GS 70, my emphasis), what Nietzsche means by ―create‖ is at issue here. 
Nietzsche‘s conception of newness and originality—how we typically think of creation— is not 
what one would expect: ―What is originality? To see something that still has no name; that still 
cannot be named even though it is lying right before everyone‘s eyes‖ (GS 151). Being able to 
call to attention—to ‗diagnose‘— the prejudices in our traditions (without thinking we can 
―wholly free ourselves‖ from them) is the focal point of creative life because it will allow us to 
set up conditions more favorable to a life of freedom— to metamorphosize, with the help of the 
child, from the lion into the free spirit. 
 
73
 That is to say, they are ―based on a physiological process unknown to us, a kind of acquired 
language for designating certain nervous stimuli‖ that does not show up at the level of thought 
or concepts (D 79). This process, as will be explained, is what Nietzsche means in part by 
metaphorical activity. 
 
74
 Examples include Brian Leiter, Helmut Heit, and to a lesser extent, Bernd Magnus. 
 
75
 This distinction informs Nietzsche‘s notion that ―we have to learn to think differently in order 
at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently‖ (D 60). 
 
76
 To put this another way, for Nietzsche, a stimulus is a nervous impulse that has already been 
interpreted, and this is the ―first metaphor;‖ at the conscious level, we transpose the first 
metaphor into the signs and formulas we‘ve grown into, reproducing them in sounds (words), 
and this is the ―second metaphor‖ (OTL 256). Saying the word ―cat‖ is therefore already a 
second-order metaphor shaped by culture. The figurative process does not end there. For 
Nietzsche, ―metaphor means treating as equal something that one has recognized to be similar 
in one point,‖ like treating the concept of a thing as the thing itself (E 160). We thus uncover 
that within this notion of metaphor the concept of metonymy is already hard at work, since 
metonymy operates ―by substituting the name of an object closely associated with a word for 
the word itself‖, like ‗the crown‘ for the ruling monarch (Handbook to Literature, 1999, 319). 
On his view, then, metaphor is a metonymical transference of sorts that happens both within the 
human body and at the level of culture.  It is the latter-stage metonymical transferences 
(codified in grammar) that register, for us, as truth or knowledge, but which are essentially 
metaphors— hence the relationship of truth and language.  This is why, for Nietzsche, ―truths 
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are illusions that are no longer remembered as being illusions, metaphors, that have become 
worn and stripped of their sensuous force, coins that have lost their design and are now 
considered only as metal,‖ as mere words, rather than coins with a specific type of original 
currency and value (OTL 257-58). Thus, although on Nietzsche‘s account, nervous impulses 
undergo a figurative process that eventually leads to the domain of spoken and written 
language, it does not have to lead to written, alphabet-based forms of language by necessity-- 
this is simply a prejudice of Western, logographic culture (RL 23). If we‘ve grown into a 
culture that privileges different forms of linguistic expression, then the second-order metaphor 
will in all likelihood manifest itself differently. An Inuit speaker, for example, might express a 
word through a particular facial expression rather than a sound. In particular, what stays the 
same is ―how concepts are formed: every word immediately becomes a concept precisely 
because it is not intended to serve as a reminder of the unique, entirely individualized primal 
experience to which it owes its existence‖ (OTL 256, my emphasis). No doubt influenced by 
Nietzsche, Heidegger makes a similar point about the nature of language: ―language, as what is 
spoken out and said, and as what can be said again, preserves in each case the being that has 
been opened up. What has been said can be said again and passed on. The truth that is 
preserved in this saying spreads in such a way that the being that was originally opened up in 
gathering is not itself properly experienced in each particular case. In what is passed on, truth 
loosens itself, as it were, from beings. This can go so far that saying-again becomes mere 
hearsay, glossa. Everything that is asserted stands constantly in this danger‖ (Introduction to 
Metaphysics, 198, my emphasis). 
 
 
77
 Nietzsche was careful to observe that in describing language as a metaphoric chain of 
interpretations he did not deploy causal inferences in the strict sense; ―to infer from the nerve 
stimulus the existence of a cause outside us is the result of a false and unjustified application of 
the principle of sufficient reason‖ (OTL 255). 
 
78
 But, as Kofman cautions, we should not interpret Nietzsche‘s notion of metaphor as a new, 
fixed interpretive paradigm for making sense of lived experience, as ―the notion of metaphor is 
itself just a metaphor‖(1993,40). According to her, ―metaphorical activity does not just mean 
anthropomorphism by another name: explanatory schemata express the world improperly, but 
they are no more appropriate to express man. When he uses them to understand himself he is 
still practicing rhetoric, for if man indeed takes what is ‗given‘ to him in order to transpose it 
elsewhere (which is what constituted metaphor), what is given to him has always already been 
tamed by the ‗camera obscura‘ or sifted through consciousness‖ (33). 
 
79
 This is especially difficult to express because the German word Körper is often understood in 
terms of the Cartesian/Newtonian sense of the body as res extensa, of a bounded material thing 
that can be measured and that occupies a determinate place in a spatio-temporal coordinate 
system. This is obviously not what Nietzsche is referring to. 
 
80
 I am indebted to Ofelia Schutte for this point. 
 
81
 For instance, to the extent that Nietzsche‘s interpreting ‗individual‘ is not a traditional subject, 
but rather a version of what Maurice Blanchot calls ―an egoism without an ego‖, it can be 
strategically appropriated by postcolonial theory as a subject of enunciation that places special 
emphasis on the fluid, irreducible movement of life rather than on a substantial essence or 
intentionality. It is in this same vein, I should add, that Ortega also uses select ―Heideggerian 
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elements‖ to theorize the complex experiences of the ―multiplicitous selves‖ despite his (even 
more clearly) problematic politics (2001,17). 
 
82
 Spivak defines this as ―a strategic use of essentialism in a scrupulously visible political 
interest‖.  As was the case in Argentina, for instance, a group of women under the specter of a 
brutal dictatorship may choose to make claims individually and on behalf of each other by 
appealing to their identities as mothers, an identity that historically, in patriarchal cultures, has 
been used to serve as a regulative concept or category over women‘s bodies, one that 
asphyxiates the open range of self-interpretative possibilities they have as beings, but in the 
interests of patriarchal domination and servitude. The women‘s creative strategy to make 
claims as mothers of their murdered or disappeared children, however, was an effective 
political counterthrust to a military regime that operated through intimidation, terror, ‗accidents 
by design‘ and maintained power by censoring all media, banning public protest and organized 
forms of civil unrest. 
 
83
 The term derives from the cultural anthropologist and theorist, Néstor García Canclini‘s Hybrid 
Cultures (2005[1989]). 
 
84
 To avoid comparisons with Greek culture, the image is drawn from the genus, not the Lernaean 
Hydra of Greek mythology.  
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